Homer was wrong in saying: "Would that strife might perish from among gods and men!" He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away.

Heraclitus


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AUTHOR’S NOTE

The general conception of social pluralism presented is derived from the teaching of John Anderson; in developing that conception I proceed, in part, by examining views of such pioneer social theorists as Marx, Michels, Mosca, Sorel,
and especially Pareto; and in my detailed arguments and explanations I also draw on the work of a number of more recent writers, including some philosophical analyses made by John Mackie.

I should like to express my thanks to Paul Foulkes, Mairi Grieve and Bill Harcourt for encouraging me, and to Margaret Gilet for her careful processing of the manuscript. A.J.Qim) Baker, who is a graduate of Sydney and Oxford Universities, taught history for a year in New England University College and subsequently taught philosophy for many years in Sydney, Waikato and Macquarie Universities and briefly in St. Andrews University and the University of Washington, Seattle.

In Sydney he was a student of John Anderson and a colleague of his and of John Mackie, and also a leading member of the Libertarian Society and the 'Sydney Push'. He has published two books on Anderson's thought, *Anderson's Social Philosophy* and *Australian Realism*, and numerous articles on philosophy and social theory. Nowadays he often writes in *Heraclitus*.

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1. SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

*Senses of "Pluralism"

The aim of this book is to present a concise, realistic analysis of social pluralism. This will involve making cross references to some areas of philosophy, philosophy of history, sociology and political science.

But the positive, general sense in which "social pluralism" is here understood needs first to be made quite clear. This is because the word "pluralism" and associated phrases are bedevilled by variations and ambiguities in their use. Thus, to mention some other uses, 1) the sense of variety or difference conveyed by the terms is sometimes emphasised to the point of making friction or antagonism the key issue, as in the description of the German Weimar Republic as "pluralist" because of the destabilizing presence in it of incompatible, especially Nazi and Communist, forces, and in similar descriptions applied by political scientists to certain new African countries because they were formed by the union of disparate and often hostile peoples or tribes. And compare the description of the division between Muslims and non-Muslims in England over the Salman Rushdie affair as "pluralism". Differently, 2) there is the description of some past British writers, including Guild Socialists (whose influence was greatest in the period up to the early 1920s) as "pluralists" because, while they were critical of liberal or laissez-faire individualism, they also opposed bureaucratic centralized State control, and instead favoured smaller scale social organizations - i.e., they offered a pluralist-
type account of the actual ways of workings of certain organizations and combined this with support for certain policies and values. Then, 3) there is the particularly value-oriented tendency, common today amongst writers and commentators, to emphasise issues about "democracy" and to appropriate the term "pluralism" to mean simply "democratic pluralism" or "pluralist democracy". This thus obscures key informative uses of "pluralism", and also runs together the evincing of socio-moral attitudes and the analysis of socio-political factors and affairs in a way that does not help objective inquiry.

The concern of this book, however, is primarily with the pluralist ways of working of socio-political affairs, i.e., with social pluralism in a wide, factual sense and to mark this I shall also use, as an equivalent to it, the virtually unused term social complexism.

There is an evident parallel between pluralism as a type of socio-political theory and the pluralism found in the history of philosophy. There the term (like so many other philosophical "isms") also has had its variations of use, including such recent ones as the description of Wittgenstein as a pluralist because of his belief in the varieties of language games, and a use of the term in ethics to refer to endorsement of moral "relativism" or "subjectivism". But in its primary sense pluralism—i.e., philosophic or ontological pluralism—can be described in a clear and unambiguous way if we refine a distinction once notably made by the American philosopher William James between pluralism and monism. [1] When we do so we can distinguish three ontological positions: 1) monism, the view that things are so connected together that what there is, reality, is simply One—or, according to Hegel's more sophisticated monism, the apparent differences between things really form an Absolute or Organic Whole or Unity; 2) atomism, the view that connections between things are only apparent, and what there is really only consists of innumerable disconnected ontological atoms or units or simples; and opposing both monism and atomism, 3) pluralism or complexism, the view that what there is consists of an infinite number of complex states of affairs, each involving innumerable wholes as well as innumerable parts, innumerable connections as well as innumerable differences.

In a parallel way we can distinguish three general theories about the nature of society and history, each of which has had its sponsors in social thought. Thus, social pluralism is a view which stresses the complex and pluralistic character of society and its ingredient and intersecting phenomena, including organizations and other social groupings or complexes. It therefore rejects the two views 1) social monism or social totalism, which treats society as basically a single whole or totality to which social parts or sub-wholes are essentially subordinated, and 2) social atomism, the view that (for example) it is individual persons or citizens conceived of as unitary, as more separate than they are socially connected, that comprise the principal social factors or determinants.

Although there are these parallels, it should be noted that if we take the sensible course of endorsing pluralism in philosophy, the situation is not so simple as to enable us to take the a priori short cut of inferring from if on its own the truth of social pluralism. This
is because philosophical pluralism is also compatible with some versions of social monism and social atomism—its general complexist contentions would not be falsified if, say, society did happen to be a (factual) organic unity or totality in the way claimed by some functionalists in social theory, or again if, say, individual (but complex) persons were the principal social factors.

**Categories**

As part of its general position, social pluralism assumes that there is no difference in principle between social and non-social material, i.e., that society is in fact part of "nature", and that social material is there, complex but available for realistic-empirical investigation. To be quite clear and thorough about the nature of this material, let me refer to a basic philosophical question, that concerning the "categories", and bring out the bearing this has on social material.

Although it is arguable that no philosophy can avoid making at least tacit assumptions about the categories, discussions of the subject are now uncommon. In the history of philosophy, however, there has been a number of explicit theories, which can be analysed as involving two main approaches. One approach is that of Aristotle who presented a set of ten categories. But in so doing he thought of them as logical, general classes of compartmentalized items: quality predicates (e.g. blue), quantity predicates (e.g. large), relation predicates (e.g. older than), and so on, are exclusive; what is one category cannot belong to another category. In this approach he was later followed by Bertrand Russell (theory of types of terms), and Gilbert Ryle who treated categories as based on types of words or expressions. Ryle in particular, although he did give currency to the good expression "category mistake" (e.g. confusing a whole with a part or a relation with a quality), was sometimes so liberal in his methods of detecting category differences that he was led to multiply them beyond necessity, as when he suggested that even e.g. bridge terms such as "trump", "slam" and "finesse" belong to different categories. These terms are actually all instances of relations.

The other, and preferable approach in the history of category theory is that placing emphasis on categories as pervasive features of whatever is. This approach derives from Kant and was adopted by Hegel, and in this century by two other category philosophers, the Australian-born Samuel Alexander and the Australian-based John Anderson. There were important differences between these philosophers on other grounds. Kant, who listed twelve categories, maintained, in brief, that what we know are phenomena for which the categories (e.g. substance, causality) are supplied by the human understanding—i.e., the categories are "mind-dependent"—while some "outside" raw material is supplied by unknowable things-in-themselves. Hegel rejected as illogical Kant's conception (and claim to know about) the unknowable, and maintained that not only the categories but all that exists is a manifestation of Absolute Reason or Consciousness. Starting with the first triad of categories, being, not-being and becoming, which are supposed implicitly to contain all the other categories, Hegel goes on to deduce a large number of triads of categories as a progressive unfolding of the nature of the Absolute and hence of all that there is. But what is common and to the point in their views is that they do not treat the categories in a
discontinuous, compartmentalized way; they are regarded as co-
continuous, through and through features of all phenomena
(Kant) or of all being (Hegel).

revision of Kant in the opposite way to Hegel, and
developed a realist and naturalistic theory of the categories.
In this view, both Hegel's conception of Absolute Reason or
Consciousness and Kant's conception of partly mind-dependent
phenomena have to be rejected; what there is are independently
existing complex spatio-temporal situations or states of affairs,
 i.e., these are knowable things as they are; and it is of these that
the categories are pervasive and interpenetrating features or
conditions.

There is no easy way of demonstrating that this theory of the
categories is correct; but it is logically better off than— for
instance— various fashionable phenomenological and existentialist
philosophies. Unlike the claims of, say, Heidegger or Sartre—
who mostly announce "the truth" on the strength of their own
subjective "experiences", "insights" or "intuitions"—realist,
objectivist theory of the categories deals with analysable, public
states of affairs; it can be argued for by showing the difficulties
and illogicalsities of denials of the theory; it does have factual
support; and it does accord well with the observations of informed,
naturalistically-minded common sense.

When it comes to specifying the categories, there are some
variations in view amongst the leading theorists in part because
of differences in their underlying philosophies. First of all there are
variations in regard to Space and Time. These are treated simply as
categories by Aristotle and Hegel, but Kant treats them separately
(as deriving from the mind's "sense" or "intuition" and not the
"understanding"), while Alexander and Anderson, following on
from Kant, rightly assign fundamental importance to Space-Time
by treating it as the "matrix" or "medium" in which the
categories are the conditions of existence of all situations. In the
case of society and history, for instance, all their material, all
socio-historical events or affairs, are situations that occur in
Space and Time and are subject to the categories.

Apart from Space and Time, there are some problems about
the duplication and criss-crossing of categories when we try to
specify a precise list of them, and there is no indisputable way of
deciding on this. However, to enlist again the aid of informed
common sense it may readily be agreed from that point of view—
given the possibility of argument about one or two additions and
omissions—that the following is an acceptable list of the categories:
identity, difference, existence, relation, particularity,
generality, cardinal number, ordinal number, quantity, degree,
substance, whole and part, causality, individuality.

Social Categories

Given this list, each of the categories can be seen to have
innumerable applications to socio-historical material. A given
army, say, has its own identity, has differences from other things,
is there, existing, has relations e.g. to its government and to the
enemy when it fights, has particular features of its own as well as
general features, has a large number of soldiers, has an order in
which to advance etc., has quantity (weight, amount of equipment, etc.) has degree (e.g. ranks of officers and soldiers), has substance (content, way of working), is an instance of a whole of parts, has causes and effects, and has its own individuality or force. But let us look at the categories one by one and note significant ways in which they relate to social affairs.

IDENTITY. This is only of importance in rather special cases. A country, or a church, or a party, say, is what it is and not another thing except when, for voluntary or involuntary reasons, it has been or is in process of being greatly altered. When that happens there may be socially significant disputes about identity-changes—compare "Did England fight for freedom so often merely to be merged in an E.G. State?", "Is this trendy liberal Church the one our martyrs died for?"

DIFFERENCE. This category too does not raise many points of direct theoretical interest. What it does—like particularity, with which it has affinities—is take in an immense amount of the raw material of history and social theory: there are innumerable different human wants, interests, demands and prejudices, innumerable nationalist, religious, political, racial, sexual differences, and so on. These differences, however, do become central to parts of social theory when they are translated into disagreements (with connections with social hierarchy and with relations of social conflict) between the various social groups involved.

EXISTENCE (or occurrence). This also takes in non-existence or non-occurrence, not in the sense of committing us to belief in non-existent entities, but in the sense of raising factual questions about whether X, which is said or believed to occur as a Y, does do so. (Compare traditional philosophy examples, Are there golden mountains, centaurs?, and the like.) This category obviously applies in a straightforward way to innumerable social situations. The French nation exists. The Allied Powers won the war. Will Switzerland join the E.G.? When will feudal rule end in Arab countries? But it also leads on in a more complex way to questions of theoretical significance about types of social beliefs, such as about whether certain beliefs which flourish in a society are not examples of recurrent social errors.

RELATION—i.e., relations generally. Although causality is a particular type of relation, owing to its importance it is commonly cited as a separate category. Vital relations are those concerning social cohesion, social co-operation, and social conflict. Questions about conflict or struggle are of particular and controversial importance. PARTICULARITY and GENERALITY (or universality or sortality). These raise questions about the foundations of social science, e.g. Are there social laws?, as well as relating to all sorts of issues about, and occurrences in, the socio-historical field.

NUMBER (cardinal and ordinal) and QUANTITY. These categories are of much factual importance in regard to such matters as whether a country's economic resources are plentiful or scarce, or are increasing or declining, or whether the size of a country's population—or its army—is adequate for its military defence. They also have theoretical importance in some special cases; for instance, effective direct democracy does not seem to be a
viable possibility unless numbers are relatively small as they were with classical Athenian citizens; population density may be (as some sociologists argue) a prime reason for the occurrence of certain kinds of crime and delinquency; it can be asked what is the approximate number of involved individual persons needed before we can be said to have e.g. a social class, an interest group, a movement or a bureaucracy.

DEGREE (or intensity, or graded phenomena). This category naturally refers to such things as degrees of industrial strength, wealth, political freedom, culture, and so on, in given societies. But it is particularly important for social theory in regard to social hierarchy, i.e., in regard to questions about the distribution of power, authority, wealth and privilege within a society, and the character and influence of divisions between its ruling groups or classes and the rest of the population.

SUBSTANCE (or ways of working). In an evident way all sorts of social phenomena are complex "substances": individual persons have substance or content, and more particularly can be said to behave or go in certain specifyable ways, and the same is true of parliamentary government, banking systems, police forces, etc., etc.

WHOLE and PART. This has a particular affinity with the category of substance—it is often a vital factor in the way of working of a particular social phenomenon. For our purposes it is particularly important in connection with questions about society itself and what sort of whole it is, on which turn issues about social monism, atomism and pluralism. CAUSALITY. This category bears on many key issues—about what are the causes of various wars, revolutions, economic developments, cultural renaissances, etc., etc.—and also on crucial more general questions about determinism and prediction.

INDIVIDUALITY. This category, which leads us back to identity, in general concerns the particular force or activity that is characteristic of something. It is of little importance for our purposes, but socio-historical illustrations are indicated e.g. by familiar descriptions of the classical Greeks as exhibiting cultural excellence to an unusual extent or of past Germans as being noted for their nationalist sentiments and their military prowess.

Given the application of the categories to the social field, there are thus also fourteen social categories: social identity, social difference, social existence, and so on. But in some cases we may be able to specify certain special social categories, or sub-categories, that apply to social situations—and sometimes also to some non-human living creatures—but not to the rest of nature. In the pluralist/complexist view (which will be supported by arguments that will come later) such social sub-categories include social hierarchy and social conflict (as special cases coming under the categories of degree and relation), unintended/dysfunctional features of organisation (under substance and whole and part), the prevalence of influential illusory moral and other social beliefs (under existence and relation), and pluralist social determinism (under causality).

Given this general statement, various pluralist issues especially
concerning certain of the categories and certain interconnections of categories will now be discussed in detail, beginning with social generality.

**Generality and Social Science**

If we are to have social science—including an informative theory of social pluralism—the initial assumption we have to make is that the category of generality (or universality, or sortality) does apply in the social field. That assumption is made, at least in practice these days, by most investigators in the various (and overlapping) areas of "social science" such as political science, sociology, political sociology, anthropology, social psychology, and of course economics. However, questioning the assumption is a tradition of thought on the part of some historians and philosophers who have claimed that the study of society and history cannot be scientific (cannot be a generalizing or "nomothetic" study). In their view the evident particularity of social or historical phenomena goes against their generality, there is an incompatibility between "uniqueness" and "recurrence", or social laws or regularities cannot be ascertained because history does not "repeat itself".

It is not difficult to point out in reply that this kind of argument depends on making unwarranted "all or nothing" contrasts. Contrary to the anti-generality claim, we can urge that no situation or phenomenon, social or non-social, is really simple, unique or purely particular; any situation or phenomenon is a complex state of affairs which has general as well as special features. If, for instance, we study individual cats, trees, icebergs or jumbo jets, we are not surprised to find they have features in common and features not in common with other individuals of the same type, the former of which may be delineated in a law-like way, and the same is true of social phenomena. If we are dealing, say, with political parties, armies, convict settlements, State bureaucracies, persecuted religious sects, trade union movements, in each case any particular phenomenon has peculiarities or special attributes of its own, but at the same time has general or regular features in common with other phenomena of its type—otherwise, for one thing, it would be surprising, not to say inexplicable, why we so often succeed in identifying as "political parties", "armies" and so on, the various social phenomena that go under these names. History obviously does in a sense repeat itself, not as re-runs *in toto* but certainly in part, in throwing up recognizable sorts of social phenomena; which is why we are able to find definite areas or themes for investigation and why there are social or historical regularities to be sought for—although as a matter of fact these will rarely be "simple" or "sweeping" laws of the kind so often envisaged by both opponents and supporters of the thesis that there are laws in history.

But given the position that social material is not cut off from or discontinuous with other material (physical and biological material) and like it is subject to the categories and open to scientific investigation, there are still some problems. When we say there is social science we need to be cautious about what we claim its being "scientific" entails, and face the fact of the well-known "backwardness" or lack of "exactness" of social science; or at least of the branches of the subject in question here. Although even in the case of economics, which does have greater claims to exactness and
system, that subject is well-known for having difficulties over the empirical application—and confirmation or falsification—of its theories, not to speak of notorious disagreements amongst economists. So to be clear, some comment is called for on the special difficulties facing social science, and on the questions of social "laws".

It is evident that there are certain difficulties about social investigation that arise both on the side of the material studied and on the side of the social investigators themselves. In the case of the latter, there is the problem that it is more difficult for the social investigator to be as detached or objective about his field of study as his physical science counterpart can be (though of course astronomers and physicists in the 1500s and 1600s, and biologists in the nineteenth century and since, have had problems in that regard). The fact is—as was pointed out by Freud, Marx and Pareto in their different ways—that the social inquirer is very close to his material, and his own interests, aspirations, prejudices or fears may lead him into wishful thinking, error and illusion, instead of to discovery, and in association with that many of the people who have been concerned to think and write about social material have really been social reformers or moral commentators rather than objective scientific inquirers.

Furthermore, those students of social material who have been most numerous and by far the longest time in the field, historians, have not directly contributed much to the development of social science. Although "history is a science", "no less and no more", the distinguished Cambridge historian J.B. Bury claimed in 1903, most historians have been interested in working at lower rather than higher levels of historical generality (on, say, the course of The War of The Roses or the reasons for the Reichstag Fire, rather than on the causes of the Industrial Revolution or the definitive features of ruling oligarchies), and their preoccupation in any case has been with particulars rather than with generalizations. In logical language they have been more concerned to describe and explain sets of singular or elementary propositions than they have been in articulating and confirming universal propositions—even if they do tacitly employ such propositions in many of their explanations.

Consequently, apart from contributions made by isolated important thinkers such as Machiavelli, Vico, Hegel, Comte and Marx, it has only been in comparatively recent times with the emergence of sociology and allied subjects as definite disciplines that serious attempts at social science have been made.

On the side of the social material to be studied, there is the fact of the complexities of that material, including the number of factors or variables that have to be taken account of, and the isolation and simplification of which is made all the more complicated because of the very restricted opportunities for controlled experiment in the social field. Hence the difficulty of finding clear laws, i.e., wide-ranging universal propositions, and the social scientist's reliance on talk about "tendencies" or his being able, for instance, to state only inexact or incomplete sets of conditions for social occurrences. Hence again the notorious inability of social scientists to make successful specific predictions.
For these reasons, there is little doubt that we won't be able to find in the social field a short list of laws of a relatively simple kind in the way that can be done in astronomy and in areas of physics, chemistry and other of the natural sciences. However, as already suggested, this difference does not justify the claim or implicit assumption (often made by historians) that if there are no simple laws in the social field then “uniqueness” or “chance” reigns in that field. It is true that it is very difficult—on significant issues at any rate—to find social propositions of the simple form “All A are P” that are justified. The familiar “All power corrupts” is perhaps an example, though of course specifying the way power does corrupt its holders within the State and other organizations involves complexities. But with, say, the question of political revolts we obviously can't just assert “All badly-treated peoples revolt”—it took e.g. French peasants hundreds of years before they came out in widespread revolt; nor, for example, can we just say “Countries defeated in war overthrow their rulers”—for e.g. Napoleon III in 1871, Wilhelm II in 1918, and Galtieri after the Falklands War in 1982 were overthrown, but not the Austrian and Prussian rulers defeated by Napoleon in 1805-6, the Tsar after the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, nor Nasser after the Six Day War in 1967.

It could be urged against the historians who are critics of laws that their preferred examples are—like the ones given above—usually of a rough and ready everyday concept kind, but in contrast the formulation of universal propositions becomes a little easier when we are working with concepts of a more precise or technical kind (such as, say, bureaucracy, economic productivity, interest groups, political elites, dysfunctions, the authoritarian personality), although here too there is little question of being able to find simple laws; to do that we should have to be prepared to accept something like the sweeping, but falsified, basic theses of Marx's social system. However, it can be pointed out that in the case of examples involving ordinary everyday concepts as well as those involving more technical social concepts, it may be quite possible, if we work on the subject and disentangle and check on the varying circumstances noticed, to arrive at various complex universal propositions. [4] These may be of such forms as “All ABCD are P”, “All (either ABC, or CDE providing F is absent) are P”, or they may involve more complicated conjunctions and disjunctions of positive and negative circumstances or conditions. And the situation can be still more complicated than that. Very often we don't have knowledge of complete sets of relevant conditions, but have to make do with incomplete or elliptical propositions—such as “All (either ABC, or ADE, or FG providing H and I are absent, or ...) are P”, where “...” indicates a condition information about which is lacking.

The last point was brought out well by the philosopher J.L. Mackie. His treatment of the subject concentrates on causal complexities—and its usefulness in connection with social causation has been recognized by some sociologists [5]—but it also has an obvious application to the question of non-causal regularities. Mackie, in order to deal with the problem that very frequently we are in no position to cite a clear set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of something, introduces the conception of an indispensable part of a complex sufficient (but not necessary) condition of an occurrence.
This is “an insufficient but necessary part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for” a result. [6] This he calls an INUS condition (named from the first letters of the italicized words). In symbols, if (AX or Y) is necessary and sufficient for P, A is an INUS condition: it is insufficient itself but is a necessary part of AX, which in turn is unnecessary but is sufficient for the result P. In the case of general statements, an illustrative example he gives is that of the connection between eating sweets and dental decay. We can't say the former is either a sufficient or a necessary condition for the latter (for instance, some people have very resistant teeth and are unaffected; some people who don't eat sweets may develop dental decay, e.g. because of other food they eat), but what we can say is that eating sweets is an INL'S condition. That is, (given that we are referring to people with some teeth of their own), if eating sweets is represented by A and dental decay by P, the position is that A in conjunction with other positive and negative factors—e.g. chemistry of the mouth and the absence of resistance-producing treatments, represented by X—gives us a set of factors that is a sufficient condition for P, but there are other sets of factors (other food, state of gums and so on) represented by Y, that are also sufficient. As a result we may be able to conclude that the disjunction (AX or Y) is necessary and sufficient for P. But A, eating sweets, itself is only an INUS condition. Even so, and even though we may be unable to specify X and Y completely, what we are asserting is factual, i.e., confirmable and falsifiable.

This kind of approach has an evident application to various complicated scientific and diagnostic investigations. In such cases, say, as those of heart attacks and heart failures, or differently of types of sleep states and disturbances, various circumstances can be discerned (e.g. blood clots, clogged arteries, cholesterol, defective valves, rapid heartbeats, etc. etc; variations in rapid eye movements and non-rapid eye movements, amounts of dreaming, addiction to alcohol, etc., etc.), some of which are (or are in part) sufficient and some necessary for a given type of condition, but in addition numerous other circumstances are unknown (or unestablished) though more of them can be expected to be discovered in the course of future research. What this thus points to is the existence of formulatable complex regularities of the INUS kind.

In regard to society and history, there are innumerable complex types of case, though in some areas of investigation, such as those concerning economic affairs and military affairs, the presence of clearly established factors and outcomes may make analysis easier, and these point the way to what has to be done in other cases. [7]

But to illustrate here with a mixed, more general type of example, let us again take the case of revolts. If we survey some of the obvious cases, it may be argued that widespread discontent amongst a country's population that has open or submerged spirit or powers of initiative (i.e., which is not merely passive or downtrodden—as e.g. appears to have been the case in the USSR under Stalin), is an INUS condition. It is such a condition because when that sort of discontent occurs in conjunction with a precipitating crisis (such as the financial problems of France that came to a head in 1789 and the maladministration of the war and the war effort that came to a head in Russia in 1917), and there is
furthermore an absence of ability and will on the part of the country's ruler or rulers, the result is a successful revolt. But there may of course be other sufficient conditions for that result, such as the related but somewhat different type of case demonstrated by the overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania in December 1989—where although Ceausescu did not lack will, a vital factor was the withdrawal of support by the USSR. Another sufficient condition, often illustrated by events in South American, African and Asian countries, is a military coup in certain circumstances—i.e., details of these circumstances are left open. Nor does that exhaust the list of possible sufficient conditions for a successful revolt.

To sum up this example in symbols, taking A to represent the INUS condition discontent of a positive kind, P to represent a successful revolt, B to represent the precipitating crisis, C the absence of will on the part of the rulers, D withdrawal of outside support, and E to represent the army's intervention in unspecified circumstances, what is asserted in this case is of the form: "(Either ABC, or ABD, or E ..., or ...,) is necessary and sufficient for P." Or, omitting the last completely open disjunct "...", we can say simply that the other disjuncts are sufficient for the result, or expressing that in universal proposition form: "All (either ABC, or ABD, or E...) are P."

This approach, emphasizing as it does complexities and the likelihood of gaps in our knowledge, throws light on the issue of laws in an evident way. General propositions of the INUS-indicating and related sorts, despite usually being incomplete, do provide us with law-type findings, or what Mackie calls "elliptical" or "gappy" laws. Laws of this sort comprise much of our general knowledge and play a part in all sciences. They are, however, especially important in socio-historical areas of inquiry as there they are often all in the way of laws that can readily be discovered. But they do make informative factual claims that are open to confirmation, and furthermore—both when they make use of everyday concepts and of more refined or more technical ones—such elliptical laws provide a stimulus for social inquirers to try to develop them into fully stated complex universal propositions.

2. SOCIAL ATOMISM, MONISM AND PLURALISM

Atomism and Individualism

We can now turn to a more detailed explanation of the pluralist account of how the category of whole and part applies in the social field.

The term "individualism" or "social, individualism" of course is often used in a value judgement way to refer to the rights and liberties of the individual, as well as being used to refer to a widely believed theory or assumption about how society actually goes on. That is why, to describe the latter, I have preferred to draw on the now little used, but more unambiguous, term "social atomism". Social atomism, or individualism in this sense, has often been associated with another theory or assumption, social voluntarism. According to the latter, social and political situations and developments are the outcome of the voluntary wishes, strivings
and decisions of the various human beings who compose society. But about this view it can simply be said here—discussion of causality as a category will be deferred until much later—that it wrongly assumes that people's characters are uncaused and their outlooks and particular decisions unshaped by circumstances, including inherent tendencies and the influence of tradition and education. In any case, if voluntarism were correct we wouldn't have sets of social conditions to study or a theory of society to set forth, we should merely have a list of records of what various decisions were made by various people at various times. And that is still the position if—in a modified "great man" version of voluntarism—the decisions etc. recorded are confined to those of the most powerful individuals; our social "theory" would be at the level of old-time annals or chronicles of kings. However, the significant issues for us here concern individualism or atomism, not voluntarism; and in fact although theories of the former kind often have voluntarist elements in them, that need not be so. For example, Freud and his followers claim to be determinists holding that all mental phenomena, including wishes and decisions, have causes, yet in their own social writings they assume an individualist view.

But whether the human wishes, aspirations, aims, intentions, decisions and so on involved are, or are not, taken to have causal conditions, the central question concerns the place of individuals qua separate individuals in history and society. According to standard social atomism which has as part of its intellectual ancestry the metaphysical theory of the simple Self or Ego that is supposed to be a person's essence, there really are no social forces or determinants except persons. What might appear to be other social forces—society as a whole or lesser ingredients of society such as political parties, trade unions, churches, social movements—are merely derivative connections of essentially unitary individuals.

This type of belief which is found amongst numerous social theorists and commentators as well as in everyday life, tends nowadays to be tacitly assumed rather than articulated or defended. However, mention can be made of one general defence made by some philosophers by upholding what is called "methodological individualism" which takes the basic method of social science to be the study of the behaviour of individual persons. This is contrasted with an approach that concentrates on social wholes and is sometimes, unfortunately, called "methodological holism" or "social holism". The trouble is that the term "holism" is sometimes taken to indicate a monistic, and sometimes a non-monistic, view of society, and in the cause of clarity is best avoided. That term aside, a number of upholders of methodological individualism defend their position by contrasting it with and criticizing a monistic or totalistic conception of society, such as Marx's, and coupling this with rejection of totalitarian values. What this ignores is a third position endorsed by social pluralism according to which, yes, totalistic conceptions of society are mistaken but what is of central importance for social study is nevertheless a variety of lesser social wholes or complexes which are not merely aggregates of individuals (and of course in regard to values having that position does not entail commitment to the camp of the enemies of liberty).

The crucial objection to methodological individualism as a form of atomism is that it needs to, but cannot, reduce social complexes
such as institutions or organizations to mere collections or aggregates of individuals. This basic criticism was advanced long ago by disciples of Wittgenstein when they argued that, as with failed attempts to reduce material objects to sets of sense-data, statements about social complexes (e.g. nations, the civil service, the Labour Party) cannot be reduced to statements about individuals—not even "in principle" as, apart from an inability to complete lists of individuals, something vital is always missing. To make the point in terms of the relation of whole and part, numerous social complexes have important characteristics which are in part different from and additional to the characteristics of the separate persons who are part of those complexes, and these characteristics are what are missed by individualist attempts at reduction without residue. More positively, what is missed are forms of psycho-social activity which occur and are participated in by individuals. In the words of Anderson, a forceful exponent of this position, far from individuals being "social atoms who can merely form a 'mechanical mixture', it is such forms of activity that make up 'individuals" [2] and when such forms of activity involve or pass through many individuals we have discernible social complexes, which is why in advanced societies we can speak of a person, not merely as an active individual agent but as "a 'vehicle' of social forces,... a member of movements which are just as real, just as definite as he is, and which are the true subject of social science".[3]

It is true that when it is agreed social monism is not the alternative to it, and certain other qualifications of methodological individualism are made under critical pressure, some of the differences between it and social pluralism become less acute. In particular, some individualists admit that the unintended consequences of human actions, and the related failure of much social planning, are of the greatest significance in social affairs, which leaves the way open for the recognition after all of social complexities of the kind emphasized by pluralists. Likewise, the difference between the two positions diminishes when less stress is placed on mere collections or aggregates of individuals and more on the interlocking relationships amongst the individuals who belong to organizations and other social complexes. In fact, if that sort of qualification is taken far enough it may save the individualist's reductionist thesis but at the price of setting up an equivalent to what pluralists argue about the special characteristics of various social complexes. But in that case instead of shirking the issue by trying to make do with descriptions of complicated individual behaviour relationships, the realistic solution is to recognize the genuine existence of, and directly talk about and study the social complexes themselves—for in the pluralist view such complexes are not above or below the facts about individuals, but are mere, forms of social activity passing through or carried on by individuals, which can be discerned and described and their characteristics investigated.

**Atomism and Democratic Theory**

This general standpoint can row be backed up by looking at some specific social theories mat involve atomism and have had considerable influence.

Examples of atomism abound in the history of social thought. Curiously enough even Karl Marx, an anti-atomist inmost of his work, appears to have believed that when it was all over, i.e., when
the classless Utopia arrived, atomism would prevail and individuals would not be tied into or constrained by social structures. A purer well known atomist was Rousseau who, in his "social contract" theory of the origin of society supposed that it arose by mutual agreement amongst previously unsocialized individuals, and in the same vein it has been supposed that the State and other institutions are also resultants of and vehicles for the intentions and decisions of individuals. A like view was held by the influential utilitarian theorists who sponsored a conception of society as (or as commendably moving in the direction of) consisting of informed, rationally calculating citizens who, amongst other things, make possible sound representative democracy. Let us take up this question by looking at arguments notably presented by John Stuart Mill on the subject.

In respect of values Mill was much concerned with the liberty of individuals and of minorities (compare On Liberty) and he saw that, apart from other difficulties, direct democracy exercised by all citizens (in the way for example Rousseau had advocated) did face the problem of how to avoid the tyrannical exercise of power by the majority over minorities. Of course Rousseau supposed this problem would be solved because the people as a whole would act in accordance with "the general will", but while Mill, like other utilitarians, had a parallel conception of general utility the furtherance of which would lead to "the greatest good of the greatest number", he took it that, at least initially, this would be decided on by wise legislators rather than by mere majorities. Mill furthermore recognized the influence of State power, "the interest of the bureaucracy" as he called it (to that extent he was a non-atomist) and hence the need, from a liberty-loving point of view, to check it. Such a check, he believed, could be provided by representative democracy. This he took ideally to involve all adult members of society (i.e. Mill was an early feminist) who, as active, aware citizens would elect like representatives to parliament who would make sensible rational decisions and govern in the public interest; but unfortunately this ideal was not realizable at that time (Britain in the mid-19th century) owing to the lack of education and consequent lack of political education and awareness on the part of so many people; as a result, he favoured a type of informed voter system in which the abler and better educated citizens had more votes and were the people elected as rational legislators; although that system would be replaced by a one person-one vote system when the mass of the people became politically aware and active.

Mill's contrast between well-meaning, active and wiser citizens and those who are passive and less wise is one that has had currency since Plato introduced the conception of "philosopher-kings". But while there was (and still is) much truth in Mill's view of the ignorance and lack of ability of the mass of voters—and compare in his time the verdict of the anarchist Proudhon: "Universal suffrage is the counter revolution"—his theory fails. It faces the well-known difficulty that such envisaged wise representatives and legislators mostly don't do, or try to do, what is expected of them—that (a) they usually don't try to do so, and (b) when they do try they usually don't succeed, shows up the atomism of this position. To put it in simple individualistic terms, although in Mill's time almost all British members of parliament were well educated (often at Oxford or Cambridge) and were men of property and influence, for every
one of them who was a sensible and disinterested policy maker (as e.g. the great Liberal Party reformer William Gladstone and the sponsor of the Factory Acts, Lord Shaftesbury, for the most part were) there were dozens who were not. History, furthermore, has not confirmed Mill's hopes. Despite widespread public education since his time, universal suffrage in Western countries has not been accompanied by the emergence of an informed, politically active mass of electors. Likewise, with regard to their elected representatives, it is arguable that their quality has declined rather than improved.

The popular picture of parliamentary democracy— influenced by utilitarian theory—is of a process in which each of the citizens casts his or her vote on the basis of aware political judgement, in order to elect competent, morally responsible representatives who faithfully carry out their wishes in the public interest. That sort of view is a vital one for the simple atomist position; if the latter is correct and is coupled as it usually is with the assumption that politicians are at least relatively well meaning, the democratic process ought to go on in something like the envisaged way; but although the convention that it does do so is cultivated at election times, the fact is that it doesn't It is true that this is often attributed to a failure of wisdom on the part of the voters. Thus, as was argued by Max Weber, and Joseph Schumpeter and numerous later writers, there is the emotionality and low level of intelligence and political awareness of the masses—or, as H.L. Mencken pithily put it about America long ago, the electorate is "homo boobiens". At the same time, elected politicians, when they do have superior ability, are still prone to debase themselves to the level of their constituents, and ever mindful of election results to shirk honest discussion of political issues. Likewise, when in power, they often trim firm policies into ineffective compromises—compare, in regard to Britain again, how in the fifty year period 1945-1995 it is fair to say that only two prime ministers (with their quite different standpoints) Clement Attlee and Margaret Thatcher have been noted for having clear principles and policies and sticking to them. And all this of course has been much exacerbated by the growing influence of television which, in making all important the tendency towards indulgence in personalities and trivialities and the tailoring of points made to fit in with the short attention span of viewers, has virtually killed thoughtful consideration of political issues. In association with that there is also the fact of the increasing influence nowadays of numerous media commentators and analysts, some of whom display a mastery of all the known logical and moral fallacies, and whose existence raises in an acute form another difficulty for the atomist view of democracy (one I think that in the case of newspapers worried Edmund Burke long ago) which is that, while the politicians have at least been elected, the media commentators and analysts have not.

However, the fact that, in general, neither modern electorates nor their representatives have lived up to the ideals of democracy is something that is not surprising and not hard to explain once we abandon an atomist outlook. Take the important development closely associated with the introduction of universal suffrage: the emergence of professional or career politicians and of the modern type of political parties to which they belong. It is evident that this class of politicians, in addition to other particular interests they are concerned to represent, also represent their own interests, or more
precisely do so by belonging to and representing their party machines, i.e., *organizations* which help to shape the outlook of their members and are also careful about who is selected to stand for parliament. That is why, while there are considerable variations in countries with regard to the awareness of voters and the quality of the politicians they elect, that is not the central point about the failings of democracy. Whether voters are gullible or aware they are normally confronted, whether they like either of them or not, by two machine-run parties that have a chance of winning the election, and they usually have little influence on the policies actually implemented by a government (at best they—or the "swinging voters"—decide a handful of specific policies, and even in that regard elected parties can be flexible about which of their promises they keep). Furthermore even the electors' "representatives" do not have overmuch influence. The real policy decisions—whether or not they turn out to be effective—are made by party leaders, key apparatchiks in the party machines, and certain other powerful groups of people such as trade union leaders and a party's financial backers. Ordinary individuals, to have positive influence, have to be organised or belong to effective groups or associations—i.e., we pass beyond atomism to complexes that are not mere sums of the individuals that compose them.

*Intentions and Achievements*

Further difficulties for atomism emerge when we consider in a wider way the place in socio-political affairs of human intentions, either in the case of large numbers of individuals, or in the case of smaller decision-making groups, or simply of particular leaders.

To take up the issue in an analytical way, let me begin by quoting a passage from Frederick Engels' writings on the subject of what is willed and what happens in history.

That which is willed happens but rarely; in the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another, or those ends themselves are from the outset incapable of realization or the means of attaining them are insufficient. Thus the conflicts of innumerable individual wills and individual actions in the domain of history produce a state of affairs entirely analogous to that prevailing in the realm of unconscious nature. The ends of the actions are intended, but the results which actually follow from those actions are not intended; or even when they do seem to correspond to the end intended, they ultimately have consequences quite other than those intended.[5]

Engels is actually saying this in order to lead up to the view that there are "inner, hidden" laws of history—the consequences of which are, after all, conveniently known to Marx and himself. But ignoring that (Marxism will be discussed more presently), what Engels is saying in the quoted passage is to the point for our purposes because he is emphasizing how widespread in history is the lack of success people have in bringing about the ends (they intend to achieve.

Unlike "natural" occurrences which have social consequents (droughts, earthquakes, plagues and the like) the deeds or actions performed by people, whether by leaders or larger numbers of people, are socio-psychological—or psycho-social—occurrences, and expanding what Engels says we can take up questions about what (if any) aims or intentions are associated with them, as well as
questions about what results they lead to. Furthermore, we can ask questions about the correlation between intentions and achievements. [6] Here we find, first, there are scientific, realistic or sensible actions that are regularly successful in bringing about intended results, as when an engineer with all the necessary resources intends to build a bridge, a politician in a productive country intends to improve its export trade, or a general with a much superior army intends to win a battle. Of course sometimes engineers, politicians and generals make bad mistakes—a bridge falls down and so on—but the intended result was still clearly achievable by use of the right methods.

Contrasting with these are those socio-political actions in which intended results are regularly not achieved. In particular, there are many cases in which an intended result X is not achieved but an unintended result Y does eventuate. A well known historical example is the revolution made by the Bolsheviks with the intention of bringing about cooperative, egalitarian socialism but which actually issued in a tyrannical, hierarchical, bureaucratic regime. Another famous case is that of Prohibition in the USA, 1920-33, which produced results quite different from the ones intended by the legislators who introduced Prohibition. Or, as more mundane but very familiar examples, consider with regard to the specific results politicians seek to achieve, how often the policies they initiate lead to outcomes quite different from the intended ones. (A general causal point that is applicable here is that attempts at social and economic "engineering", even of a “piecemeal” kind, are much more futile and counter-productive undertakings than is believed by politicians and social atomists.) This leads us on to a further type of case in which, owing to the complexities of social affairs, a course of action produces multiple results. In particular, there are cases in which success, or a measure of success, is accompanied by non-success, as when X is intended and achieved, but Y, which is unintended and undesired, is also achieved. To take a broad example, in World War II Winston Churchill’s intention was to defeat Germany and he succeeded; but also, he did not intend, as he said, “to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire,” though that is what he really did. There can also be complicated cases of multiple intentions that achieve conflicting multiple results, a well known example which occurred in the days of the Cold War and has parallels in relation to China today, being provided by those Western countries which furthered certain policies opposed to Communist countries, and at the same time traded extensively with those countries and even lent them enormous sums of money.

Different again is another kind of commonly occurring actions. These are the actions performed in accordance with tradition, or custom, or in an automatic way. A historical example is provided by the development of a language such as English. In carrying on the activity of speaking English, people do not plan or intend that grammatical and other changes should be made, and yet over a period of time changes do take place. But then learning to speak English (as a first language) is also something that people don’t plan or intend to do although it does have various effects. The fact that there are innumerable examples of actions of this type in socio-political affairs presents us with telling evidence against the claims of social atomism. For many things that human beings do or acquiesce in are not accompanied by any intention at all. Just as we can see that Rousseau’s account of the “social contract” is a myth (if
people got together and planned the origins of society, their getting together would mean society already existed) we can also see that many features of social life were not planned or designed—by leaders or anyone else—and furthermore that, whether they were at some time in the past intended or not intended, in society today we inherit at birth and are automatically induced to carry on all sorts of customary activities we had no opportunity to decide we wanted.

What the prevalence of actions of the mentioned kinds helps to bring out against social atomism is the following. With regard to the population at large, individuals mostly are, or are forced to be resigned to being, acquiescent about the character and direction taken by socio-political affairs. By and large they only have the chance to exercise some influence if groups of them are organized in some way. It is true that there is the eloquent position put by followers of Max Stirner (The Ego And His Own) whose view is that the thing for individuals to do is to oppose factors or forces that have the effect of moulding or constraining them, including any kind of organization, and in that way achieve freedom. Yes, we might admit, but it would take very dedicated as well as very many such people. Suppose we had, say, many thousands of equivalents to Max Stirner—or to The Good Soldier Schweik—that might put in jeopardy some powerful traditions and institutions. But such a conception is regrettably fanciful, as the biological and psychological odds against that occurring are far too great, and when sometimes in history large numbers of people do come for a time to act in new ways—as e.g. in stages of revolutions—that mostly involves factors other than resolute Stirner-type individualism.

With regard to political leaders and other powerful figures in society, they do have more influence than ordinary people but not to anything like the extent they should on anatomist leadership view. This applies at all levels of historical generality. Take, say, such significant broad phenomena in modern history as the development of the modern State, the growth of the Protestant churches, or the emergence of a strong House of Commons in England in the 17th century; it is evident that while each of these phenomena was influenced by the actions of certain leaders (e.g. Thomas Cromwell, Richelieu; Luther, Zwingli and Calvin; Eliot, Pym and Hampden) none of the phenomena can justifiably be said to have been planned or designed. Even in the case of those institutions which were explicitly founded to fulfill certain functions—such as standing armies, standing bureaucracies, police forces, political parties, trade unions, or even new universities—they quickly and pluralistically came to have a variety of features, including ones that were unintended and undesired by their founders. Or consider how much at variance with the ideals (or professed ideals) of their founders are the actual ways of working of the United Nations, UNESCO, and any number of ex-colonial Third World countries. Likewise, at the more ordinary level of socio-political affairs—running countries and their economies, having disputes with other countries, and so on—the limitations on the scope and effectiveness of what leaders can achieve are amply evident from each week's news about world politics.

Social Monism

It must, however, be re-affirmed that in rejecting social atomism, pluralism is not committed to the claims of monistic or
totalistic social theories which are also critical of atomism. According to such theories, society is a single whole, system or totality all the parts of which, including individuals are governed by or subordinated to the activities or purposes of the whole. An illustration is the traditional "solidarist" view that everyone—in accordance e.g. with God's will—has their appropriate place or station in the social order. A more metaphysical illustration is the conception of society as an organic whole or unity (which embodies the self-realization of Absolute Reason or Spirit) put forward by Hegel and his followers. An example of a more empirical (but untenable) theory is that of those anthropologists, such as A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, who thought of society as being a functional unity in which the actions and relations of individuals form, and fulfil the purposes of, a single, integrated whole. Or, most notably—and this is the view I will look at more fully—there is Marx's version of a monistic position.

Of course, once the subject of Marxism is introduced, we must face the fact that, as well as being a social theorist, Marx also wrote as a prophet and a revolutionary. In fact, he did so perhaps more than he did as a serious scientific analyst of social forces, as a result of which we are confronted by many elusive, unclear and conflicting points made in a variety of scattered writings. In addition, for more than a hundred years there has been an abundance of interpreters and reinterpreters of Marx usually consisting of Marxists or neo-Marxists anxious to show his revolutionary claims were still on the right track. They have become very muted at this moment in history, but they and the history of Russian-type Communism leave a legacy of ambiguous theories and special pleading for discredited developments and policies. That is why, if we want to preserve sound parts of Marx's social theory (and with the swing of the fashion pendulum it is becoming necessary to point out that Marx's own theory and criticism does have sound parts) it would be better to reformulate that material in a way that is distanced altogether from his characteristic concepts, metaphors and prophecies.

It will be sufficient to refer briefly here to Marx's well-known and much discussed core doctrine of historical materialism (or economic determinism), which gives his general account of social structure and causation.

According to this, economic conditions are the "motive force" or the "determining" factor in history, and are so because in any society there is an economic base or structure on which arises a dependent superstructure. The economic structure consists (a) of the forces of production (including tools, natural resources and materials, men's labour and technical skills) and corresponding to them (b) the relations of production (social relations of human beings at given periods of history including particularly relations between ruling and ruled classes). The superstructure consists (a) of a society's political and social institutions—the State apparatus, political parties, churches, etc. and (b) of ideas and ideologies. But there are notorious unclarities (1) about the exact nature of forces of production and relations of production and of the supposed correspondence between them, and (2) about the relation between the structure and the superstructure. Thus, in the case of (2), which is important for our purposes, Marx claimed that what is fundamental or essential to society is the structure, which
determines the superstructure, and from this claim issued the use by leading Marxists of a monistic principle of explanation according to which political and intellectual activities and anything else which is non-economic, including the forces of nationalism and religious institutions and movements, are always explicable in an economic way.

Let us look at this in two crucial cases, first in regard to political forms and activities. Here Marxists are plainly mistaken when they attempt to reduce these phenomena to the status of merely being parts of the "dependent" superstructure—or try to maintain as Lenin did that politics is just "concentrated economics". Contrary to that view, political factors exist in their own right in history as is manifested by what can be called, in more individualistic terms, the power-seeking and power-wielding interests of politicians and officials and, in more institutional terms, by the character and influence of the State apparatus and its attendant bureaucracy. That is what the anarchist, Mikhail Bakunin—recognizing the place authoritarianism and the exercise of power do have in history—was the first to draw attention to against Marx when he deplored the latter's theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", i.e. the claim that the proletariat would take over the State in order to implement the first stage of the revolution. Such a move, Bakunin argued, prophetically in the light of what happened in Russia and other Communist countries, would merely replace the old rulers by a new ruling bureaucratic class. Like criticism was rightly voiced by any number of later critics such as—to mention just one of them—by Max Weber who criticized Marx for his equation of economic and political power and his consequent failure to see the independent importance of the means of administration.

Secondly, the Marxist view has long been condemned by historians for its failure to recognize the potent influence of nationalism in history. Far from fading away, as Marx may have imagined would happen, that influence remains undiminished. As examples of nationalist and associated racial or religious opposition—which only hardened Marxist metaphysicians could subsume under "economic factors"—consider the following cases, to go no further back, since 1980: Wars in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait. Near wars or bitter fighting between Israelis and Arabs, between Kurds and Iraq, Iran and Turkey, within Lebanon, between Libya and Chad, between East Timorese and Indonesia, between Russia and Chechnya, within the former Yugoslavia amongst Serbs, Croats, Bosnians, and Albanians. Recurrent antagonisms within Cyprus, Fiji, between Greeks and Macedonians, within India, Malaysia, New Caledonia, Northern Ireland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tibet, Uganda, and within the USSR and ex-USSR. Such widespread and continuing data falsify Marx's view and views of that kind.

In an effort to ward off criticism, Engels, after Marx's death, made a well-known attempt to qualify historical materialism by maintaining that, while there is economic necessity, the superstructure can react back on the structure, so that it is only ultimately or in the last instance that the economic factor is the determining factor in history.[7] However, this addition of pluralist trimmings does not succeed in covering up the fact that a basic monism is still being asserted. Engels is still assuming that political,
nationalist, intellectual, artistic, religious, etc., activities are ultimately, i.e. really, dependent on and derivative from economic phenomena. A genuine pluralism would reject the whole monism-implying distinction between structure and superstructure and recognize that the various types of non-economic phenomena, while they interact with one another and with economic phenomena, are genuine, independent social phenomena, and furthermore, partly as a result of that, economic phenomena however prominent they are in history are sometimes not the decisive or determining factors in given social or historical situations.

Nor is an acceptable answer provided by those later Marxists, such as Gramsci and Lukacs, who made play with alterations to the classical view of the relation between the base and superstructure to the extent or arguing that the various parts of the latter, such as political forms and class consciousness, need not depend on the former—so that e.g. the superstructure can actually lag in time behind the economic base. But such qualifications aren't made on behalf of a genuine pluralism—or on behalf of a genuine attempt to set out a testable scientific theory; if they were we should expect them to be expressed (a) in a clear way by abandoning Marx's now admitted to be misleading superstructure metaphor, and (b) not in a context geared to referring to the "crises" or "contradictions" of capitalism and why it hasn't collapsed yet. Instead, what emerges from decades of such non-thoroughgoing concessions to pluralism is that they were merely attempts to save from falsification certain key explanations and predictions of classical Marxism. Why did the (inevitable) revolution so unobligingly keep failing to occur in capitalist countries, or why was the coming of the "classless society" so constantly delayed in the established Communist countries? Because of the lack of correlation between the base and the superstructure. But the assumption regularly and insistently made was that this lack of correlation stemmed from some aberration, some "anachronism" or some "accident", and was merely temporary; i.e., that some day the superstructure would do as it should and fall in line with the economic base—which is where the classical monistic view was smuggled in again.

Whereas in genuine pluralist theory, the conclusions to be drawn on the available evidence (obvious enough long before the dissolution of the USSR) is that Communist controlled revolutions are extremely unlikely to occur in advanced capitalist countries, that genuine "proletarian" revolutions may never occur anywhere, and that the conception of the classless society is quite Utopian.

**Pluralism**

When these criticisms of social atomism and monism are brought together they can be seen to give strong support to an intermediate realistic position of social pluralism/complexism.

It is not individuals (either in the mass or in the restricted form of leaders) that are the principal social determinants. Separate persons aren't really isolated or unitary phenomena; we have to take account of trans-individual complexities, various forms of psychosocial activity which occur in individual persons and which, in association with like forms of activity in other individuals, constitute forces and factors that have a positive, highly influential place in social affairs. But also, contrary to monistic views such as Marxism, we don't have one social whole or system or complex of which these forces and factors are mere ingredients. There is no
such thing as *the* purpose, function, business, or way of working, of society. What we have is a variety of ways of working, a variety of sub-wholes or sub-complexes and other interdependent phenomena made up of forms of activity that pass through individuals.

These various phenomena, some of which will be discussed in detail as we proceed, include social groups, organizations, movements, social causes and other complexes in which individuals directly participate, together with separable intermeshing factors such as social beliefs and myths, political apathy or inertia, the force of tradition, the submerged psychological stimuli for social attitudes and values. Pluralism emphasizes the existence and influence of these various phenomena and the crisscrossing relations amongst them.

3. CLASSES, ELITES, DEMOCRACY

*Social Relations*

The categories of relation and degree, in association with that of difference, have special significance in the social field in regard to questions about co-operation and conflict, and about power and status divisions.

Except for mistaken theories about the origins of society which ask e.g. how did individuals come to end "the law of the jungle" and form society? no problem is posed by the fact of the occurrence of social harmony in the form of co-operation, solidarity, integration and so on within given societies and in the form of periods of peace between nations. In the pluralist view it is equally evident that internal and external conflict also occurs to a very considerable extent in social affairs—for instance, members of social groups notably co-operate with each other, or groups with other groups, or nations with other nations, in order to carry on conflicts with other groups or other nations. However, this is disputed by various "harmony" or "social unity" theorists who do not so much deny the existence of wars, struggles for political power, struggles for freedom, religious clashes, racial clashes, and so on, as regard these things as aberrations, and seek to minimize their prevalence by making *moral* claims about how social disagreements ought to be settled by rational, co-operative human beings. In other words, unsubstantiated, wishful thinking theories of atomism and voluntarism are once more being assumed. That is why Hegel and Marx, for example, are in a much stronger theoretical position in stressing the integral place in history of wars and other social antagonisms and tensions; although it has to be added that their views on this issue are not thoroughgoing as they are advanced in relation to their monistic and teleological presuppositions, according to which social harmony or unity will after all prevail in the end: when the Absolute finally achieves self-realization (Hegel), when the classless society arrives and history proper begins (Marx).
Better than their views is that of Heraclitus who, in the very beginnings of social thought, recognized that conflict is an irremovable, categorial feature of social affairs when he said: "Homer was wrong in saying: 'Would that strife might perish from among gods and men!' He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass way."[1]

**Social Group Divisions**
Conflict and co-operation, together with such relations as dominance and subordination, have a certain evident bearing on social divisions such as those into classes or between elites and non-elites.

Among theories bearing on this subject, at one extreme is Marx's theory, to which I will return in a moment and at the opposite extreme is A.F. Berkley's pioneer treatment of multiple groups and group interests [2] as the subjects for study in this context. According to him there are in society innumerable groups—which vary from large groups of people based on such principles of classification as citizenship, race, economic interests, religion or language, down to membership of small organizations and of families. Such groups and their associated interests are not necessarily polarized but may intersect or crisscross with other groups and interests. Such interests, while including economic interests, are by no means confined to them; consequently Bentley endorses the criticisms of Marx's classes that they are made too hard and fast and are too narrowly based on economic criteria.

Still, while there are indeed many such groups we have to recognize there are variations in their strength and influence. The family, for instance, is very important in the personal life of most people and in shaping their early acceptance of various social traditions and beliefs; or again, what Max Weber called the "status group" is often important in the life of small communities; but neither of these have the same direct influence in socio-political affairs as certain other groups. In particular, as is disclosed by historical record and contemporary observation all societies have hierarchical-dominance features which include the concentration of greater power, wealth, privilege and prestige in the hands of certain identifiable small minority groups, and the correspondingly inferior position in varying degrees of a large majority set of groups. However, while that is obvious to the point of being "undebatable" as Raymond Aron has said, [3] it by no means commits us to Marx's too monistic, and mostly economic, treatment of the subject.

**Ruling Groups**
The classical Marxist theory does forcefully draw attention (in a way writers are not noted for doing today) to the economic structure of capitalist societies and the place in them of ownership of the means of production by leading capitalists—or members of the "high bourgeoisie"—and the inordinate power wielded by, and the inordinate financial rewards accruing to, these small social groups. And this is so even though capitalism did not develop and then collapse in the way Marx envisioned, but developed in the imperialist way stressed by Lenin, and in recent times has developed in ways that include large
profit-making activities of multi-national corporations especially in backward countries, and the worker numbers reducing technological advances in Western countries, not to speak of today's extensive currency speculations and manipulations.

But Marx tied his analyses in with his claim in *The Communist Manifesto* that "The executive of the modern State is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie", when the fact is that that assumption of a homogeneous and harmonious ruling class is mistaken.

To take a specific case, if Marxists looked for a plausible example today of a developed country that supports their view, about the best they could do would be to cite a country like Australia. A handful of rich entrepreneurs in this country (i.e., fewer in proportion man e.g. in the USA or Britain) do appear to have extraordinary influence—thus considerably reducing the real power of the political section of ruling groups vis-a-vis economic sections. But even so, Australia scarcely satisfies classical Marxist claims. To make the point by reference to a crude example, back in 1989-90 there was a domestic airlines pilots' strike, which when it was broken led to the emigration of hundreds of well qualified Australian pilots. In the course of the strike, Prime Minister Hawke did give the pilots' private enterprise employer, Ansett Airlines, every support, including assistance from the Australian Air Force, and generally acted and sounded as if he were an agent of the company's chairman. However, this was well publicized in the media and regarded as surprising—i.e., as an exceptional case. Admittedly (Australia is a small nation state) our main political parties often obviously promote the interests of powerful local and multi-national corporations, but if the Marxist view were correct our leaders ought always to be acting in something like the cited Hawke way.

A different approach found in some of Marx's writings is emphasised by a Marx scholar, Jon Elster, who claims [4] that after 1848 Marx really abandoned his simple economics theory for a new modified theory. (If so, it is a pity that Marx did not tell his disciples this as then and later they chose to endorse his initial theory.) This theory seeks to accommodate historical facts such as Louis Bonaparte's rule in France and the fact that the governing politicians in Britain in the 19th century were not capitalists but usually men drawn from the landowning aristocratic elite. This later theory is what Elster calls an "abdication theory" according to which the capitalists abdicated, or abstained, from direct exercise of power because it suited the interests of their class to have the working class weakened into fighting on "two fronts": against economic exploitation and political oppression. However, as Elster points out there is no direct evidence to support this and a better explanation is that the capitalists were too busy with their economic affairs to wish to be politicians, and furthermore that on the main point the independence and power of the State was greater man that allowed for by Marx in this modified theory.

In general such ruling or dominant groups usually have a looser or less cohesive character than the Marxists make out. While such groups do have various interests in common—including an underlying joint interest in ensuring that neither the electorate nor any large groups from the other classes have real, aware, decision-making powers in regard to crucial issues—there are ordinarily divisions
within the ranks of big capitalist power-wielders (including today between national capitalists and multi-national ones), and within the ranks of leading politicians and high officials, as well as between these main groups. However, there can in this respect be considerable variations. Thus, for example, in certain historical periods or situations a given ruling group—or, alternatively, a given opposition group, or a given revolutionary and potential new ruling group—can profit from a special unity of purpose and will. Furthermore, there is the now notorious weakness of standard Marxist theory that it does not account for the bureaucratic class that rose up after 1917 and for so long ruled the USSR and other European Communist countries and still does in China and North Korea (and more a typically in Cuba) and whose rule was or is marked by an extraordinary concentration of power coupled with an extraordinary amount of repression.

**Ruled Groups**

In the case of Marx's imagined homogeneous working class that was, and has increasingly become, heterogeneous. Coupled with that, in regard to relations between ruling and ruled groups it is not just a matter as Marx claims of economic exploitation, or of this assisted by political domination (when that is added as a junior partner) which has central or decisive influence on history and society. Instead there is a pluralism of socio-psychological relations that can exert independent influence in varying ways, including co-operative relations (for these of course do occur between rulers and the ruled) and relations of a power-asserting antagonistic, authoritarian/servile, exploitative and hierarchical kind. Likewise such relations can occur within the ranks of the ruling group and especially within the ranks of ruled groups in a variety of ways.

With regard to the variety of groups within the non-elite (to start using that term), some of them were recognized by Marx himself, notably in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* where, in addition to the petty bourgeoisie and the rural population, he noted such extra groups as the lumpen proletariat, the intellectuals, the army and the clergy. It can be granted too that some Marx-influenced historians have been informative and factual on class issues, such as Albert Soboul in giving an account of the place of the sans culottes—the lower class Parisians who made up a radical movement of great importance in crucial phases of the French Revolution. But these are side points as the standard claim of Marxism is that the prime class is that of the workers, who are supposed to be a cohesive class, and where they are not mat is only because of their lack of awareness of themselves as a class and consequent lack of "revolutionary consciousness", which in certain situations prevents them (supposedly temporarily, for aberrant reasons) from becoming active forces in the class struggle.

But this attempt to minimize variety within the non-elite will not stand up empirically for a number of reasons.

As historians point out, since the late nineteenth century, despite extensive profit-taking by capitalist owners and managers and despite slumps and recessions, a good deal of wealth created has often been shared in by the work force in Western countries. This accentuated and added to the variety of interests and outlooks to be found within the non-elite. Many of its members have always formed hostile attitudes towards ruling groups on the strength of natural resentment, egalitarian idealism, and union militancy, but many others
have been quite prepared to accept things as they are (whether e.g. through political apathy, the influence of ideology, or a desire to do well for themselves). People in particular occupations are often quite prepared to do well at the expense of other workers—as when they work for very profitable companies, or for State-funded public services such as the Australian federal public service whose members have, compared with the rest of the work force, for many years profited greatly from relatively high salaries, job security and other special privileges. Furthermore, as a particular source of division and friction there has been the continuing widespread phenomenon of people in jobs, often good jobs, retaining or increasing their wages at the expense of increasingly great numbers of unemployed—and in association with that, e.g. in Australia, the recent remarkable increase in the number of part-time employees, especially women, at the expense of full-time ones, who are often men who become permanently unemployed.
These developments have connections with what seems to be the onset, after a long period of rising and partly fulfilled expectations, of a new period of reduced economic returns for a great many people: declining real buying power of wages and salaries, many husbands and wives being impelled to have jobs if they can, and so on. If this situation continues, it can be expected to exacerbate friction (a) between the lower classes and the dominant capitalist elites who are doing so well under the auspices of market forces economics and ideology, and (b) amongst groups within the non-elite as they compete for diminishing benefits and privileges. For instance, as an example of the latter in Australia, various vociferous groups (the public servants just mentioned, the greatly expanded class of university people, the ethnic, women’s, literary grant, and so on minorities and lobby groups) which have been well looked after by the federal government, may be subjected to internal conflicts and to greater opposition from the majority non-subsidy etc. receiving sections of the population. In the case of (a) it can be recalled that radical writers such as Herbert Marcuse were arguing decades ago that what kept well paid workers like the American ones saturated with ruling class values was their access to motor cars, all sorts of consumer’s goods, and so on—with the Marxist implication that it was this that stopped them from developing “revolutionary consciousness”. We don’t have to agree with that—the evidence of history is that the workers, or for that matter any large social group, very rarely become radicalized. But we can say that, given the contemporary state of Western new wealth creation which has been noticeably resulting in “the rich becoming richer and the poor poorer”, there will be a return to influential radicalization within the lower classes and probably the emergence of new revolutionary-type doctrines that will stress—rather than in the contemporary way deny or skate over—social conflicts.

Then, as another significant type of group heterogeneity, there are the conflicts of attitude involving differences of race, religion, culture and language. There are mentions of these in Marx’s writings, e.g., in the case of English and Irish workers, coupled with suggestions that such conflicts are engineered by the ruling class for its own ends—for which there is no evidence; ruling classes may certainly exploit and profit from them but they don’t usually create them. But for the most part these phenomena were ignored by Marx as sources of class tension and antagonism—perhaps like atomistic-minded commentators on the same subject today he thought that, as they weren’t based on very logical attitudes, they would simply go away. In fact, such phenomena were quite powerful in Marx’s own time, and in quite recent times have become even more so.

Compare the continuing conflicts within the work force in a variety of countries brought on by differences of race, religion, or of languages spoken. Then, as an increasingly acute problem in Western Europe, there is the hostility between native and immigrant workers, which has been exacerbated by recession, and in the 1990s by hundreds of thousands of people of different races and religions coming e.g. into France, Italy and Germany. Such antagonisms may be deplored from a freedom-loving point of view, but it is realistic to recognize that they exist and in an acute form at the moment, and it is unrealistic to believe that they are merely the work of troublemakers and that imprisoning e.g. a few neo-
Nazis will produce racial harmony.

Mosca and Pareto

If we are to have a serviceable general theory about ruling and ruled groups, it is much better to proceed independently of Marx and make an analysis along the elite theory lines developed by the Italian sociologists Mosca and Pareto. Their views, or improved versions of their views, are part of the realistic pluralist position, and there is much material about them in the literature, including of course in Pareto's case about his economics. There has also been discussion about which of them had priority in introducing the theory, where the answer seems clearly to be Mosca. However, Mosca used the term "ruling class" and Pareto's "elite" is clearly preferable, not least because it is not Marxist-laden. As Michels, who is usually treated in conjunction with Mosca and Pareto, places more stress than they do on theory of social organizations, consideration of him will be deferred until the next chapter.

Gaetano Mosca, in his theory of the "ruling class" or the "political class" argued that in all societies, whether relatively simple or of a complex modern kind, contain a minority ruling class and a majority class that is ruled over. "The first class," he says, "always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent."[5] The ruling class itself consists of two strata, a small group of high level leaders, and a larger "second stratum" of political and intellectual leaders, without whom power could not be exercised and who carry out the directions of the higher stratum, and may themselves be recruited into that stratum. The self confidence and authority of the ruling class is accentuated by the existence of a political formula in which both it and the ruled classes believe (e.g. feudal values, bourgeois democracy, socialism), although such beliefs and associated concepts like the will of God, the will of the people, the sovereignty of the State, are in fact mythical. Furthermore, history is not static; social forces—including but consisting of far more than economic forces—affect the possession of power by the ruling classes. When such a class encounters threats to its dominance, it may survive if it is politically clever and if its ranks, especially the lower second stratum, are open to entry by able members of the ruled class. If not, or if adverse social forces in any case become too strong, the ruling class will be overthrown, e.g. by revolution.

There are some differences between Mosca's and Pareto's positions, as Mosca's rulers are conceived in a more traditional way and as being motivated or inspired more by their sense of legitimacy (by acceptance of the political formula in which they and the obedient masses believe), whereas Pareto places much more stress on possession by the rulers of certain psychological characteristics. But basically their views are alike as Pareto makes points about the rise, recruitment and decline of elites similar to those of Mosca noted above, although Pareto does so in a more complex way and with a great profusion of examples.

Pareto's initial formulation of his position in Les Systemes
Socialistes in 1903 was much more of a direct attack on Marxism than his later writings, but in his elaborate *Trattato di Sociologia Generals* [6] in 1916 (Pareto was bi-lingual) he went on to include what he thought were defensible parts of Marx, and of Machiavelli and Vico, in a wider more pluralistic system of his own.

Pareto introduces the conception of *elite* as a description of those people who excel in any branch of human activity: it includes the people who are outstanding as chess-players, lawyers, mistresses, poets... and in political affairs. The last group forms a *governing elite*, i.e., it is made up of people who in a direct or indirect way have a considerable influence on government. It is an elite, not for moral reasons or because it necessarily has ability in other ways, but because it is *excellent at gaining or maintaining power and privilege*. The rest of society is a non-elite of subject classes. Pareto also refers to a "non-governing elite" which consists of those who excel as chess-players etc., but this is unhelpful as chess-players and so on seldom have any influence in politics. It is better to specify, as I will do, a second level *auxiliary elite* (parallel to Mosca’s "second stratum") which does have some influence. The governing elite always meets with some opposition from members of the non-elite, and this, together with class or elite circulation, is of the greatest importance in leading to social changes. Elites, it should be made clear, are affected by "circulation of elites" in two ways. (1) There is movement of new individuals into (and other individuals out of) the elite in given countries, and generally speaking an elite will last much longer if there is a good deal of social mobility in the shape of recruitment into it of members of the lower or governed classes. But (2), no elite is permanent; for various socio-political reasons, even if it lasts for centuries in the long historical run any elite declines and is overthrown by a new elite.

Pareto’s sociology, especially his theory of *sentiments*, will be looked at in some detail in chapter 6 but because of their connection with his theory of elites mention needs to be made here of two of the main sentiments and associated psychological characteristics he lists. These are:

**Class I** "Combining" sentiments. People in whom these characteristics prevail tend to be innovative, flexible, progressive, scheming, cunning, concerned with the present and material rewards. In terms of a contrast made by Machiavelli in *The Prince* between "foxes" and "lions" in politics such people are "foxes".
Class II "Persistence of Aggregates". People in whom these characteristics are strong are steadfast and reliable rather than clever or crafty, and tend to be conservative, loyal, morally dedicated, concerned with the future, and willing to use or condone the use of force. In politics they are "lions".

There is an all important contrast between Class I sentiments (supplemented by individualistic sentiments) and Class II sentiments (supplemented by sociality ones) the relative preponderance of which greatly affects the political nature of a given society and the way its classes circulate. Unlike popular beliefs which can change quite quickly, sentiments in fact change very little in society as a whole. There is, as it were, a permanent pool of different sentiments in a society, but they are not evenly distributed in all sections of the people. Thus, Class II sentiments always have their greatest intensity in the more uneducated and underprivileged strata of society, but in some sections of society—especially me more educated strata—sentiments can change quite quickly.

It is generally agreed that Pareto's reference to sentiments does not have the explanatory power he appears to have believed it had. But even so it can be seen that it does bring out in an evocative way a connection between the presence in groups of social agents of certain psycho-moral attitudes and certain important types of social occurrences. Compare the following two of his many examples.

Nations can be contrasted by reference to the sentiments that prevail in their classes, especially their ruling elites. In the Peloponnesian War (431404 B.C.) for example, there was a marked contrast between Athens and Sparta. In Athens Class I sentiments were dominant in the ruling class elite so that its members were clever and adventurous, but lacked firmness of purpose, whereas the Spartan leaders had reverse qualities because of the dominance of Class II sentiments. Again, with reference to modem parliamentary democracy, the contrast usually works in this way: in the electorate as a whole Class II attitudes prevail, but while this means that every political party must make some appeal to principles, ideals etc. in order to gain support, the distribution of sentiments is different amongst party politicians themselves. All parties possess some members in whom Class II values prevail and who help to give the party a reputation for honesty, loyalty to principles etc., but if there are too many men of this kind we get an intransigent party doomed to stay out of power. Successful parties thus have a majority of members rich in Class I sentiments but there is a further division amongst them between people who are concerned to pursue material benefits in the form of money, and those who are more interested in power and honours.

In the case of revolutions different qualities are needed. Revolutions are made by members of the non-elite who are rich in Class II characteristics, such as dedication to ideals, steadfastness of purpose, and a willingness to use force—as is illustrated by the famous cases of Cromwell and the Ironsides, Robespierre and the Jacobins, Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Mao Zedong and the Chinese of the "Long March". But if "lions"
with Class II qualities are needed to overthrow an old elite, the help of "foxes" with Class I characteristics is needed to maintain the new elite in power. Once an elite has established itself the use of force becomes less, desirable and needs to be replaced by political strategy, and in the course of time this is accompanied by a decline in the strength of the original ideals and a coining into prominence of new, more careerist-minded people. In other words, the Class II values gradually give way to those of Class I; the "lions" begin to be replaced by "foxes". Pareto spends some time discussing the conditions under which a governing elite can prolong its tenure of power and points out that an elite will last much longer if it succeeds in recruiting able men from the subject class, particularly men in whom Class II residues are strong. But revolution cannot be indefinitely postponed. In the long run Class I sentiments accumulate in the governing elite, and potential "lions" in the non-elite are more and more alienated by the increasing lack of principle, spread of corruption etc., in the elite. In the end revolution occurs. That is why "History is a graveyard of aristocracies".[7]

**Elite Theories**

As pioneer elite theorists, Pareto and Mosca thus offer us a broad theory of ruling or dominating elites which is a realistic improvement on the classical Marxist view with its underemphasis on the possession of political power and its Utopian illusions about conflict between classes being superseded by an eliteless world. Furthermore, of course, although they formulated their theories before the Russian Revolution occurred, what they have to say has been very much to the point because of its easy application to the new Communist ruling groups.

But because of the range and generality of their theories, there has been a good deal of argument about how correct they are—though some of this has been brought on by crude applications of what they say which neglect complexities they allow for. In particular, there is the question, Are they too inflexible on unvarying in their conception of the ruling elite, and do they treat the elite as too tightly unified and undivided in its actions and outlook? It does seem true, for example, that Mosca (going the opposite way to Marx) treats the elite in a too narrowly political way. But I think Pareto can be largely defended against this charge if we pay sufficient attention to his account of *economic interests* and to the existence of various divisions between financiers and politicians. Furthermore, he rejects "conspiracy" views and other atomistic conceptions of the elite, and points out, for instance: "Ruling classes, like other social groups, perform both logical and non-logical actions, and the chief element in what happens is in fact the order or system, not the conscious will of individuals, who indeed may in certain cases be carried by the system to points where they would never have gone of deliberate choice." [8]

A theory of Pareto's type is acceptable as a general theory providing it is presented in a flexible way and allows for pluralism within the ranks of the elite—of which, for example,
there is past and present evidence even with Communist Russia and China. Such a mostly descriptive theory will not be very predictive and will not of course satisfy mistaken demands for a rigorously "scientific" theory of elites, as have been made by critics who either seek to defend Marx or else hanker after some equivalent "simple law" type approach to the subject. It is possible future inquiry will refine elite theory and its core concepts by making it more explanatory, and in some respects more predictive, but if so, that will be in the direction of finding complex law-like propositions as distinct from satisfying Marx-model expectations.

Various other writers have at different times set forth their own versions of what kind of elite is, or is about to be, in power; in each case putting forward a more specific view than Mosca and Pareto did. The first of these was Bakunin who, as I noted earlier, foresaw that Marx's socialism would lead to rule by Statist bureaucrats. Others include Thorstein Veblen who placed emphasis on engineers as the rulers of the future; Waclaw Machajski who developed a theory about intellectuals—along with bureaucrats and managers—as filling this role; Max Nomad who had a partly similar view; Bruno Rizzi, an ex-Trotskyist who in La bureaucratisation du monde (1939) foreshadowed rule by "world bureaucrats"; James Burnham who specified managers; and C. Wright Mills who analysed the American power elite as consisting of people who exercise power through three sets of interlocking institutions—political, military and business.

Of these, I will say something now about Burnham, and about Machajski and Nomad in the next chapter.

Burnham was for a time particularly influential. A professional philosopher, he first supported, then broke with Trotsky, and in 1941 published The Managerial Revolution. He followed this up with The Machiavellians (1943) in which he gave renewed publicity to the views, among others, of Mosca and Pareto. Later he became a leading theorist for the American Right.

In writing The Managerial Revolution Burnham made use of theories then in the air including those of Mosca, Pareto, Machajski, Nomad and Rizzi. [9] He argued that Marx was right about the coming of the revolution but wrong about its nature. The old capitalist rulers would be replaced, not by the workers, but by a new managerial and bureaucratic class which exercised dual economic and political control. Illustrations (he was writing during the war) were the rulers of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Soviet Russia, and he saw a lesser step in the same direction being made by the people who were exercising power in President Roosevelt's New Deal administration. Also, for instance, Australian supporters of Burnham cited as further illustrations the growth in Australia during and after the war of the public service bureaucracy and of managerial and technocratic directors of affairs. [10]

Burnham furthermore argued that under capitalism a change was discernible in that power was passing from the formal capital owners of the "productive forces" to the
actual supervisory and productive managers of capitalist enterprises; and he thought such managers were similarly becoming more powerful in Russia and Germany.

Although Burnham's theory is largely ignored today (because it went against the current of subsequent radical optimism?), as a broad position it is certainly on the right track in describing and anticipating the part that has come increasingly to be played in both State and business affairs by managers, planners, technical experts, senior supervisors, and so on. However, as a specific delineation of elites Burnham's theory can be criticized because he treats the elite in a too tight or narrow way, and furthermore his sweeping claims have not been empirically confirmed. (He was rightly criticized by Orwell in this regard for his numerous but mistaken predictions.) Thus, there is no good evidence that in Communist countries it is the production managers who were or are in a position of superior power rather than the controllers of the party apparatus. As Anderson, an early serious critic of Burnham pointed out "It is unfortunate that Burnham, while he clearly delineates certain of the characters of the new ruling class, comes down on the side of management rather than direction (of the internal rather than the external relations of enterprises) as its main distinguishing feature. This involves an underestimation of the importance of political monopoly, of centralized direction by 'the party'." [11]

It may be added that Anderson, who wished to emphasize struggling for freedom as against acquiescing in servility, suggested that Burnham's view of history was marred by a lack of concern with moral issues. This criticism was taken further by Rush Rhees when he said Burnham in his treatment of social forces "almost seems to mink of them as physical forces without ideas. But the force of any opposition does depend partly on the consciousness with which it is exercised; or on the degree to which those who carry it on are alive to the issue at stake. Otherwise the 'social force' is likely to grow servile and present no real opposition." [12] However, it may be questioned whether this criticism is justified. Certainly Burnham, like Pareto (or for that matter Marx when he is referring to bourgeois "illusions") does take a kind of toughminded joy in pointing out that the sort of socio-political beliefs which flourish and are widely believed in any society are mostly devoid of any evidence in their favour, and this may lead him to talk less about beliefs and more about other social forces. Still, Burnham does not deny the power of beliefs in history; it is rather that while he refers to the need to fight for freedom, he takes it that straightforward, thinking, spontaneous, non-servile ways of going on are less strong in history than Anderson and Rhees imply, and he places more stress than they do on treating prevalent social beliefs as false or illusory and not in the main part to be taken at their face value.

Returning to managers, as some critics have pointed out Burnham is too unitary in his account of managers; the business situation is more fluid and pluralistic than he makes out and includes, for instance, significant distinctions between managers of big businesses and those of smaller ones. At the higher level the
rise of the managers vis-a-vis the owners in the directing of economic affairs is also pluralistic. There are various interlocking connections between owners and managers including increasing use of committee systems; some individual owners still do exercise immense power—e.g. Murdoch and Packer in Australia; and there is also the common phenomenon of highly successful managers becoming sizable owners themselves. Nevertheless, many people who are more managers than they are owners do exercise much power in the case of today's very important multi-national organizations, as well as in deciding the investment policies etc. of big banks, big insurance firms, and big superannuation bodies.

Such managers also exercise much political power, but more indirectly, e.g. on and through political parties, politicians and bureaucrats.

Summed up, Burnham correctly draws attention to the great and growing importance of managerial elites in society. But in his overall view he attributes too much power to them. Within Communist—and other totalitarian—countries, the decisive wielders of power have been the leading politicians and the senior bureaucrats—the "policrats" or "bureauticians"—rather than the economic managers (which is a view that may be subjected to empirical tests in the near future if crucial conflicts develop in China between the Party and the managers of the big enterprises); and within capitalist democracies it is groupings of bureaucrats, manager-owners, and big owners who make up the controlling elite—though it can be added that with the growth in Europe of the E.C. as an international State structure it may be that (as in effect history's replacement there of disappearing Communist Statist elites) international bureaucrats of the Brussels type will come to comprise the dominant sections of the elite.

Elites and Democracy

Elite theory has been criticized especially by theorists often described as "pluralist democrats". Sometimes in the literature they are merely called "pluralists" which is misleading because (a) as was noted earlier, the one term is used to express a moral preference and to convey what is the case, and (b) as a matter of fact the most dictatorial of regimes such as hard-line Communist and Third World ones are pluralistic to some extent in that there are (or were) some differing and conflicting forces in their institutions. Sometimes too, the people who regard themselves as pluralist democrats are merely defenders of democracy in an atomistic way (e.g. numerous newspaper writers), but usually they do take account of parts played by social complexes.

A leading example is Robert A. Dahl. He developed a now well-known theory [13] according to which democracy in an ideal and so far unobtained sense is contrasted with polyarchy, or more limited forms of democracy in which, among other things, citizens are far from equal in their influence on government. In contrast with dictatorships, Western countries are examples of polyarchies because they have the institutions of democracy including free and fair elections, freedom of speech and criticism, and freedom to form relatively independent
organizations or associations such as political parties, trade unions, and interest groups. This last point is an important one as it takes us beyond an individualist account of voters and their elected representatives to what Dahl has called "organizational pluralism" or "associational pluralism", according to which democratic processes are especially furthered by the interplay of the government and various organizations and associations.

A special difficulty arises with business organizations, especially large corporations, owing to their powerful place in society and their possession of tendencies inimical to democracy. This has worried pluralist democrats including Dahl in his later theory, and led them (mixing value and policy preferences with a study of how capitalist corporations do operate) to consider how greater democracy could be introduced into the business world. Thus, in another work, [14] Dahl takes up the question of "stockholder democracy" and argues that business firms themselves could be governed in a polyarchic way and so far as voting is concerned, this would best take the form, not of having number of votes determined by number of shares held as at present, nor of having just one vote for each shareholder, but of having a firm governed by its employees—now become "owner-workers"—each of whom has one vote. No doubt that would make big firms—including multi-national ones?—more democratic and so might help to make society as a whole more democratic. But Dahl admits that the problem (really a problem of social atomism) is how to pass from existing hierarchical control to a polyarchic way of running economic organizations. Another problem would be that, just as Dahl and other pluralist democrats neglect anti-democratic features that arise in organizations such as political parties and trade unions, parallel features could be expected to develop within "owner-worker" firms.

Pluralist democrats, in criticizing elite theory on behalf of their own position tend to assume that if there are elites they will be tightly cohesive and conspiratorial (i.e., of the kind C. Wright Mills took his power elite to be). But such an elite they argue does not exist e.g. in the USA, and so that country can be regarded to be considerable extent as a genuine democracy. In Dahl's case, for example, despite his recognition of the political influence of large economic enterprises and of the lack of political equality amongst citizens of polyarchies, he remains critical of elite or minority domination theory. This is partly because he treats the elite as having to be of a "solidary" or Marx-type unheterogeneous kind, and partly too because—with his visions of future improved democracy—he is anxious to deny Mosca's and Pareto's claim that minority domination is inevitable. Likewise, in talking about and demanding evidence for "the chain of control between rulers and ruled" he is setting up a too simple or inflexible view of control or complete dominance. He takes it that either a dominant elite has exclusive control of government decisions and encounters only negligible opposition, or else it is just one more minority, like farmers, old age pensioners, or environmentalists, struggling to further its interests.

But as against that view, we can affirm a third alternative:
the existence of a more modified, more flexible type of elite. Such an elite, in present-day Western democracies, has diversity and is subject to some internal conflicts, and indeed does not control, or exclusively dominate, policy-making, and the non-elite—or sections of it—regularly exerts considerable influence, especially in cases where the interests of the elite are not vitally involved. Nevertheless, the elite is not just one influential minority among many: it is dominant in the sense of exercising much greater influence than any other minority or class or interest group. It is true that verifying evidence about how exactly this influence is exercised is hard to come by. Even in the crude case of overt political corruption and venality, while we know it extensively occurs, solid evidence has rarely been forthcoming, and all the less so about donations to parties, the interconnection of long-standing or temporary affinities of interest, networks of personal associations and friendships, the ability of leading politicians, bureaucrats and entrepreneurs to anticipate wishes, give and return favours, and so on. Little about this could be established according to the canons of court of law evidence, or of course by scientific experiment, but still there are plenty of historical and current affairs clues to enable a social theory detective to form at least a plausible hypothesis on the subject.

Contrary to the pluralist democrats there is thus a compatibility between elites and the existence of definite democratic tendencies. In fact Mosca in his later thought came to sponsor such a view when he maintained that parliamentary democracy provided a balance between elite or aristocratic rule and democratic openness and interplay, and made possible the gradual invigoration of the elite by the addition of aspiring able people from the lower classes.

In this compatibility view, the exercise of power and the enjoyment of privilege is concentrated in the ranks of the elite; the members of which are anti-democratic in their power-wielding practices (whatever claims to the contrary they may sometimes happen to profess). But mere can be important variations in the degree of cohesion and unity of purpose to be found within given elites in given countries. Pareto's theory, for example, does, or at least can be made to, work in that way. As already suggested, his theory can flexibly accommodate both political and economic sections of the ruling elite—"plutocrats" or entrepreneurs along with politicians and bureaucrats, and we can add military sections in countries where they are important. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, in conjunction with the ruling or dominant elite we can take account of the auxiliary elite, which consists of second rung politicians, capitalists, administrators, and soon, and increasingly nowadays the class of prominent media people, education administrators, lobby group spokespersons, and other "opinion formers"—who all have a stake in the system and gain privileges, status and sometimes considerable influence from their position, but have no real power in relation to fundamental economic and political decisions. This auxiliary elite will also normally be rather more heterogeneous than the ruling elite, and it also provides a pool of personnel for recruitment into the ruling elite, just as parts of the non-elite do for recruitment into the auxiliary elite—or, in very fluid societies, such as the USA in the late nineteenth century and in recently turned
capitalist Russia, directly into the ruling elite. Pareto, as we saw, furthermore rejects the "conspiracy theory" of history, including as applied to members of the elite, and the flexibility of his theory enables it to be easily applied, as well as in totalitarian countries, to two party systems in which there are rival sections of the elite drawn from competing political parties and their economic and other backers.

Such a complex conception of the ruling elite as compatible with varying possibilities suggests—as another reflection of the category of degree—a kind of range of types of factual cases. If we start with Oriental despoticisms of the sort that have been analysed by Karl Wittfogel, [15] we have cases where there is little diversity within the ruling elite. These have parallels today with the fairly simple military dictatorships sometimes found in South America and elsewhere. Then in more complex regimes such as the Roman Empire, Nazi Germany, and Communist ones, we have dictatorial ruling elites, but ones marked by greater internal diversity, and also by certain differences. For example, in the case of Nazi Germany there was a surprising and continuing social mobility in which members of the lower classes were able to rise in various areas sometimes to high rank, in ways that were unthinkable under the Kaiser or in the Weimar Republic. [16] Whereas in the Communist cases, while there was an initial wholesale replacement of the original landowning and capitalist elites by new Communist elites and auxiliary elites drawn mainly from the lower classes, that was a once only occurrence.

Democratic Sub-Range

The "more democratic" end of the elite-range can be amplified by making distinctions in terms of degrees of democracy—i.e., we have a democratic sub-range as well. Thus, moving from overt dictatorships, there are various plainly elite-controlled countries, e.g. a number of black African States, where there is the appearance but not the reality of democratic processes; then countries such as the Philippines where there is some democracy mainly residing in the competition between two wealthy elites; special cases such as Singapore's modified authoritarian democracy which, however, differs from most Third World countries in being economically efficient and non-corrupt, and differently, South Africa which for many years had a Western-type democracy but for whites only. Then, there is a situation such as that in Turkey where the military elite (following a tradition established by Kemal Ataturk) has maintained an independence of the political and economic elites and tried to be a guardian of viable two party electoral democracy. Then, further along the range, we have the established Western democracies, which differ from one another in certain ways too, and whose elites are less cohesive and have their ascendancy and their share of the "spoils", particularly in the case of the auxiliary elites, determined to some extent by the results of elections.

Then, further on, we have the remarkable case of Switzerland. Although that country does possess a rather cohesive elite (which has most of the capital and enjoys various privileges—for instance, in practice its members make up most of
the officers of the "citizen army"), owing to its harmonious overcoming of internal racial, religious and linguistic differences, the existence of decentralized cantons and frequent use of referenda, there has been an unusual amount of active democracy there—all the more so after 1971 when women were finally given a vote in federal elections and in almost all of the cantons (and at last in all of them in 1991). It would be an even more democratic country if its main organizations including financial ones had internal democracy (in the way suggested by Dahl) but it is, of course, Utopian to envisage Swiss banks and big firms operating in that way.

As this last point suggests, there are unrealized further stages in the democratic sub-range. The final stage would be one in which a country's organizations or associations had genuine internal democracy and co-operated in workable ways with one another, while the centralized State organizations would either not exist or have very little power.

For this ideal to be realized, it would be necessary for all or at least most people to be aware and active in socio-political affairs, which is something in history to which there has only been a limited, temporary approximation at times of crisis and great change (such as replacement of an old elite by a new one)—as in certain phases of the French Revolution of 1789-1794 and in some of the early Soviets of the Russian Revolution. Furthermore, the strong tendency towards oligarchy in organizations (which will be discussed next) would need obligingly to vanish.

It is, however, possible to envisage some socially possible situations in which there is more than the present customary amount of democracy. Early in this century much attention was paid to in radical thought to conceptions, such as those of the grass roots self help approach of syndicalism and the related but less confrontational and more amenable to other groups approach of Guild Socialism, which looked, respectively, to the end or to a great reduction of the powers of the State. But such conceptions were largely abandoned owing to the onset of faith in the apparent success of Soviet State Communism. But now, with the demise of the Soviet system and perhaps of its ways of thinking, we can expect a renewal of socialist thought of the pro-grass roots and anti-State kind as a corrective to today's offered remedy of market forces economics, the greed ethic, and the non-elite's enjoying a mental fare of moronic television and being compliant to the point of servility. I am not suggesting that if there is in some future times and places a resurgence of radical resistance there won't still be much discernible elite control of affairs, but that there could be a considerably greater degree of democracy of the kind indicated than there is now.

4. ORGANIZATION, OLIGARCHY, INTELLECTUALS

Organizations

Theory of elites is closely related to theory of organizations as elites exercise the power they have, not in isolation, but working through, or in some respects being carried
Organizations, together with certain other integrated social groupings, are important manifestations in the social field of the category of substance or way of working. They include recognizable organizations or institutions such as the State, political parties, trade unions, business and financial organizations, churches, educational and sporting bodies, international associations, and also other discernible ingredients of society that are less cohesive than organizations but have social force, particularly artistic, intellectual, political and religious movements, and in a rather more nebulous form, ways of life and sets of moral outlooks (e.g. religious, intellectual ones) which sometimes have socio-political influence.

Among organizations or institutions, the most important—and one with which ruling or dominant elites have always had close connections—is of course the State. The modern State, an organization requiring compulsory membership and backing up its authority by the control of organized force, cannot, anymore than other organizations, be accounted for in an atomistic way. The State, including the ingredient parts of its governing apparatus, the sections of the bureaucracy, the judiciary, police, army and so on, is not a mere instrument mechanically made use of and malleable in the hands of the persons who are politicians or State officials; instead it is an institution that has characteristic ways of working of its own which help to shape the interests and activities as well as the outlook of the persons who are parts of the apparatus (including in the direction of "power corrupts"); and alteration of these ways of working, except in marginal respects, is usually beyond the powers of the most highly placed individuals.

To say this about the State once again goes against not only the classical liberal view, but also Marxist theory. Thus, briefly and obviously, the notion of the State as a mere reconciler or arbitrator or umpire which adjudicates fairly and impartially between competing forces or interests in the cause of the "common good" is not a notion that is matched by what actually goes on; the settlements or adjustments imposed by the State in given cases regularly favour certain given interests at the expense of certain other given interests; and furthermore the State is an independent political force in its own right with interests of its own (including its authority) to advance or defend. So while it may be said that one of the functions of the State (i.e., this is one of the things it actually does) is to a large extent to serve or promote the interests of the prevailing elite, this is by no means its only function, and owing to the prevalence of conflicts of interest (pluralism within the elite) it may promote State interests (and the interests of its members of the elite) at the expense e.g. of those of capitalist magnates.

In the case of Marx and his followers, while they do reject the liberal view of the State, in their standard theory—as was mentioned in connection with the ruling class—they treat the State as merely an instrument of class interests. But this failure of insight into it as an organization is mitigated in one interesting case, that of the "Bonapartist" State, which is the part of Marx's theory derived from his analysis of the situation in France under
Louis Napoleon (1848 and after). According to this, the period was one of acute antagonisms when the rising French bourgeoisie was threatened by both the lower classes and the old aristocracy, and as a way of alleviating or veiling these antagonisms the State under Louis Bonaparte temporarily raised itself above the classes. It still favoured the interests of the bourgeoisie but was now not its "managing committee". (A similar account was offered by Marxists to try to account for the German State under Hitler.) That is to say, the State was here admitted to be an independent force, although in the orthodox Marxist view this was supposed to be only a temporary or unstable phenomenon. But the pluralist position is that every State, to a greater or less degree, has features of the kind outlined. That is to say, all States are independent social structures with particular ways of working of their own, and the leading politicians and officials—the leading policrats or bureaucucians—who operate within them form powerful sections of the dominant elite.

This applies as well to particular parts of the State apparatus, and to various other institutions or organizations that have considerable, or less considerable, importance. For example, in the important case of bureaucracies, these have been much studied by sociologists ever since Max Weber presented his account of the "ideal type", or pure, bureaucracy, according to which it has "technical superiority over any other form of organization", and is the more efficient the more unemotional and "dehumanized" it is. But he also allowed it is not a mere instrument available for disinterested and efficient use; it is a social force in its own right with its own ways of working and particular interests to protect. Subsequently various sociologists have gone further than Weber in showing how in actual cases bureaucracies depart a great deal from his envisaged predominant "ideal type" and have various conspicuous negative features.

To cite first some evident examples, it is a matter of common observation that public service bodies (such as those providing health, postal, telecom, transport and welfare services) have various interests and functions, including ones that do not "serve the public". Likewise trade union officials—e.g. in the case of the ACTLJ—are known to be sometimes much more concerned with preserving or extending their own interests than with advancing those of the workers.

Functional theory in sociology is fraught with confusions and unclarities, but we can here usefully employ the concept of dysfunction in referring to bureaucratic tendencies of the cited kind. Thus, in relation to what a public service body or a trade union is generally supposed to do or function as, tendencies promoting its own power, authority, privileges, "imperialism", and so on, are dysfunctional tendencies. However, the function/dysfunction distinction is really a relative one. If from the point of view e.g. of the public or the rank and file X is a function and Y a dysfunction, from the point of view of some groups in an organization Y may be its function and X, in so far as it impedes Y, a dysfunction; although there is the difference of course that in the latter case it usually has to be claimed or pretended that X is the function.

Consider, as specific examples of variations and conflicts of
interest within organizations the following assorted cases: The bureaucratic extravagance and engagement in activities contrary to professed aims of UNESCO especially under the notorious long leadership of M'Bow; the similar continuing extravagance and waste of money of the army of other United Nations agencies based in Geneva; the uselessness and waste of money of CHOGM; the fact that even under the anti-bureaucratic Margaret Thatcher the British National Health bureaucracy and expenditure in the 1980s increased while service for patients declined; as a small, crude but also typical instance of "imperialism", when in the late 1970s the Australian Government demanded "razor gang" cuts in the number of public servants, what happened (as was later acknowledged) was that the number of tea ladies and lowly clerks was reduced but that of senior "fat cats" was not; as a revealing non-political example, the fact that the New South Wales motorists' association, the NRMA, in addition to furthering the interests of motorists in certain ways, was for a long time—until organized opposition began in 1990—commonly regarded as being controlled by a "self-perpetuating oligarchy" owing to the manner in which the association's captive membership of two million or so was regularly and successfully encouraged to vote for sitting councillors or else for approved replacements of them; also revealing is the situation in international chess where well attested conflicts, such as those between the FIDE bureaucracy and the chess champion, G. Kasparov/ have shown that issues and interests have been at stake besides the ostensible job of organizing and promoting chess games; likewise with the International Olympic Federation, Olympic bodies in particular countries, Rugby League bodies, cricket bodies... If we have any amount of evidence that even sporting organizations have varied functional /dysfunctional features, it is not surprising that these features are found, all the more so, in overtly socio-political organizations.

Michels on Organizations

For our purposes, the subject is best developed by Robert Michels, who was influenced by Weber's theory and gave a seminal account of political parties and bureaucracies in his *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der Modernen Demokratie*, 1911, translated as *Political Parties*. He brings out how important social organizations differ from what we should expect them to be if we think of them merely as associations of individuals joined together to carry on certain activities for certain stated or understood reasons. Instead, Michels points out, any such organization has, or comes to have, complex forms of operation some of which alter and conflict with the organization's ostensible functions or purposes.

His central thesis concerns the inability of large scale organizations to be democratic and their need, because of problems of administration, to give power and decision-making to bureaucracy and leadership. Thus, even in organizations in which the will and interests of the mass of members are supposed to be sovereign, such as trade unions and working class political parties, direct democracy—by means of mass participation or referenda—does not work because of "the incompetence of the masses" and problems of time in consulting
the rank and file. There is a need for technical specialization which leads to the existence of "expert" leaders or directors, but owing to the concentration of power in the hands of such people, they soon free themselves in significant ways from control by the mass of members of their organization. So in every organization of any size or social influence, whether it is a political party, a trade union, a State bureaucracy, a Church or a university, for example, there is a tendency towards oligarchy. This tendency is furthermore accentuated by the psychology of the masses. They are noted for their political apathy, and they have a particular need for hero worship of their leaders, which is why oratory and demagogic characteristics are so important for successful leaders, and why the modern newspaper (and all the more so the television of today) has such a crucial role in popularizing the names and styles of leaders of the masses.

This all helps the direction of power and decision-making away from the rank and file to the leaders or bureaucrats or oligarchs. Although there are rival groups of leaders, at the head for example of opposed political parties or within those parties, who struggle with each other for power, this does not serve the interests of the masses. The main concern of leaders, even of the most honest among them, is not with trying to educate the masses and improve their competence; on the contrary, in their efforts to win or maintain power they reduce themselves to the normally low and impulsive level of the masses; which is particularly evident when it comes to elections owing to the overriding interest parties have in obtaining power.

In his treatment of oligarchic-bureaucratic tendencies Michels notes, in a pluralistic way, that there are tendencies within some powerful organizations towards decentralization (as well as centralization) but this does not lessen oligarchy from the point of view of the rank and file, as all it means is that instead of a single monolithic oligarchy there are competing smaller oligarchies. In regard to the mental and moral character of bureaucracy itself—whether State bureaucracy, party bureaucracy, or any other—he offers the following telling comment: "Bureaucracy is the sworn enemy of individual liberty and of all bold initiative in matters of internal policy... The bureaucratic spirit corrupts character and engenders moral poverty. In every bureaucracy we may observe place-hunting, a mania for promotion, and obsequiousness towards those upon whom promotion depends; there is arrogance towards inferiors and servility towards superiors." [1]

Michels observes, as a crucial fact, the way in which leaders or officials come to view themselves as representing an organization's general interest. Like members of ruling elites in society as a whole, they identify their own special interests with the good of everyone. And this is not just because of personal power-seeking or dishonesty on the part of officials or leaders; it is an intrinsic way of working of the organization that it shapes in a requisite mould the dedicated organization person's activities and outlook. As a good bureaucrat, say, he develops special bureaucratic interests but he himself may be unaware of this fact. This fusion of his own interests and pursuits with those of the
organization explains too why the dedicated official will try to preserve the organization or "the machine" at all costs. He won't, for example, risk revolution and suppression by the authorities, as was demonstrated by the strong Socialist parties in France and Germany in 1914 when they voted for war credits; more recently, it was partly the reason why, in the May 1968 revolt in Paris, the powerful Communist-backed unions—although supposedly committed to revolution—refused to support me students and workers. [2]

Michels brings together his views under the heading of his famous phrase "The Iron Law of Oligarchy" and points out—in harmony with the related views of Pareto and Mosca—that law is quite compatible with a historical materialist view of class struggles providing we excise the religious optimism of the Marxists and recognize that the "cruel game" of oligarchy following upon oligarchy will probably continue without end.

It is noteworthy that few critics have been prepared to reject outright Michels' Iron Law. Even Dahl is on record as merely changing the metaphor to an "alloy" which "bends more easily than iron". [3] However, Michels' position has sometimes been criticized on the grounds that it makes use of too crude a psychological account of the selfish motivation of officials and politicians and of the need for veneration of leaders and so on, on the part of the masses. I think there is some force in this criticism and that so far as underlying psychology is concerned, more attention has to be paid to unconscious mental processes in regard especially to the combined self-deception/self-seeking tendencies of the people in a position of power. Furthermore, with regard to the veneration and adulation of leaders by the people, that is only of real importance in electoral situations or in special cases of great oratory or revered pronouncements (e.g. Hitler, the Ayatollah Khomeini); in many organizational situations positive adulatory attitudes may not be of great importance, although the psychological attitude of political apathy and that of servility especially in bureaucratic situations, remain so.

Another criticism sometimes made is that Michels underestimates the way, or the possible way, in which decentralization can lessen oligarchical tendencies. He does allow, as we saw, for competing (but also oligarchical) tendencies being present, but he does concentrate on political parties to obtain his insights, and this may make his approach too unvarying. When we go into finer points, some of these ascertained by more recent research, facts emerge about organizations that supplement or correct Michels' account in some ways. Thus, centralization/decentralization can be affected by whether the bureaucracy or administrative apparatus of an organization is large or modest in size, by whether there is fast or slow turnover in the higher echelons ("ossification" versus "rejuvenation"), or by whether, when people at the top do all the decision-making, they are or are not prepared to listen seriously to the advice of subordinates. On the other hand, decentralization can have its own complications—compare in the case of universities
how when, in recent times, decision-making in departments and schools of study were made more "democratic" by giving equal votes to junior staff and student representatives in many cases, there was (in line with Michels) a very noticeable development of factional sub-oligarchies. Or, as a different type of case, upward mobility in an organization can have differing effects. Thus, when promotion is mainly not by merit but by seniority (as in some police forces and other public service bodies) this tends to stifle innovation, or when there is promotion by positive discrimination in favour of women or of particular ethnic groups, that produces new oligarchic side effects as well as lessening the competence of the organization. However, in respect of competence, the somewhat less oligarchic procedure based on merit can have the effect of moving promotion-seekers away from where their work is of most value, as when e.g. highly competent computer programmers, say in a bank or a government department, are soon promoted away from direct computer work but their replacements are often not of the same quality. Then, with regard to the rank and file of an organization, we can have cases where subordinates, cut off from or uninterested in rising in a public service or other hierarchy, may not be as passive or acquiescent as Michels sometimes implies, and instead act in a covertly resistant way (e.g. delay or hinder the flow of orders and information, make life difficult in "accidental ways" for careerists who identify with their superiors, and so on). But this of course does not threaten oligarchy in a major way.

Established organizations such as State bureaucracies, political parties and trade unions proceed or drift along in customary ways with leaders usually powerless, even if they want to, to alter them substantially. An exception occurs especially in the case of business organizations where concern with making profits (and the easy verification of efficiency that provides) enables business chiefs, if they have the ability and will to do so, to insist on important alterations in the working of their firms. This is a subject that has been studied in some detail recently by American sociologists who have made various findings e.g. about how efficiency can be improved by bringing in specialists, or making promotions from outside an existing hierarchy, or about how resistance to change by personnel is diminished under certain conditions—such as when lower level staff understand the point, and have some trial and error experience, of innovations, or when senior staff (who feel their power threatened) come to realize that they too can benefit if their organization becomes more efficient and successful.[4]

There are various further refinements that might be developed in detail. For example, distinctions both amongst organizations of the same type, and from ones of different types, in such cases as those of government bodies, parties, business firms, trade unions, churches, universities, newspaper organizations, sporting bodies, and armies. (In the case of armies, even these can be said to be non-oligarchical in some ways in view of the characteristics of some volunteer fighting armies.) Despite these variations, however, the main point stands that all these organizations have essentially oligarchic ways of working. Or, in the words of one writer
on bureaucracy, "The Iron Law of Oligarchy seems unavoidable even in the most avowedly democratic and egalitarian institutions." [5]

Overall, then, Michels does develop an easy to defend factual account of the broad nature of oligarchic-bureaucratic processes. In so doing he also amplifies pluralism by making up for Pareto's failure to develop a detailed theory of organizations, and by giving additional force to the criticisms made earlier of social atomism.

Can The Iron Law Be Averted?

If Michelsian theory is correct, organizations have at best only a relative degree of democracy as there is never an absence of powerful oligarchic tendencies. So a question that naturally arises is, How, if at all, can those tendencies be averted or at least fought against?

One view is that effective moves can be made to give greater strength to grass roots, democracy, both in the community at large and in lesser areas. This is the view sometimes expressed by citizens' associations, liberal-minded minority parties, and sections of Labour and Socialist parties, e.g. in Britain, when they express a commitment to devolution, decentralization, and generally greater public awareness and participation in affairs. However, while such group or associational activities, including ones within organizations, is a way of fighting against oligarchy and apathy, and may make some inroads into them, to suggest that that is sufficient to nullify the Iron Law ignores complexities pointed out above.

The would-be Marxist solution, patently falsified in the USSR long before Gorbachev, can be mentioned out of historical interest. Lenin, for example, argued in State and Revolution that under socialism the problem of bureaucracy would be solved because everyone would take turns to share in the administration so there would not be a permanent bureaucracy available to develop bad habits. But he here forgot (or decided to ignore) his main view, expressed e.g. in What Is To Be Done?, that owing in effect to the apathy and incompetence of the masses it was essential to have a vanguard of professional revolutionaries—who in the sequel secured the Revolution but verified what Michels says. Then, some years after the Revolution, Bukharin in Historical Materialism replied specifically to Michels in the usual Marxist way by arguing that under socialism, because of the development of productive forces and the growth of education, the masses will lose their incompetence and oligarchic tendencies will disappear. He so argued in spite, for instance, of the fact that Lenin himself, in his dying years, had tried to protest against the Soviet bureaucracy that he had helped to establish. To this, it is true, non-Communist Marxists used to reply: if only instead of Russia (where available talent was exceedingly scarce) the Revolution had occurred in Germany where there was any number of available people with a high level of competence and responsibility, the bureaucratic outcome would have been very different. But that is a counterfactual defence on which it is
difficult to check, although there is the negative evidence that competent German citizens were not able to work well with, or save, the institutions of the Weimar Republic.

Of the theorists who do take in deadly earnest Michels' dictum "Who says organization, says oligarchy." [6] and seek to struggle against it, among the most honest are the anarchists. The anarchist answer—that is, of anarchists wedded to the idea of "total solutions"—is either that there will be an overall rational transformation of oligarchic into autonomous organizations, or else, as individualist anarchists project, a total end to organization. However, in neither case do they give any convincing explanation of how these desired changes are to be brought about. Better than their views on this issue, though limited in its realizations, is the now mostly forgotten view of Georges Sorel who did not merely counter assert, or counter hope, against Michels' kind of view of the oligarchy-creating features of established organizations or institutions. Sorel had a reply in the form of what he believed to be the redemptionist, anti-oligarchic character of social movements. His view, as put forward in Reflections on Violence, is that people are ordinarily servile and unaware politically—and are encouraged to be so by politicians of all kinds, including socialist and Labour ones—but when they are caught up in and inspired by social movements they can come to exhibit quite different, independent and autonomous ways of living and working. This is by being actuated by the heroic, self-reliant, anti-servile, "ethic of the producer" as Sorel called it (not to be confused with the sort of ethic associated today with "economic rationalism"), which is opposed to the "ethic of the consumer" and carries with it a complete rejection of the values of capitalists and of professional politicians, and also a complete rejection of bureaucracy within the trade unions—everyone in such circumstances would be an involved, active participant in the movement (instead of being e.g. a mere passive vote-marker who signs away his freedom and involvement to self-interested trade union officials or politicians). The example he was chiefly concerned with was that of co-operative, anti-bureaucratic syndicalist workers in France, but he also mentioned non-political examples of his ethic, including the Gothic cathedral artists of the medieval period who anonymously produced great works without seeking rewards or fame, the "free men" of the French Revolutionary—i.e., before Napoleon—armies, and the courageous groups of American pioneers who opened up the West.

Now Sorel does justly draw our attention to movements of various kinds as another complex form of activity that works through people and has characteristics in some respects different from those of organizations, and in so doing he adds in an original way to the factual findings of social pluralism. Whereas organizations are more formalized and rigid in character, movements are more volatile forms of social activity which tend more to "capture" their members, free them from apathy and fire them with enthusiasm and a commitment to causes. However, it has to be emphasized more than Sorel does, that only some movements have had to any pronounced extent the characteristics he commends. There have been numerous movements, especially political and religious
ones, that have predominantly been of an authoritarian-oligarchic kind. In fact, what he is pointing to has been better fulfilled in cultural and intellectual forms of activity, such as some philosophical and artistic movements which, while relatively small, have been influential examples of common activities working through people in a creative, dedicated and disinterested way.

In the case of political and some religious movements, it is true that these often do, especially in early stages, communicate attitudes of new awareness, initiative and moral fervour to their members, and it is often through movements that rank and file tendencies towards political solidarity and self-help autonomy are expressed. Nevertheless, while such movements may inhibit standard tendencies towards oligarchy, the historical evidence demonstrates that their overall influence is either only limited or is never sustained. Movements arise and gain strength only in certain social circumstances, their members are by no means exempt from the influence of powerful illusions (as Sorel recognized with his reference to the social myths that may actuate movements), and in history they have usually proved to be ephemeral except when (to their detriment as Sorel argued) they are closely associated with, or else lead to the formation of, formalized bodies such as parties and clerical organizations. When we seek about for political movements that did tend to fulfill Sorel's projections, we find they were all many years ago. The French syndicalist movement of his time soon weakened, as did the British Guild Socialist movement, the movements present in the early days of the Russian Revolution declined or were suppressed by the Bolsheviks, and the anarchist movements had little time to try out their anti-oligarchic collectives in Catalonia. As for more recent times, while there have been numerous strong movements they have not exhibited many Sorelian features. The various African nationalist and liberation movements and their associated parties and armies have manifestly been hierarchical and authoritarian, as were numerous Communist-affiliated movements. In the case of the anti-Vietnam War protest movements which were especially powerful for some time in America and Australia, these did contain various enterprising, self-help, cooperative tendencies at the grass roots level—and compare as an indication the remarkable communicative enthusiasm of those times for protest and folk songs. But nevertheless the dominant leadership tendencies were authoritarian and power-oriented and the dominant theory illusion-subscribing. The women's liberationist movement of around the same time also showed considerable promise, theoretically and cooperatively, but in subsequent decades did not continue in that way.

It can be mentioned that a phenomenon connecting with movements, though not in a way that furthers democracy, is the "effect of vociferous forces" (as I think de Tocqueville said). In history active groups of all sorts have tacitly relied on the failure to speak up on the part of "the silent minority", but in the twentieth century this has taken the organized and more effective form of sustained activity by particular groups, sometimes small in numbers, which has enabled them to dominate protest movements and organizations. This is what Lenin was an
innovator of and brilliant at when he used tactics and arguments that split groups opposed to his policies so as to enable his own faction to prevail. Later this became standard Communist practice where feasible, and it was used in a new and original way by Mao Zedong when, during the Cultural Revolution, he called on adolescent red guards to act and so overcame powerful anti-Mao parts of the Chinese bureaucracy in a struggle for power.

The influence of vociferous minorities has also become much more evident within democratic countries. A good example is in Australia where in recent decades, especially under the patronage of Labor governments, various minority and lobby groups have become well known for successfully demanding public funding for their special interests—at the expense of more mainstream groups.

**Intellectuals and Politics**

Another attempted solution to the problem of oligarchy (and of the inefficiency and corruption of rulers and politicians) is by means of an appeal to intellectuals, sometimes including scientists. The original example was that of Plato's proposed ideal republic of "philosopher-kings", and some other examples were Saint-Simon's and Comte's plans for a supreme council of scientists, and the writer Flaubert's belief in the supremacy of science and logic and the need—contrary to the supposed virtues of universal suffrage—for rule by intellectual mandarins. It has to be said at once that their hopes (another version of atomism) have negligible likelihood of fulfilment, but the subject of the place and influence of intellectuals in politics does have certain connections with issues about elites and oligarchies.

Michels himself also takes up the subject of intellectuals, especially with regard to the "bourgeois intellectuals" of modern times. He notes generally that in historical struggles between ruling and ruled classes the letter's leadership is very often provided by people drawn from the ruling or well-off classes, and this has been conspicuously true of the leaders and theorists of modern working class parties and movements who, like Owen, Fourier, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Trotsky, etc., have so often been intellectuals of bourgeois origin. Michels notes too that such ex-bourgeois socialists have often exhibited a more dedicated idealism than leaders of proletarian origin. However, this has not prevented critics from being deeply suspicious of these intellectuals; Bakunin was first in the field in expressing fears that such people would come to form the ruling class of the future, and Sorel, for example, repudiated all bourgeois intellectuals as corrupting influences and regarded them as having no place in the syndicalist movement. But, as Michels points out, Bakunin did hold that bourgeois revolutionaries were necessary in backward countries like Italy and Russia, though as a guard against them they were only acceptable and trustworthy if they became declassed, self-sacrificing persons who completely abandoned their former outlook and way of life. (Compare the example of his disciple Nechaiev—and also Lenin's conception of the professional revolutionary.) Another of Bakunin's points was a pithy observation to the effect that when the revolution *did occur*, what would be needed to save it was the immediate disappearance or suicide of the intellectual leaders. Such a remedy, however, has not proved popular.
There is, of course, an ambiguity in the term "intellectual" in that it may be used, on the one hand, to refer to members of the "intelligentsia" who are very well educated and form a small minority of the population, and on the other hand, in a wider way to mean all those people who are educated beyond the level of the ordinary manual or blue collar worker. It was in the latter wider sense that Bakunin and later theorists about intellectuals mainly used the term, and they naturally thought of them as "bourgeois intellectuals" because until comparatively recent times in Europe, in contrast with members of the middle and upper classes, manual workers were badly educated or else illiterate.

That is the stand taken by Waclaw Machajski who followed up the suspicions and insights of Bakunin (though Machajski may not have been directly influenced by him) by developing an original theory about the place of intellectuals in ruling political elites. The little known views of Machajski, a Polish revolutionary who wrote in the late 1890s and the early years of this century, were presented to a wider audience by Max Nomad in his Rebels and Renegades and subsequent writings. Machajski's basic idea was that higher education was a sort of invisible capital that enabled its possessor to have, or to secure, a privileged place in society in comparison with the uneducated masses. Socialism, he argued, for all its claimed "proletarian" sympathies/ was ideology or myth-making on behalf of a new stratum of radical intellectual workers or mental workers, that is, dissatisfied professional men, technicians, white collar workers and self-educated ex-manual workers, who were opposed to the old privileged classes and sought to replace them. But when they did so— under a system of State Capitalism—the manual workers would continue to be exploited by a new ruling class of officeholders, managers and engineers. Applied to Russia, there was thus an analogy between Machajski's view and the view being put forward by Lenin in the same period about anti-capitalist ideas being brought to the workers by middle class intellectuals—except that, according to Lenin, this would lead to the emancipation of the workers, whereas Machajski saw it would lead to a new type of rule by the more educated over the less educated classes.

Machajski did still envisage the possibility of a development in the direction of Socialism as the badly educated or illiterate manual workers came to secure better education, and he himself canvassed a "revolutionary dictatorship" on their behalf. However, Nomad has criticized this policy as a form of special pleading that plainly lies open to Machajski's own anti-intellectual criticism—as the dictatorship in question was to be exercised over the masses by one more educated group, that led by Machajski and his associates. [7]

Machajski's main position, taken in a general way, does bring forcibly to our attention a key feature— their better education— of the kind of people who, in the 20th century, have risen into prominent positions both in new revolution-established
regimes and in Western parliamentary Socialist or Labour parties and governments. It is no wonder that when he died in 1926 his outrageous views about the existence of inequalities between educated and manual workers were vituperated about in Pravda. But his more particularized contentions are more dubious. Thus, take his crucial comparison and contrast between the old ruling class with its control of economic capital, and the new ruling class, the intellectual proletariat, which has or will come to have control of intellectual capital. If the latter conception is suggested, not as a pluralist addition to what Mosca, Pareto and Michels argue, but as the principal explanation of what the new class is, we have once more the invocation of a too monistic criterion which ignores other factors giving unity and purpose to the people in question. Taken simply as an intellectual or better educated section of the population which can be distinguished both from members of the old ruling elite and the ordinary badly educated masses, Machajski's intellectual proletariat—although much more numerous today because e.g. of the great expansion of university education—is a rather heterogeneous collection of people; too heterogeneous in fact to form a class in the sense of a unified dynamic group.

Similar suggestions of belief in intellectuals as a revolutionary or liberating class were found in the course of the radical ferment of the 1960s and 1970s in the West. Thus in 1960 C. Wright Mills was rejecting the conception of the working class as a revolutionary force, and pointing instead to the influence of young intellectuals, the students. Later, Herbert Marcuse in influential writings saw the student rebellions of the 1960s and 1970s as a new force which, in alliance with sections of the older intelligentsia and other dissident groups, was likely to act as a catalyst for the revolution. This he envisioned as one in which there would be the emergence of a "new aesthetic sensibility" different from the consumerist values that did actuate the American and other masses (and different from the deadening values of Communism); but the revolution was also taken in the usual monistic way to foreshadow "total liberation". As we know, in the sequel not only did revolution not eventuate, American radical fervour soon abated after the end of the Vietnam War.

There was, however, one subsequent new development—though it was scarcely what Marcuse and Mills had in mind. This was that in the years which followed a great many of the educated middle class radicals ended up obtaining good jobs within the existing social system. Compare in Australia too how the euphoria, sense of release and idealism that greeted the coming to power of the Whitlam Government in 1972, soon gave way to a very different situation in which many of the radicals obtained public service and other good jobs, while of course still echoing "ideologically correct" views. On the other hand, a much smaller number of radicals who differently did well, more honestly admitted changing their views in the direction of believing in the moral virtues of "economic rationalism". Compare as an American example how the notable radical, Jerry Rubin, turned to economic enterprise and, partly through making use of a network of former radicals, was successful on Wall Street. However, mere is also a third class of radicals who remained faithful to serious social theory and serious opposition to ruling elites, who mostly did not rise high as apparatchiks or in academia and whose views, while
more penetrating, naturally have little influence today. In connection with this there has been some recent argument in America about whether the most numerous first group really mainly consists of genuine radicals and protesters of the 1960s and 1970s in good jobs, or whether they rather mainly consist of new careerists taking the opportunity to voice all the fashionably "correct" views and get on.

Whatever its exact composition, what is interesting about the first group as an intellectual or quasi-intellectual group is the remarkable ideological influence its members have come to have especially in the USA. There they have become so dominant in the universities, as feminist leaders, and in other ways in regard to the propagation of approved ideas, that they can act as what critics call "coercive Utopians", "new McCarthyists", "thought police" and so on who sponsor and enforce what is "politically correct" in a Stalinist-like way. This is a new type of intellectual/ideological situation in which the views and values enforced on the "silent majority" are hardly those of the ruling elite or in its direct interests except in the "divide and rule" sense that these new-type radical groups and other people are thus diverted away from making head-on attacks on the ruling elite. In fact, with reference to elites and auxiliary elites, it would appear that, in exchange for not opposing but really allying with the primary economic and political elite, this new social grouping of influential politically correct etc. people has won for its leading members a substantial place in the auxiliary elite.

Another writer concerned with intellectuals in a wide sense is Max Nomad, [8] who was also an excellent expositor of certain pluralist findings, and was notable for drawing, in a logical way, certain policy conclusions from them.

In his earlier writings Nomad shared and publicized Machajski's views about the "new class" of intellectual workers—or about, as Nomad sometimes phrases it, the replacement of the old exploitation of the "have-nots" by the "haves", by a new form of exploitation of the "know-nots" by the "knows"; and in this regard he is thus open to the objections made against Machajski's view of intellectuals as a class. However, Nomad took Machajski's view further, identifying the new class with the managers, elected officeholders, bureaucrats and other State-funded apparatchiks who rose from the ranks, first of all in prewar Communist and Fascist countries, and then after the war with similar people who emerged in the West with the expansion of the "Welfare State". Subsequently there was the development including in Australia, of many more jobs and extensive funding in connection with the growth of universities and of education bureaucracies, multicultural and women's affairs, social work, arts and literary grants and associated officialdom...which provide evident continuing confirmation of Nomad's views.

As an improvement on Machajski, Nomad also came to widen his position so as to incorporate Michels' Iron Law and what he treated as its equivalent, Pareto's "circulation of elites". This strengthens his position, and by drawing more
attention to the importance of organizations and other wider social forces, helps to overcome some suggestions of social atomism brought on by his emphasis on the influence of the personal motivation of leaders of radical causes. In his formulation of his own and Michels-Pareto findings, there is no final or permanent way out of the general situation that "all politics, whether 'regular' or revolutionary, is a confidence game in the interests of competing or antagonistic elites and would-be elites." Nevertheless, while recognizing also the overall political stupidity of the masses, Nomad strongly endorsed active resistance or permanent protest on the part of the dominated lower classes. There is no need, he argued, for the underdog's "resigned submission to fate" and that "Michels' pessimistic 'iron law of oligarchy' implies another 'iron law' as well: that of permanent revolt against oligarchy, whether feudal, capitalist or bureaucratic-managerial". [9]

Furthermore, in his numerous books and other writings, Nomad backs up in a factual way what Michels and others maintain by presenting in a series of evocative studies what are, in effect, case histories of hundreds of well known communist, anarchist and syndicalist revolutionaries, Socialist and Labour Party leaders, and radical trade union organizers and agitators, who set out to work for the cause of the badly treated masses. He brings out how a small number of these men and women retained their honesty and idealism and did not swerve from their stated aims, but most of them have acted differently—for reasons that are not hard to detect: as well as the spirit of revolt and a feeling for the badly treated masses, what actuates many leaders is a lust for power and for material rewards, and as they progress and succeed it is the latter concerns—assisted by self-justifying rationalizations—that come to prevail in almost all of them.

Nomad also directs his social psychoanalysis at Marx.[10] For instance, he notes a certain ambivalence on Marx's part in the analysis he gives of Louis Bonaparte's control of France. His regime built up an enormous bureaucracy subsidized by heavy taxation of the other classes and— Nomad points out— anticipated in an embryonic way what happened in Communist, Fascist and Welfare Statist societies in the twentieth century. Marx noticed some of these facts and even introduced the concept of the "Bonapartist" State (referred to earlier). But he sheered away from the real implications of what was involved (just as he did in the case of his other concept of Oriental despotism). Why was this?, Nomad asks, and why did Marx obscure the influence of bourgeois intellectuals—by claiming for example that mankind was indebted for theory to the German proletariat, at a time when it was mostly illiterate? Was it his inability, or his unwillingness, to recognize facts? The answer, Nomad argues, is hardly that a social thinker as bright as Marx really missed the point and deceived himself about the potential emergence of a neo-bourgeoisie of office-holders and managers; rather it is that he was a "crypto-ideologist" for mat neo-bourgeoisie. He probably did anticipate, without avowing it, the findings of Michels and the other "pessimists in sociology". But he kept his insights to himself as his revelation of them would not have helped the cause of his own aspiring "out-elite" group.
In his account of recent radicals, Nomad can be seen to be adducing persuasive new instances of a type of phenomenon that has actually been long recurrent in history. Take as one long ago example the early Christians who, although they were imbued with next world ideals and mostly lived lives of austere Christian virtue, they were not saved from displaying other qualities when it came to their involvement in socio-political affairs. As Edward Gibbon commented about them: "The ecclesiastical governors of the Christians were taught to unite the wisdom of the serpent with the innocence of the dove; but as the former was refined, so the latter was insensibly corrupted, by the habits of government. In the church as well as in the world, the persons who were placed in any public station rendered themselves considerable by their eloquence and firmness, by their knowledge of mankind, and by their dexterity in business; and while they concealed from others, and perhaps from themselves, the secret motives of their conduct, they too frequently relapsed into all the turbulent passions of active life." [12]

Intellectuals can also be considered in a much narrower sense as society's highly intellectual/educated thinkers, scientists, eminent critics, and so on. But although they are often politically aware and can have an influence much beyond their numbers, it is still the case that they are too heterogeneous and lacking in cohesion to form a genuine single group. There are variations in their situation in various countries—for example, in France intellectuals have for many years had particular prestige and influence in affairs, and yet as in other countries there are considerable variations in their allegiances. [13]

What emerges overall is that there is a certain pluralism of sub-groups of intellectuals, some of which sub-groups are cohesive enough to have considerable sociopolitical influence, but there is no such cohesion amongst intellectuals as a whole. There may be speculations about what could happen if intellectuals did speak and act in unison, though even then there would be no good reason to expect them to act in politics in a particularly logically-minded or benevolent way. Nor, for that matter, have they even displayed much striking ability and motivation in political affairs. Amongst people who rose to great power in history only Lenin can perhaps be accounted a genuine intellectual (unless we regard Julius Caesar as one too), [14] and even in more ordinary political affairs it is only a handful of the leaders who reached the top, such as Guizot, Thiers, Woodrow Wilson, Masaryk, and one or two popes, who were intellectuals of quality. However, these are side issues as there is no evidence that intellectuals—either in a narrow sense or in the wider sense of the better educated citizens of a country—are ever likely to act as a single force. The most that could be plausibly suggested along these lines is that when a revolution is in the offing a symptom is what Crane Brinton called the "desertion of the intellectuals"., i.e., the transfer of their allegiance away from the old order. But normally what they do is help to provide leaders and especially apologists for
parties or factions of all shades of opinion.

Also certain famous intellectual figures in history, of course, have been responsible for originating or promulgating various beliefs that have had great influence in society, and are of the kind that will be analysed next.

5. IDEOLOGY AND ILLUSORY BELIEF

The category of existence or occurrence embraces all sorts of obvious social phenomena, as well as ones that are less obvious or require argument about—such as, as we have seen, the existence of powerful oligarchic tendencies within organizations. But where, in particular, crucial issues arise about existence, or more especially non-existence (as when claims that X's do or can occur as Y's clash with what is actually the case), is in connection with social belief. For what is recognized by a main current of social thought to which pluralism belongs is that there are many social beliefs, ideals, imperatives, programmes, and so on, and offered justifications and vindications of them, which—although they may be socially influential—are not warranted or substantiated in the way their believers take them to be. This happens in either or both of two main ways. One is because the reasoning used on behalf of the beliefs, imperatives etc. is patently fallacious—which is a subject Pareto in particular paid considerable attention to. The other, on the side of the content of the beliefs, is because the key claims made and the core concepts employed are plainly open to criticism, so much so in the case of certain more grandiose and widely accepted beliefs that they can be classed as social illusions or myths and lead us to look for other explanations of their origin and influence—which is a subject that was notably pursued by Marx, Mosca, Pareto, Sorel, and in some ways Freud.

Ideology

The best way of approaching the subject is by way of an examination of Marx's theory of ideology. This I will do briefly—and without traversing the large literature on the subject. But it should be noted at once that the word "ideology" is fraught with ambiguities owing to the fact that it has come in modern times to be a fashionable vogue word that is used in varied and conflicting ways both by Marxists and numerous other social writers. By a line of complicated descent, this stems largely from Marx and from the fact that, whereas Marx and Engels used the term "ideology" as a derogatory label for certain beliefs, Lenin and his successors obscured the distinctive content of Marx's view by speaking freely, and in a favourable way, about "our ideology", "proletarian ideologists" and "proletarian ideology".[1]

The word "ideologie" was coined about 1798 by the French writer Destutt de Tracy to mean simply the "science of ideas", and was given a political application when Napoleon referred contemptuously to the cloudy "ideology" of French political "ideologues" and their "ideology", and in this sense the words were taken by up Marx and Engels in their early work The German
Ideology

where, in conjunction with Hegel's general view of "false consciousness" and Feuerbach's specific criticism of religion, they advance their own historical materialist theory of ideology.

For Marx ideologies arise in the first place in his account of how the ideas of the ruling class become the received ideas in any epoch. A little reflection makes it clear to us that it is absolutely essential for Marx to have such a view. To put it in a simple and graphic way, given the obvious inequalities and injustices and the hard lives often lived by the mass of me people, why do the latter put up with it? Why in every age hasn't the mass of the people done what the poet Shelley advised in "The Mask of Anarchy" (written after the Peterloo Massacre in 1819)?

Rise like Lions after slumber In unvanquishable number, Shake your chains to earth like dew

Which in sleep had fallen on you—

Ye are many, they are few.

It is not really because of the threat of force, as armed defenders of rulers have never been a match for the majority of the population in their wrath, and in any case why are poorly paid troops and police servile towards their masters? The answer, of course, is that the people en masse have hardly ever been stirred to revolt because their mental outlook is mostly one of acquiescence in the status quo and obedience towards those in authority—and according to Marx this results from their acceptance of the ideology of their rulers (along with the associated "traditions of all the dead generations") which has the function of keeping them docile. As he puts it in his economic way, "The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it."[2] However, having introduced the concept of ideology in connection with the ruling class, Marx does not tie ideology entirely to that class as he wants to leave room for revolutionary changes. That is why, by extension, other classes are said to be capable of having their own appropriate ideologies—so that the class struggle can be accompanied by a corresponding battle of ideologies, as happened with the contest between feudal and bourgeois ideas before and during the French Revolution of 1789.

So far ideologies, as ideas or sets of ideas dependent on material economic conditions, are merely adjuncts to Marx's monistic (or pretended pluralistic in late versions but still monistic) view of historical materialism. As parts of the alleged superstructure, they are supposed to be purely dependent or derivative. "We set out," he claims, "from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life process... Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the
semblance of independence. They have no history, no development... Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life." [3]

If this were all that Marx meant, nothing additional would be conveyed by speaking of "ideologies" instead of "ideas". But as well as this overall (unsound) general theory of ideology, there is also what I call his special theory of ideology. [4] In terms of the latter, what is, according to Marx, distinctive about an ideology, what makes it more than merely a dependent reflection of economic conditions, is that it is essentially an illusory or distorted idea, belief, theory or philosophy, an idea which masquerades as something other than it is. When Marx refers, for instance, to the aristocratic concept of chivalry and the bourgeois concept of thrift as examples of class ideology, he is indicating that ideologies, unlike some other ideas, are distorted or subject to errors in a specific way; they have a disguised content that does not appear when they are taken at their face value. That is the usual point too of his own references to "illusions"—as when, for example, he speaks about "active, conceptive ideologists, who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of livelihood". [5]

But some Marxists maintained that all science is ideology, associating this with Engels' observations about the dialectics of nature and with his contention that all truths are "relative" or "class" truths. This position flows again from the simple, general theory of ideology; all ideas or views, including the views of bourgeois physics, proletarian physics, and the views of Marxism itself, as parts of the dependent superstructure, do not have objective or absolute truth, but merely express relative, class viewpoints—though future history was conveniently supposed somehow to be on the proletarian side. The illogicality of this type of position is well-known and can be summed up quickly. First of all, its advocates are often simply unable to understand the force of logical terms like "proposition", "true" and "false" and fail to see what they are committing themselves to—they fail to see, for example, that when a certain state of affairs is the case (say, there is a tree over there, that all human beings die, or that economic affairs influence society) to say that is the same as saying a proposition to this effect is true. Apart from that, the trouble with the general theory of relative truth is that the very statement of it involves self-refutation. To assert that "The proposition 'No propositions are true' is true" contains a patent inconsistency, but when the relativist claims that all truths are relative or that no truths are absolute (or according to some postmodernist etc. claims that we only "construct" or "constitute" or "defer" knowledge or truth—there is a new version of the old fallacy every few years) he is involved in the same inconsistency; he is asserting something to be the case, i.e., to be absolutely true. [6]
Likewise open to criticism is the attempt by Marxists and their like logic minded successors to turn questions about truth into questions about ideological attitudes by claiming that what anyone maintains merely expresses their class viewpoint and the like. This involves a fallacy of the same kind as that involved in the elementary fallacy of *argumentum ad hominem* (where an attack on a person's motives etc. is confused with a consideration of what the person has asserted). We can, it is true, ask social as well as intellectual questions about people's beliefs. Given a belief p there are two kinds of question that can be taken up about it. (1) Is p true or false? (2) Why do particular people believe p, or more generally, what are the social origins and effects of p's being believed? Consideration of (2) has certainly to be made as part of the theory of social illusions, but it is a logical fallacy to proceed as many Marxists did and many people today do and substitute (2) for a critical consideration of (1).

The extent to which Marx himself endorsed this kind of "Marxist" view about relative and class truth is not clear, but there is some evidence in his writings (not well publicized ones) that he did accept the ordinary objectivist view of what is meant by saying that a theory or proposition is true or false. [7] Certainly Marx wanted to emphasize the existence of the illusory and distorted thinking which is often imposed on human beings by their social conditions— that is what gives power to his special theory of ideology— but he did spend a good deal of time criticizing—i.e., objectively—the unscientific or false character of bourgeois, especially economic, beliefs, and he did imply it was truly the case that capitalism superseded feudalism, that the forces of production really do have the effects he specified in history, and the like. It is noteworthy, moreover, that the most famous statement of Marx's on historical materialism, the passage in the *Critique of Political Economy* in which he introduces the metaphor of structure and superstructure and one which was frequently quoted by crude Marxist relativists, contains the tell-tale objectivist statement that economic conditions "can be determined with the precision of natural science".

When we note these complications, what we can disentangle as the more defensible part of Marx's position is
his special theory of ideology. According to this, there is a contrast between ideology and non-ideology; much of what is believed, especially in the socio-political area, is ideological or illusory in character, but there are also many beliefs—in science and in everyday life—that do involve recognition of true propositions. It is a regrettable fact, however, that this distinction was mainly lost sight of in the Marxist corpus.

Theory of Ideologies, Illusions, Myths

We can thus obtain from Marx the first materials for developing a defensible theory. When his insights are detached from the rigid setting of his social metaphysics and taken in conjunction with the views of some later thinkers, we can set forward a more complex and more pluralist theory of the nature and influence of a host of widespread but arguably illusory socio-political beliefs. No single term is exactly suitable for summing up this theory, but I will give some preference to "ideology" in the sense explained for this purpose.

Let us look now at writers other than Marx. Mosca gives his account of the political formula as the type of non-scientific belief by means of which ruling classes enlist the aid of political and moral doctrines as a support for their naked possession of power. He concentrates on recurrent examples in history of "universal illusions", including beliefs associated with nationalism and religion which have induced millions of badly treated people to fight with great fervour for their countries and ruling classes. Georges Sorel wrote about social myths that give rise to hopes and passions in the historical arena, as is instanced by the religious myths promulgated by Christ, Luther and Calvin. His concern with myths was from the point of view of the hopes and moral dedication of the lower classes—as distinct from the rulers—and he thought that in modern times it was the working or producing class who, by believing in the "myth of the general strike", may come to redeem, society from the prevailing corrupt "ethic of the consumer". (Sorel, it should be noted, used the term "myth" in a more specific, narrower sense man usual.)

Pareto develops a theory of what he calls derivations, which refer to non-logical beliefs and the pseudo-reasonings,
explanations etc. used in an attempt to justify them. [8] He examines a whole array of traditional beliefs concerning religion, *a priori* metaphysics, reason, morals, etc., presenting refutations of them in line with arguments often advanced by empiricist philosophers. He is also emphatic in criticizing the pronouncements of traditional political philosophy concerning the foundations of society, progress, the good of all, and so on—compare, for instance, his comment on natural law: "'Natural law' is simply the law of which the person using the phrase approves; but the cards cannot be ingenuously laid on the table in any such terms; it is wiser to put the thing a little less bluntly, supplement it by more or less argument."[9]

Pareto makes a comprehensive survey of derivations, classifying them into four main classes.

I. Simple assertions which have some moral prescription force or sentiment-evoking powers, e.g., "Silence is an ornament to all women". Such and such a measure "makes for a better humanity".

II. Arguments from authority, as illustrated by appeals to such authorities as famous men, tradition, sacred texts, divine beings.

III. "Accords with sentiments or principles." These are cases of wishful thinking where strongly held beliefs are "proved" by appeals to the "universal consensus", "individual interest", "collective interest", "the social contract", "nature", "welfare", "progress", "equality", "democracy", "the will of the people", "the categorical imperative", and so on.

IV. "Verbal Proofs." These comprise the many ways in which uses of language, including uses of indefinite, emotive, ambiguous and metaphorical words, facilitate sophistical reasoning.

These four classes cover the various forms of fallacious reasoning (the "material" and "formal" fallacies of logic); Class III in addition draws special attention to types of concepts that have been highly influential in the history of derivations. A particularly important example is the concept of "collective interest", which, Pareto allows, may sometimes involve a real interest of the mass of a community (avoiding economic ruin, say, or resisting a brutal invader) in which case there need not be a derivation and it is logical conduct to seek the end desired. More often, however, it involves a special interest masquerading as, being made by rationalizing derivations to appear to be, the collective interest.

Sophistical reasonings of these kinds abound in society as much as ever—as is amply confirmed if we make a logical study of, say, the reasoning of politicians and of the arguments that often
appear in the newspapers. And this is not necessarily just a matter of ignorance of logic. We have to agree with a criticism Pareto made of Bentham's once well known account of fallacies. "Bentham's assumption," he says, "is that the person who uses a fallacy recognizes it as such (insincerity) or mat, if he fails so to recognize it, he is wanting in intelligence. As a matter of fact many fallacies that are current in a given society are repeated in all sincerity by people who are exceedingly intelligent." [10] The reason for this is that in such people psychological factors, or else concealed interests, are expressing themselves in the form of illogical reasonings.

Pareto goes on to develop a general theory about the place of myths in society the nature of which he sums up in the following striking formulation.

The accord of a doctrine, or theory, with fact is one thing; and the social importance of that doctrine, or theory, quite another. The former may amount to zero, the latter be very great; but the social significance does not prove the scientific accord, just as the scientific accord does not prove the social significance. A theory may not correspond to objective fact, may indeed be altogether fantastic from that standpoint, and yet meantime correspond to subjective facts of great moment to society. A person aware of the social importance of a mythology will have that mythology real. A person who denies the truth of a mythology will also deny its social value. But the facts clearly show that mythologies have no reality and at the same time have the greatest social importance. Feelings are so strong on this point that people are persuaded that the day of mythologies is definitely over, that myths are but ghostly memories of a past for ever dead, and so deliberately shut their eyes to facts truly vast in numbers which show that mythologies are still alive and flourishing. [11]

When we bring together in an analytical way what these various writers have maintained on the subject, we can develop a general theory the main elements of which are as follows.

(1) In addition to scientific, realistic or common sense beliefs, there also flourish in society a variety of influential beliefs which are so lacking in critical and observational support, and are so illogically and emotively defended, that they merit the title of ideologies, illusions or myths.

(2) These beliefs are, for the most part, sincerely believed by their believers, who are usually quite unconscious of the disguised- or covert socio-political role their beliefs actually have.

(3) Such beliefs are socially significant because, in addition to their apparent or face-value characteristic of claiming to be true or logically justified, they have certain less obvious characteristics, certain covert connections with other phenomena
which make them very influential in socio-political affairs.

As a simple illustration of the presence of these three factors in a specific historical situation, we can quote a comment by Gibbon on the state of religion in the early Roman Empire: "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true; by the philosopher as equally false; and by the magistrate as equally useful." [12]

But let us consider (1), (2) and (3) in more detail.

(1) Character and Criticism of Beliefs

According to the theory, beliefs of the kind in question usually are—or are regarded by their critics as being— basically without factual or logical foundation, so that special reference to social and psychological conditions is necessary to account for their prevalence and influence.

But as an initial question, it may be asked why the same can't apply to admittedly true beliefs. To this the first answer is that it can, that true beliefs as much as false beliefs, have social and psychological conditions and also may have influence in unexpected ways. However, a social finding that emerges from the work of Marx, Mosca, Pareto, etc., is that the differences in this regard are more important than the resemblances.

A main reason for this is that beliefs, to have importance in an ideological way, need to be value and imperative oriented, offering endorsement of policy advocacies, prescriptions, proscriptions, and so on. But the socio-political fact of the matter is that the beliefs that have striking socio-moral force in this way are very much more likely to be ones that contain disputable concepts, and are obscure, emotive, and lack factual and logical support, man ones that are straightforward, clear, descriptive, and well-substantiated.

Or, as a complexity of a different kind, let us take the case of scientists and other intellectual inquirers. Ambiguities arise about their beliefs arise in a way that was first stressed by Bakunin when he applauded science but criticized scientists. Many of the propositions of science and other academic fields of study are empirically established truths about which qualified people are expected to have much expert knowledge. Yet, when they come to give voice to their own ideals and policies—as when, say, they press for increased Government funding or for salary increases—they are quite capable of enlisting the aid of dubiously-based appeals to exhortatory beliefs as well as of making liberal use of emotive arguments and other standard forms of sophistical reasoning. However, these are beliefs and reasonings that flow from the socio-political aspirations of academics and are quite different from belief in the verified, core propositions of their disciplines. To cite a notorious scientific example, when physicists discovered the conditions under which atom bombs can be made, the true beliefs involved did not, in themselves, imply that scientists ought, or ought not,
manufacture the bomb. To seek to justify either exhortation some extra non-scientific premises (concerning e.g. the urgent need to win the war/the dire consequences for the future of civilization) had to be added.
Likewise, with regard to the modern growth in the scope and power of science, it is true that that adds to its prestige and assists the development of a mystique of science—cultivating beliefs that science can or must “work wonders”, will be a panacea for medical and other problems, and the like. But these uncorroborated, incipient hopes /illusions are again socio-moral extras, not part of the findings of empirical science as such.

These complications arise from the fact that, although scientific and intellectual activities are concerned with inquiry into what is the case, they are themselves social phenomena; they go on within institutions and movements and interact with various other social phenomena, and that is why scientists and intellectuals are found to have various particular interests and attitudes and not to be exempt from socio-political illusions. So the point stands according to the present theory, that it is not the beliefs of science as such or of other true beliefs that are noted for having the kind of covert social complexities that have been mentioned; these typically exist in the case of beliefs whose own core contentions may be dubious to the point of being illusions.

The fact that we can study beliefs as social occurrences is, parts of today's fashionable social, political, educational, and so on doctrines, we have to be prepared to back up our theory with criticism of beliefs. For without that we may be accused of being arbitrary or dogmatic ourselves, or indeed, of using our theory as an elaborate argumentum ad hominem against the holders of the beliefs claimed to be illusory. That fallacy, as noted earlier, is one to which Marxists and Communists were addicted, as also have been numerous Freudian writers—i.e., they have dismissed beliefs without logical scrutiny by referring merely to their supposed social or psychological origins. Marx and Freud themselves may be exempted from the excesses of their followers as they both did suggest arguments against the beliefs they rejected—and Pareto in support of his views offered many detailed criticisms of beliefs. But the fact of their ad hominem approach is a salutary comment on the logic of many Marxists and Freudians, and likewise, of course, on the logic of those people today who simply brandish labels like "elitist", "racist" or "sexist" as a substitute for logical argument on the issues.

To give as an illustration some criticism of a topical belief, let us take the case of equality.

Many years ago socialists and especially anarchists and syndicalists had positive, specific conceptions of the sort of equality they were aiming at. For example, as mentioned in the last chapter, Sorel (and Anderson agreed with him in his earlier years) had a conception of the worker-producers of society as coming en masse to exhibit the producer's ethic (or communicative psycho-social goods as Anderson called them) in a way that included their having positive equality by participating actively and democratically in affairs and in all being responsible for decision-making, and so on. However, we have to say today that expectations that the mass of the work force will ever come to act
in those positive ways can only be regarded as Utopian.

Subsequently the approach which became dominant was that relying on the imposition, especially of economic equality, from above by means of State communism or socialism. But what came out of that were well known results of a non-egalitarian kind.

But, as a rather curious development, today's leading "equalitarians", even when they are concerned with economic equality, pay much less attention than Marxists and classical anarchists did to the structure of society and the need to combat the power of dominant elites if they are to bring about serious social changes. In fact, today's "equalitarians", or at least the ones who are most vociferous, appear to have much in common with the earlier time Utopian Socialists and associated reformers. In other words, their social theory appears to consist in the social atomist view that persistent, morally fervent expressions of belief in the social changes they desire will bring about those changes.

It is also curious in the case of recent Australian equality reformers that they have largely ignored the continuing loss of a particular kind of equality. This is the sort of economic equality and accompanying egalitarian attitudes (i.e., relatively, as compared with the situation in almost all other countries) present in this country for many years owing to Australia's farming and mineral wealth and small population, but now disappearing in the wake of the new globalization etc. policies that have been introduced since 1982.
It is notable, furthermore, that today's demands for equality often take a wider and more negative form, as for instance in current preoccupations with victimology, with concern with how people are unfairly treated, not only by "society", but in effect by inequalities brought on by their being deficient or disadvantage in respect of their intelligence, physical state, psychological susceptibilities and so on, and of making amends to them for this. Associated with this, by ideological reasoning, can also be the implication that people who are not affected in such ways, i.e., the large class of "non-victims" in society, are somehow "guilty" or "to blame" for the characteristics of the "victims".

But to refer to a well known example of sustained attempts to implement equality, consider education. In Australia, e.g. in Victoria and New South Wales, alterations were made to State schools and their curricula in ways designed to help underprivileged students. As well as issues about instruction and learning this of course has involved other factors, including the desires (1) of teachers to improve or protect their work conditions, (2) of education bureaucrats and union officials to maintain or advance their power and authority, and (3) of politicians to cultivate the myth- that they are promoting "equality". But with regard to the equality issues, the search for equality of outcomes (because of real variations in the abilities of students) has not been a success. It is now hardly contestable that many more parents than formerly have been induced—at least if their children are not already attending one of the relatively few good "selective" State high schools—to send their children at considerable cost to themselves to expensive private schools which maintain more the old educational values, and as result, in the acquisition of knowledge and the subsequent competition for better jobs many State school students, including ones with ability, are faring less well than they did in the past. In other words, the search for one kind of equality has led to greater inequality of another kind.

Likewise in universities, e.g. in Australia and England, there was a great expansion, largely in response to the demand for equality, which led to various effects other than the officially intended ones: until the bonanza ended constant successful demands for large salary increases and other monetary grants for staff, rapid growth of careerist and administrative interests, and a decline in the intellectual quality and dedication of numerous of the new academics. This was assisted by the administrative tendency to blame the teachers for the failings and failures of students; standards were lowered especially in proliferating "soft" subjects, and while any number of degrees were awarded, as came to be recognized by some employers and by academics with standards, what was achieved en masse was not equality of genuine intellectual merit but pseudo-equality. [13] Or, in a different phrase, as with other recent "achievements" of equality, what we have is the kind of "surface equality" that de Tocqueville referred to in connection with the French Revolution.
(2) Sincerity of Belief

We have to emphasize, as against "manipulative" and "conspiracy" theories, that beliefs of the kind under consideration are mostly accepted at their face value and in the utmost good faith by the people who believe them. They are mostly sincere in their beliefs and at the same time unaware of the further characteristics of these beliefs. That is what Hegel drew attention to with his doctrine of the "Cunning of Reason", according to which Absolute Reason "cunningly" uses historical figures like Napoleon for Reason's purposes in ways of which they are unaware. It is a metaphysical doctrine but one which can have an empirical equivalent, as was indicated in Marx's early writings when he suggested that believers in religion, rampant nationalism and so on were sincere, but were unconscious of the real character of their beliefs. What Marx's insights thus pointed the way to is recognition of the operation in social affairs of mechanisms of a similar kind to those developed by Freud in individual psychology, such as unconscious motivation, rationalization, substitution and displacement. It may be noted that the best of Freud's own work that is relevant here is his study of religion, *The Future of an Illusion*, but as mentioned earlier his own social theory is too atomistic, and in his later work he tends to rely heavily on the deployment of abstract, empirically unverified principles such as "the life instinct" and "the death instinct".

Of course, when we are talking about unconscious motivation, rationalization, and so on, we have to be clear about who is being referred to. In particular, we need to note a more complex type of case in which, for example, a cynical ruler, orator, charlatan, advertiser, film-maker, best-seller writer, etc., exploits the existence of widely held beliefs.

This type of case brings up the question of manipulative or conspiracy theories of social affairs. For it has often been wrongly assumed that the references made by Marx, Pareto and others to the occurrence of deception and illusion in history and society entail merely the claim that cynical, unscrupulous manipulation reigns in politics and elsewhere, i.e., that it is mostly a matter of small groups of people in positions of power and authority deliberately imposing their policies on society, including deliberately imposing appropriate false beliefs on the mass of the population.

Now, in rejecting this view, we do not have to go to the extreme of being complimentary about the moral qualities of many leading politicians, high officials, big capitalists, media owners, and other members of ruling or auxiliary elites. We can admit at once that hypocrisy, corruption and deceit, including the deliberate spreading of fraudulent or illusory beliefs, are real and abiding parts of what goes on. But we do not have to agree that any of these things, including the manipulation of beliefs, is normally the principal factor in socio-political life. It probably is in some small dictatorships and may also happen on occasion in small democracies, but is scarcely ever so in large Western democracies.

In general, the manipulation theory of history—along with the more extreme conspiracy theory—is a variant of the "great
man” version of social atomism, and against that not much study of history is needed to show that leaders, including the most unscrupulous leaders, are limited by social conditions. Manipulation, we can say, is parasitic on existing conditions and can only occur against a background of non-manipulation. But if manipulative leaders are clever, they may gain a name as great "Machiavellian" leaders because, working with an existing interplay of forces (i.e., ones not created by them), by operating quickly and making improvisations they can turn certain of these forces to their advantage, and in that restricted way manipulate outcomes.[14]

Similarly, in the particular case of "Machiavellian" manipulation of beliefs there are certain definite restrictions that obtain. That kind of manipulation involves an example of the multiple roles of beliefs: a belief in its "primary occurrence" is a false or illusory belief sincerely and innocently believed by its believers, but in the case of the manipulator's own belief it has a "secondary occurrence" as a consciously understood part of a (true) manipulative belief. But the socio-political restriction on the successful manipulator is that he has to work with primary occurrence beliefs which either are well-established, or else are new beliefs that accord well with influential existing interests and attitudes.

Take, first of all, the rather crude case of political propaganda, as advanced by political parties and through the various media. It is true that this, like much successful advertising, can proceed by repetition, distortion, omission and straightforward lies, but even so its success on any large scale requires (a) an appeal to particular demands or frustrations arising out of existing social circumstances—as Aldous Huxley once put it, "The propagandist is a man who canalizes an already existing stream. In a land where there is no water he digs in vain", and (b) the existence of propagandists who, from the nature of their work and outlook, are captured at least ambivalently by the views they are presenting—compare the characteristic rationalizations of political party and media workers, and the tendency towards servility on the part of senior newspaper men who, it has often been suggested, are prone to engage in self-censorship to satisfy what they think are the wishes of their proprietors.

Compared with the relatively simple case of propaganda, historically significant illusions and myths are more complex phenomena with more subtle ways of working and in their case, all the more surely, in so far as mere is manipulation that manipulation is circumscribed by social conditions. Take an example often mentioned in this context, the fact that Hitler and the Nazi Party in gaining and maintaining power were greatly aided by their promotion of anti-Semitic, German nationalist, etc., ideas. Hitler and his associates did not create these ideas; they already had considerable currency in Germany and the Nazis were able to promote them more widely still only because there existed particular social tensions and frustrations that made many Germans potentially receptive to such ideas. Moreover, contrary to the manipulative theory about them, while Hitler and
Goebbels were certainly very skilled in the use of propagandist techniques, they, like most other Nazis, were sincerely attached to some of the beliefs they propagated; so much so that such beliefs sometimes interfered with Nazi efficiency—compare, for instance, how belief by Nazi leaders in their own racial theories ruined a favourable German opportunity in the Ukraine during the war when they proceeded to treat harshly an initially friendly population, or, again, the grotesque personal example of Himmler, who, far from being efficient in a time of great crisis, spent valuable time building up his collection of non-Aryan skulls!

Other powerfully placed men have been regularly limited by social circumstances and subject themselves to the authentic acceptance of certain key beliefs. This was true, for example, of three of the most famous figures often cited as being "Machiavellian" manipulators. Thus, Richelieu of France in the 17th century and Bismarck of Germany in the 19th century both appear to have genuinely believed in the religions they professed and they were certainly convinced believers in the cause of their respective Kings and States, and it was precisely when they were furthering ends associated with these beliefs that they were most ruthless and manipulative. Likewise, even Metternich, the aware, cynical Austrian chancellor who orchestrated European affairs after 1815 and was finally defeated by circumstances in 1848, plainly cherished the values of the old regime he sought so guilefully to prop up.
(3) Covert Characteristics

Beliefs of the relevant kinds, in addition to their overt characteristic or function of appearing (usually wrongly) to be true or logically supportable beliefs, have further covert characteristics and it is recognition of these that enables us to understand what such beliefs do in history and why they are so socially significant. The characteristics in question consist of a central type of political influence many of the beliefs have and, intertwined with that, a varying range of socio-psychological effects and relationships.

There are various ideological equivalents of Freudian-type mechanisms in the social field that can be pointed to in past history and present-day affairs. It is not easy to give a complete or precise account of them, but we can cite various main types of mechanisms given that they are not sharply separated and can have various interconnections. There are beliefs that help to affect members of social groups in relation to certain things in such ways as the following: (1) by deceiving, misleading or mystifying them, or disguising or masking things from them, or blunting their will to action, (2) by comforting, compensating, or consoling them, or giving them surrogate satisfaction, or (3) by imparting enthusiasm, strength of will, dedication, zeal, or socio-moral force to them.

To give some specific illustrations, we may with little fear of opposition today reject as ridiculous the traditional doctrine of the divine right of kings, but in the past the fact that many people believed the doctrine aided the cause of numerous kings by gaining them widespread support, blunting the will of some of their opponents, and intensifying their own belief in the legitimacy of their policies. Again, there is the kind of role Marx attributed to an influential bourgeois doctrine in 1848-49 when he spoke of replacing "the inscription: 'Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite' by the unambiguous words: 'Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery'". [15] When we unpack this pithy comment we need to note (more than Marx and his followers ever admitted) that concepts such as liberty, equality and fraternity have had positive content by representing, in part, particular policies struggled for by particular groups and won or lost. But as well as that, appeals to these concepts in particular situations are very often ideological; they impart strength and feelings of solidarity to the participants and also often camouflage the promotion of certain specific interests at the expense of other specific interests, as in Marx's 1848-49 example where he is rightly suggesting that the concepts in question enabled members of the French bourgeoisie to rationalize to themselves, and divert the attention of other groups away from, the fact that it was bourgeois interests in money and power that were being furthered by the bloody suppression of the lower classes.

The function of ideology in providing solace or consolation can be illustrated by the criticisms of religion Marx made, under the influence of Feuerbach, in his early writings. For example, when Marx says "the secret of the holy family is the earthly family" he is intimating that the religious doctrine is a fantasy projection which compensated for the hard lives lived by many
men and their wives. Ironically, as numerous critics have pointed out, Marx's own belief—and that of other Utopians—in the coming of the "classless society" is of a similar ideological kind.

The consolatory aspects of religion, identification with nation, race etc. are often associated with diversionary or pacifying effects of the first kind. As a minor variation that has some currency in more recent times, in backward countries where there is government emphasis on sport the badly treated people are often rendered euphoric if national teams achieve success in the Olympic Games etc. Compare too how in the days of apartheid other black Africans, themselves ruled by rapacious black elites, were comforted by feelings of well being when there was progress in the freedom fight against the white oppressors in South Africa.

In the third type of case we have stronger manifestations of some of the same things, as when the more passive comforting effects become more positively invigorating and morale-raising. As a simple historical example there is the case of the doctrines of Mithraism that were widely believed among, and gave courage to, the Roman legions. A striking example of the same sort of thing in English history is provided by the Puritan soldiers of Cromwell's time who, in fighting on the side of the French against the Spaniards in the Battle of the Dunes near Dunkirk in 1658, roused the admiration of Turenne for their joyful, psalm-singing entry into battle and their remarkable prowess in it. [16] But it is not only in religious and military affairs that moral dedication is communicated by shared beliefs; the same occurs in the case of powerful, dynamic beliefs in nationalism; likewise in the case of revolutionary movements—compare Sorel on the moral force of myths—and also in various other types of movements and causes that capture the allegiance of numerous people.

Furthermore, beliefs of the kind in question perform a particular intellectual job, that of dressing up human wants or aspirations in a rational, theoretical or philosophical costume, often in a quite elaborate way—offering, so to say, secondary elaborations of primary rationalizations. That is why, in part, the beliefs can succeed in their overt role of appearing or purporting to be true beliefs; they do reflect the human being's intellectualizing tendencies, or what Pareto has called the human "hunger for logic", including the hunger for "pseudo-logic".

Reference so far has chiefly been made to the ideological psychology of the mass of the people who in socio-political affairs deceive themselves or are deceived or pacified, as distinct from the psychology of the minority groups which profit from these deceptions and pacifications, but the latter too have certain group psychology characteristics. There are some differences as well as resemblances between the outlooks of the two types of groups. Thus, there is the fact that aware manipulation of the rank and file is carried on by some members of ruling groups or aspirant ruling groups (or by some leaders within organizations and movements) but, as I have urged, there are sharp limits to the extent of that manipulation and the rulers and aspirant rulers themselves usually share at least core parts of the illusory beliefs they sponsor. It is true that such minority groups do profit from having their special interests promoted by the beliefs in the covert political
way described above, so they need not be altogether subject to illusions themselves about that—members of ruling and auxiliary elites who, say, in the past sponsored the virtues of patriotism as furthering the common good of the whole community, or sponsor today the virtues of "market forces" economics for that role, can rarely have been, or be, unaware that such beliefs do no harm to their own position in society. However, they themselves often have intellectualizing tendencies of the kind mentioned above (rather more so in the case of auxiliary elites) partly because they are normally better educated than the masses and so more likely to engage in theory or speculation—but in the case of their socio-political thought and belief this issues in large part in self-justifying rationalizations and idealizations.

**Influence of Ideology**

Ideology does not of course have a monolithic ascendancy in history and society. First, there is the fact that particular ideologies are often in conflict with rival ideologies. Second, and more important, ideological ways of thinking, reasoning, and imposing imperatives on people always encounter opposition, in varying degrees at different times and places, from ways of thinking that see through those things. If, as Croce says, "history is the story of liberty", critical thinking resistance to ideology is part of that story. Ideological processes, however, are always there, arising out of the pressures and struggles of social life and the psychological susceptibilities of the human mind, taking place in a largely unconscious way, and affecting members of groups who profit from a particular ideological belief or claim as well as those who are merely misled, pacified, or communicated zeal or enthusiasm by it. For this reason it is a thorough misunderstanding of the nature of social illusions, myths, unwarranted beliefs, ideological forms of moral reasoning... to dismiss them (as some writers on the subject do) as unimportant epi-phenomena of "real historical forces". In fact, they are powerful historical factors in their own right. As we may put it, they are the currency with which sociopolitical transactions are mostly conducted, and as such they have a distinctive influence, helping to decide and limit the transactions which do occur.

**6. SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS**

**Psychological Factors**

The beliefs just discussed raise further questions that bear socially on the categories of existence and causation. We have to ask what it is in the psychology of individuals that disposes them to be strongly attached to various highly influential social and moral beliefs and all the more so when the beliefs are quite unwarranted or unsubstantiated. But a problem here is that while we must regard the psychological side of socio-psychological (or psycho-social) theory as of equal importance to that of the social side, the fact is that the latter is more developed and backed up by evidence.

It is true that references to psychology have often appeared in the history of social theory. As we saw, Marx himself did suggest a psychological basis for ideology in his account of the
compensatory character of religious belief, but he made no attempt to develop such suggestions and concentrated almost entirely on economic factors. Mosca treated the political formula as involving a "universal illusion" that answers a real need in the human being's nature, and likewise Nietzsche, in some of his epigrammatic writings, advanced a theory of classes as having a morality appropriate to their interests and to the psychological urge which he called the will to power.

However, in this area of inquiry no one except Pareto has gone into analysis in detail with any real plausibility. The work of academic psychologists, including social psychologists, does not appear to offer much that has a vital bearing on issues of social politics as their work is either very abstract or else has an individualist bent that ignores or minimizes the importance of organizational and other complex features of society. That applies too to Freud, as was pointed out before, although we can make some applications of his (and Marx's) conception of the unconscious to the social field. Nor is the position much better with socio-psychological writers influenced by Freud. Marcuse, for example, had a considerable vogue as a social philosopher, yet much of his basic theory, instead of having factual backing, reads like an elusive, unverified amalgam of Hegelian and Freudian metaphysics. Another member of the "Frankfurt School", Theodore Adorno, in his work on "the authoritarian personality" did provide informative insights into the authoritarian and servile political outlooks, but it is an error to exaggerate what he says into a leading principle of social explanation. Another quasi-Freudian writer, Wilhelm Reich, will be referred to separately in the next chapter. So, although there are some difficulties about Pareto's psychological theory too, for our purposes he remains the one writer whose views are worth considering at some length.

Pareto

To begin with, mention needs to be made of the unfair hearing Pareto's work has received in some quarters. When his work became more widely known after the translation of his Trattato into English in 1935, it was perceived especially by some American sociologists to be an impressive contribution to social theory. But it was also greeted by an astonishing amount of ill-informed and emotional "criticism" (though Pareto himself would not have been surprised by that. In his considered judgement most "social thinkers" have not been objective inquirers but really moralists or reformers seeking to impose their own convictions on the world). The misinterpretations of, and objections to, him and his work range from regular misunderstandings and distortions of what he actually said—such as a misreading of his objective account of ruling elites as just propaganda in favour of those elites—through to the crudest kinds of argumenta ad hominem. Compare, for instance, the contributions of a psychoanalyst and a philosopher which took the form of replying to Pareto by claiming that he was neurotic. [1] At a more critical level, appreciation of Pareto was also held back by the work of Franz Borkenau, a socialist who wrote an influential book on Pareto in which he misinterpreted Pareto on certain key issues. [2] It was left, in particular, for the leading Oxford theorist, S.E. Finer, to give a balanced account of Pareto and his work. [3]
Factors in Pareto's overall sociology include *interests*, especially economic interests, such as—in the manner of Marx's classes—the interests of the elite and of the non-elite; *derivations*, which are mistaken beliefs and reasonings and thus Pareto's equivalent to Mosca's political formulae; and *residues* or *sentiments*, which are historically significant manifestations of psychological states.

Pareto's terms "residues" and "derivations" are so named because of his method of analysing social belief and conduct—when we strip away various derivations/beliefs we have left residues, which are manifestations of psychological states. However, another word he uses for residues, "sentiments", is a more straightforward term for describing what he is referring to, as in some contexts are such terms as attitudes, predilections, propensities. Pareto was admittedly breaking new and difficult ground, which explains his sometimes loose use of relevant psychological words.

*Derivations*, as we saw earlier, are illusory beliefs along with support for them by means of fallacious reasonings. Although they aren't true or justified in the way they purport to be, in the functions they have of a justificatory, rationalizing, compensating or suchlike kind they are integral components of the socio-political process. But more important usually in deciding actual historical outcomes is the pursuit of economic and other interests, and the influence of residues or sentiments.

In Pareto's overall view, *interests* (along with simple appetites, tastes and inclinations) and *sentiments* are the two fundamental socio-psychological factors—though this has not stopped some uninformed commentators on his work from playing down interests or even ignoring them altogether. Interests he regards as having an influence comparable with sentiments and together they are "the main factors in determining the social equilibrium". [4] The account of interests is, in effect, a retention in his position of the defensible parts of Marx's economic determinism. Pareto, in rejecting Marx's economic explanations as too crude and monistic, and adding to interests the theory of sentiments, presents a much more pluralistic account of *interdependent* factors—which include what he calls the operation of "social heterogeneity".

What Pareto calls *non-logical* socio-political conduct is not the same as illogical conduct as it includes *both* actions based on illogical belief and reasonings and actions that flow merely from custom or impulse. Non-logical conduct is typically associated with sentiments and logical conduct with interests, though the latter may involve non-logical actions—as when individuals misunderstand or disguise from themselves the nature of their interests or make other errors; which is something that is not uncommon in economic affairs.

With reference to interests it is evident enough and unexceptional to point out that the pursuit of economic and other interests, however efficiently or inefficiently carried out and with whatever amount of conceptual obfuscation, has a large part in affairs, including when social groups compete or
conflict with one another. But what is more exceptional and what Pareto stresses is the part played by "unreason in history" or more precisely by non-logical actions and beliefs. In history (as will be discussed more later in connection with social causation) there is not merely the failure of grand attempts "to make the future" but also the very frequent failure of more limited attempts at social planning—compare how rarely politicians ever achieve what they claim they are going to achieve. But if that tends on occasion to be admitted by social commentators and theorists and then promptly forgotten, the position is worse where underlying psychological factors are in question. In history in the cases, say, of people fighting and dying in the old-time wars of religion, or "for their country" in The Great War, while numerous people involved thought about what they were doing and why and acted logically at least in the light of their sincerely-believed premises, it is obvious that many people merely acted out of euphoria or custom or obedience—i.e., their acts were non-logical in Pareto's sense. Such cases may be admitted by social atomists but are usually glossed over as merely belonging to history past, and when they are confronted by striking examples of the operation of deep-seated feelings, prejudices and so on thrown up by today's current affairs parade of religious, racial and tribal hatreds, brutal behaviour, persecution of minorities...there is a similar tendency to explain these things away as highly unusual aberrations or abnormalities which will soon do as they ought to and go away. But what Pareto points out is the existence and great influence, both in striking and more mundane ways, of such phenomena in past and present history.

When the *Trattato* was translated into English there was considerable dispute about Pareto's theory (and of course it continued to receive a bad press from Marxists in particular). For one thing, Borkenau and some other critics wrongly tried to dismiss the theory on the ground that Pareto was committed to a particular kind of biological *instinct* view of psychology. But in fact in his references to residues—and interests—as manifestations of "instincts" and other psychic states, he was merely using the word in a general way to refer to underlying psychological conditions. These (in any view) are not easy to specify, but he took it that some of them are biological in character and others are of a socially generated kind. [5] That is, some sentiments and interests may flow from the human being's instinctual nature, such as the instinct of intellectual curiosity in the case of Class I kinds and sexual drives in the case of Class VI ones, while others are not so much inherent in human nature as socially induced, as, for instance, with some of the moral and conservative attitudes associated with Class II and Class IV kinds.

With reference to the manifestations in history and society of these psychological factors, there is the problem of whether Pareto's description and classification of them is correct. When he tries to infer their existence from sociopolitical actions and beliefs this leads, as some critics have noted, to a circularity in some of his explanations: when an elite, say, becomes predominantly clever and corrupt and this is explained as a case of strong Class I sentiments, there is no real evidence independent of the former for the occurrence of the latter. That
is, as Finer says, Pareto fails "to provide proofs". But as he adds, "Nevertheless this does not prove that something like these psychic states do not exist." [6]

In fact it is hard to see how any theory of the kind in question could achieve proof. That is why some of Pareto's hostile critics on the subject are disingenuous. Either because they have been Marxist sympathisers or in any case misled by equations of social with physical science, they have demanded of Pareto what can't be supplied and has tacitly not been demanded by them of their own assumed alternative views on the subject.

A detailed treatment of the psychological side of socio-psychological theory is certainly called for, and for this purpose the only illuminating and workable treatment is that of Pareto. It is a known theory of a pluralist kind, is realistic and objective in its approach, and is well backed up by empirical evidence as Pareto, far more than any other writer has ever done, has marshalled an extremely large number of relevant, and mostly incontrovertible, facts in support of what he says. At any rate, I will now survey and comment on his account and classification, citing a few of his own, deliberately mainly long ago, historical examples but adding to them various modern and contemporary examples, including Australian ones.

**Types of Sentiments, Attitudes, Predilections, Propensities**

Pareto distinguishes six main classes of socio-psychological phenomena, the first two of which have a special bearing on his theory of elites and were referred to earlier. These classes and their main subvarieties are as follows.

**Class I. Combining Propensities**

I a. *General* combinations of disparate items as in the procedures of magic, manipulations of numbers, inventive searches for medical cures, and the like. Sometimes, Pareto argues, these innumerable acts of combination have had chance useful outcomes as probably was the case with the first domestication of animals or the Peruvian Indians' discovery of quinine as a specific for malaria.

Also included here and of great importance are speculation (science, intellectual inquiry), speculation (money), and shrewd and ingenious activities in politics. In this area, when 1a predominates (and Class 11 values are weakened), "The individual comes to prevail, and by far, over family, community, nation. Material interests and interests of the present or a near future come to prevail over the ideal interests of community or nation and interests of the distant future. The impulse is to enjoy the present without too much thought for the morrow." [6] That approach is very evident in Australian politics, and I a tendencies are also strongly present in many Australians in the shape of our remarkable proclivity for gambling on races, lotteries, poker machines, etc.

In addition to I a there are various more specific or more special types of cases:

I b. The combining of like with like, or like with unlike, as,
for example, in medical homoeopathy and allopathy, the use in magic of needles stuck into wax models of enemies, cannibals eating enemies to acquire their characteristics, the use of talismans and relics. Pareto notes five varieties of I b.

I c. The ascription of mysterious powers to things, as with medieval trials of people by floating in water, attribution of powers to holy water, belief in the evil eye, belief—increasingly found in Western countries today—in astrology.

I d. The urge to blend factors with one another, which Pareto connects with metaphysical speculations and with the desire to have clearcut answers without discordant notes—as is illustrated by the tendency of the believers concerned to believe that nothing at all is mistaken about what is claimed in sacred religious books, or (until recently) in the writings of Marx or Lenin.

I e. This is the very important intellectual urge to seek logical explanations. But it is satisfied not only by sound thinking but also by pseudo-logic or rationalization. This interest/predilection is illustrated by the occurrence in society of science, theology and metaphysics, and is, of course, a potent factor in the formation and acceptance of myths and illusions.

I f. Belief in the efficacy of the combinations that are involved. Illustrations are the pagan belief that there must be a way of controlling storms, the biologist Pasteur's devout belief that God, having created germ-induced diseases, must also have made it possible for cures of them to be discovered,

the contemporary belief that there must be a cure for cancer or for AIDS, or, again, the unshakeable faith some gamblers have had in their betting systems or in their Melbourne Cup winner dreams.

Class II. Persistence of Aggregates

II a. Attachments to people and places as displayed in three main ways.

(1) Attachment to one's family or one's community, as found in attachment to the patriarchal family, pride in ancestors, and in nationalism.

(2) Attachment to places, including one's native land. Compare, for instance, the association of German patriotism in history with the river Rhine, or, again, the attachment of the French to their own country and regions which may help to explain the fact that comparatively few French people (compared with other Europeans) have been prepared to emigrate.

(1) and (2) are, of course, often closely associated as in the cases of nationalism and patriotism that have been manifested by so many countries in history.

(3) Attachment to social class, group or sect, often coupled with antipathy towards opponents, outsiders, traitors, foreigners, and so on.

Although Pareto himself did not make this clear, it is in this
sub-class that we need to place sentiments about race, such as feelings of racial superiority, and attitudes of resentment or hostility towards other races.

To cite some Australian examples, there are some complexities that have arisen in this country in connection with II a (1), (2), and (3) sentiments. Thus Australians, like other colonised peoples, for a long time tended to look to the “Mother Country” and to accompany this with a pronounced belief in the “Sovereign” and with what has been called a “cultural cringe”. That is to say, there was attachment to the people and place of Britain but less to Australia as a place—partly for the obvious reasons that it is a “young country” with too few generations to build up the requisite attachments, and that there has been considerable mobility amongst the population.

Some departures from this were evidenced in the 1890s when Australian republicanism was voiced, and then more so (though still mixed ambivalently in with attachment to the Mother Country) when many Australians fought in the First World War. This started at Gallipoli when the fact that colonial Australians (to the surprise of some observers) fought well under very difficult conditions came to typify what has been regarded as “the birth of Australian nationalism”. It was because the first fighting was at Gallipoli, and under the adventurous, storybook conditions of being mislanded on a beach backed by cliffs, that there came to be so closely identified with the “Anzac spirit” rather than e.g. Pozieres, the Australian capture and holding of which during the Somme Offensive in 1916 was tougher and more heroic. A similar expression of nationalism and Australian values (in association with Vb anti-servility sentiments) was manifested by a lack of respect often displayed by Australian soldiers for upper class British officers and their saluting and parade ground approach and for what was perceived to be their incompetence in war, and likewise by occasional brushes with British military police who, in some incidents (as a sort of presaging of Third World anti-colonial attitudes to come) were forced to desist in the face of rifles and bayonets. Such attitudes recurred during the Second World War, but during that war a more important public assertion of Australian independence occurred. This was when Prime Minister John Curtin, partly spurred on by interests owing to the imminent fall of Singapore and the danger from Japan, publicly looked to the USA as distinct from Britain for help.[8] But the British connection revived and continued (along with an American one) after the war, especially under Prime Minister Menzies who represented very traditional-patriotic Class II values, and it was only later when, as a result of immigration, the population became less British in race and when furthermore Britain joined the European Economic Community, that pro-Australian—as against pro-British and pro-royalty—sentiments became more powerful.

In the particular case of II a (3), attachments and antipathies to groups, interesting Australian examples include the often mentioned phenomenon of male “mateship”, the feeling Irish-Catholic Australians had for a long time that they formed an oppressed stratum, the trade unionists’ long-time antipathy towards “scabs”, and the “White Australia Policy” of the past
which may be generalized as a mixture, particularly of interests (protecting the living standards of white workers), together with racial antipathy towards kanakas and Asians. Postwar antipathies of British and Irish descent Australians towards newcomers from continental Europe have largely disappeared, but have been replaced by some antipathies (coupled with an interest in preserving an integrated European-type community) towards Vietnamese, Middle Eastern and other Asians, especially in the wake of Government-sponsored immigration and "multicultural" policies that have discriminated especially against people of British and Irish origin. At the same time, separately from that, as a matter of interests some concerned people believe that there is urgent need for serious objective consideration of whether Australia can really support economically a larger population than the present one.

II b and c. Concern for the dead and their possessions. These are exemplified by variegated beliefs throughout history in ghosts, fairies, etc., the custom of burying with a dead man his possessions, wives and slaves, or in modern times by the display of Lenin's body in Moscow. In Australia it is noticeable that these feelings do not appear to be as strong as, for example, in Europe, and the country is in the forefront of Westernised countries which widely accept cremation—though a positive illustration of II b is presented by veneration of the Anzac dead, which occurs in conjunction with (as a special IIa place sentiment) particular veneration of Gallipoli as a place.

II d. Persistence of abstractions. II e. Persistence of uniformities. II f. Sentiments transformed into objective realities. II g. Personifications.

These are powerful sentiments that underlie the transformation of metaphysical and other abstractions into supposedly real things, as e.g. with the objectification of moral notions into Duty or the Categorical Imperative, or the medieval Crusaders turning what was really a hankering for adventure and easy money into "God's will"; or the way in which in Roman times Roma (Rome) and Annona (the year's crop) were personified into goddesses. Today we don't go as far as that, but numerous people do make rather similar objectifications of Humanity, Progress, Welfare, Equality, Democracy, Socialism, and so on—i.e., their outlook resembles a religious one. Pareto thus emphasizes that the decline in the strength of orthodox religions—increasingly so since his time except in Islamic countries like Iran—has not meant a decline in the influence of religious sentiments. Instead, they are coming more and more to be expressed in the form of political and socio-moral faiths which are also dogmatic and Utopian like the religions they are replacing.

In regard to such recent faiths, whereas some decades ago conservative dogmatism and prejudice were often in the ascendancy, it became increasingly evident, especially from the 1970s, that radical versions of the same things now had ascendancy. Consider, as a well verified example, how both professional and sentimental protesters have been noted for instantly noticing and complaining about acts of American oppression and injustice—and likewise when apartheid was in force for doing so about South African actions. But they were
quite unable to notice—viewed with absolute silence—similar actions on the part of the USSR, the Khmer Rouge (until it became fashionable to criticize them on behalf of Vietnam), Vietnam, or the black African dictatorships. But this is hardly surprising; George Orwell, for example, noted a similar contrast in the case of pre-war English protest, which could see everything that was wrong with Hitler and not a thing that was wrong with Stalin.

It would have been better if Pareto had included in these sub-classes, especially II e, the authoritarian and moralistic sentiments that so commonly and strongly affect the propagation of moral, religious and other concepts and commandments in history and society. Pareto himself seems to imply that the metaphysical sentiments which produce conceptions of "The Highest Good", "Duty" etc., belong here, whereas the authoritarian and moralistic sentiments associated with them are to be classed under Sociality IV b and also under the Sex Residue. But we can accommodate this by taking II d, e, f, g sentiments as working, especially in socially important cases, in conjunction with Sociality and Sex ones.

In the case of these authoritarian-moralistic sentiments, while in Pareto's time they were conspicuously present in the form of religious and strict moral attitudes and a stringent censorship of material regarded as blasphemous, seditious and obscene, that is not so today. However, it is not difficult to discern in Pareto's way that it is not that the underlying sentiments have vanished; it is rather that the old sentiments are manifesting themselves in new directions—as is illustrated by the vociferous health moralism associated with current attacks e.g. on smoking, and by the zealous, covert censorship of today's politically or ideologically "incorrect" views.

II h. The need for new abstractions. This is an expression of the search for modernity, for new fashions, and helps to account for the fact that faiths do not stand still; new faiths come into being and old ones are subjected to innovations. That is why it is a sign of vitality in a religion or a political faith if heresies continue to arise within it.

Class I and Class II Sentiments

Although they stand in sharp contrast there are interconnections between Class I and Class II sentiments. Some forms of I are stabilized by II (otherwise they would prove just to be ephemeral), and when forms of II come to be expressed in a new way they are influenced by the presence of innovatory Class I sentiments. For this reason, it might be better to treat II h (need for new abstractions) as a hybrid type acting in association with Class I. Also, as will be mentioned later in connection with "wolves", there are certain historical figures who strikingly combine certain Class I and Class II sentiments.

In Pareto's view Classes I and II (and likewise the other four classes) have remained relatively static in their balance over the centuries, though there has been some shift in recent times towards Class I—owing to the growth of science and the spread of education. There may, however, be considerable variations in the strength of sub-classes of these sentiments, as well as
variations within different social strata and within different individuals.

Class III. Expressive Social Acts
These concern the human need to express sentiments by external acts, and give rise to religious rites, exaltations, frenzies, and other kinds of demonstrative activities such as Bacchanalian revels or sexual orgies (as, e.g., occurred in Sydney when the female convicts first came ashore in 1788). As well as by religious revivals, they have been illustrated in recent times by parades and mass gatherings, as in May Day or Labour Day processions, pop festivals, Anzac Day marches, anti-Vietnam War, anti-nuclear weapons demonstrations, etc. The French word for political demonstrations, manifestation, nicely captures what Pareto is drawing attention to here.

Class IV. Sociality
These sentiments concern involvement in social life and related tendencies towards social discipline and obligation.

IV a. Tendencies inducing people to belong to particular associations, such as religious, political and literary societies.

IV b. Need for social conformity. (1) By voluntary conformity, as occurs in imitating other people, following fashions in behaviour, dress, language. (2) Conformity enforced by persuasion, censure or penalties, as with past religious persecution, sexual censorship, modern compulsory trade union membership, and quite recently, new attempts to enforce thought conformity on everyone. (As noted before, this sub-class overlaps with II a (3). (3) Neophobia or hostility to innovations, as is illustrated by the attacks made on the inventor of the umbrella, disapproval of the first trains and motor cars, opposition to new ideas in medicine and in warfare. Australian examples have included well-known disapproval of "ratbags", "stirrers", and people with "uppity" or "refined" accents.

IV c. Pity, including humanitarian sentiments, and cruelty. These linked feelings express themselves in three ways. (1) Where self-pity—often in association with self-interest—is extended in a social way, as when people blame "society" for their misfortunes. On the question of pity for criminals, vis-a-vis punishment of them, Pareto noted a trend which is much accentuated today towards the former. This has involved a shift in the object of pity; the murdered victim, for example, is not present at a trial, but the murderer is visible and available for sympathy. (2) Where this involves complete repugnance to suffering, as with conscientious objectors, or in the case of people who demand complete disarmament or peace at any price. (3) There may be reasoned repugnance to useless suffering, a form of which may lead an agent—e.g. a dentist or a ruler in relation to "law and order"—to be "cruel to be kind".

We can add that if (3) is a realistic and (2) a sentimental masochistic approach, there is a further case (4) that of sadistic-authoritarian cruelties—as is illustrated in modern history by Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia.
IV d. Self-Sacrifice for Others. Society depends on and receives reciprocal goodwill, which issues in protection of family, or of social group, including fighting for one's country—though the sentiment may be overlaid with "logical varnish" about patriotism, etc. In milder form, there may be a sentiment of sharing one's goods with others—though Pareto notes drily that affluent political reformers (compare recent trendy, terrace-house academic "Marxists") usually have no desire to share their own property with others. We should, however, stress more than Pareto does that there are some reformers and radicals with genuine attachment to (idealistic) principles. Still, at least in the case of professional politicians, it has to be admitted that few of them have been like the British Labour leader Attlee, who displayed evident selfless dedication and ended his career no wealthier than when he began.

IV e. Hierarchy. These residues concern feelings in favour of social ranking, deference towards superiors etc., and are not based just on force—and were not so even in Feudal Europe if we may judge by the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381, during which, it appears, the doctrine of social levelling advocated by the preacher, John Ball, was not popular with the mass of the people. There are three types, (1) patronage and pride on the part of social superiors, and their domineering and authoritarian attitudes towards the lower classes, (2) veneration of authority or respect for superiors on the part of social inferiors, with which is associated socio-political servility, and (3) the urge to seek group approval or esteem.

We can offer as a good example of (1) conjoined with (3) what Thorstein Veblen called (in *The Theory of the Leisure Class*) "conspicuous consumption" and "conspicuous waste", as is illustrated by idle, American and other very rich people whose possession of many houses, motor cars, yachts, etc., has been not so much for use as to enhance their social status. A modern form of (2) is found amongst many people who are supposedly supporters of egalitarian political principles. The mass of the people, as Michels pointed out, have a need of something to worship, and today this is often evidenced by their deferential respect for Labour politicians and trade union leaders which often reaches the point of idolatry. (Compare in Australia the immense popularity for years of Bob Hawke even after he came to sponsor policies a long way from being "working class" ones.) An interesting intellectual form of this (connections with I e) is found in the reverence for power displayed on the part of some members of the literati (who, it might have been thought, were more logically-minded). This has included power as embodied by Mussolini, Hitler, and Mao, but the most notable case of a 11 was Stalin. Compare the well attested admiration for him on the part of G.B. Shaw, H.G. Wells, E.H. Carr, and numerous other writers. [9]

IV f. Asceticism. These tendencies represent an extension of the "instinct of sociality" beyond—from any realistic point of view—necessity. Ascetic habits were particularly strong in olden times, as is shown by the masochistic case histories of numerous saints and Church Fathers, public flagellations, and countless related religious phenomena. But like underlying factors actuate fanatical opponents of sexual
intercourse, and are e.g. also revealed (with connections with IV d) in such modern political protest phenomena as Buddhist monks burning themselves to death in South Vietnam, and Irish prisoners, beginning with Terence MacSwiney, Lord Mayor of Cork, in 1920, engaging in terminal hunger strikes.

Class V. The Integrity of the Individual

These qualities are complements of Class IV and reflect human beings' individualistic tendencies and their concern for private property and for equality, and their possession of qualities of personal integrity. The propensity people have to pursue their individual interests also falls into this class. But while such interests may be pursued by means of logical actions and beliefs, they are often intermingled with other Class V psychic tendencies, so that interests too may be expressed in non-logical ways.

V a. Sentiments in favour of the existing social order or equilibrium, or of an ideal version of it— that is, in favour of what the person regards as a "just" or "good" social order. Such sentiments may be tied in directly with interests, as when a member of a ruling group, a big property-owner, say, identifies himself with another property-owner who has been subjected to an "injustice"; or less directly, as in the case of repugnance to murder where the actual danger of a given person's being murdered is very slight. Another type of case involves feelings of national pride, such as the pride evinced by the English after Waterloo and by the Germans after defeating France in 1870 and 1940.

V b. Sentiments of equality among people in lower classes or of inferior status, including feelings in favour of their personal interests and integrity. George Orwell, for example, well evokes this sentiment in his writings when he urges respect for the human dignity of the poor and other underprivileged people. A contemporary illustration is the growing emphasis by women on the integrity or inviolability of their own bodies and their feelings that it is they alone who should decide whether or not to have abortions, or whether or not to accede to male sexual advances.

In history these sentiments are revealed, in particular, by the demands of lower or badly treated classes for political, social or economic equality. This is thus very much an expression of interests as distinct from the psychological residue; though the latter, as Pareto points out, very often helps to disguise the one-sided nature of the equality that is in fact being sought—as is illustrated by the way in which in "democratic" or "egalitarian" societies women were for a long time deprived of the vote and other rights of citizenship. Compare too, as mentioned earlier, how in various parts of Africa first blacks were oppressed by their white colonial rulers and then, "equality" having arrived, most blacks continue to be oppressed by their new ruling black elites.

Another example of V b is provided by some often noted Australian egalitarian and anti-authoritarian attitudes. Let us look in a little detail at the question of these attitudes (which are likely to decline in the future because of economic and other
pressures). Although the subject is attended by some myth-making, these attitudes have a definite place in Australian conduct and ethos and flow from several conditions: the country's convict origins, the initial mix of British and Irish peoples, the independent "pioneer spirit", the comparative economic well being of the workers (in the years before 1900 and for many decades afterwards Australian and New Zealand workers had the highest standard of living in the world), and the absence of a respected ruling class (it is noteworthy that early attempts to introduce what critics called a "bunyip aristocracy" of rich squatters and the like were quickly laughed out of business).

The egalitarian and anti-authoritarian attitudes that arose, while familiar to many Australians (and deplored by some) became better known because of Australian soldiers, especially when they first appeared overseas in the 1914-1918 war. Compare, as one evocation of those attitudes, reference by a Sydney novelist to: "The lawless, fearless, pioneering spirit," soldiers who were "casual and imperturbable" and from whom "even four years of warfare was not to wring the fundamental humour of their outlook."[10] Or, again, take the comment of an English artillery officer (about France after Ludendorff's advance in March 1918, which the Australian soldiers played an important part in stopping): "During the afternoon Australian soldiers came up from behind, they went along the road past our guns, up towards the line. This was the first time I had seen Australians, they were unlike any of our divisions, and on this first occasion I was not attracted by them. They were noisy and swaggering, they did not march along the road, they just walked, they seemed to be without any kind of discipline..." [11]

But let us note too that the easy going egalitarian outlook and contempt for officious authority could also fit in with failures of fighting prowess. The Diggers were prepared to fight hard in Gallipoli, France, Libya and New Guinea where arms and circumstances were more or less even. But they were less enamoured of a "fight to the last man" approach in impossible conditions. Hence the fact that in Greece in April 1941, when confronted by greatly superior German armour, numerous of them sensibly ran away; and likewise that in Singapore in February 1942, given the appalling British army leadership and the uninviting prospect of being prisoners of the Japanese some of them went their own way, including the ones who forced their way on to the last ships.

Likewise in civilian life many ordinary people have displayed egalitarian attitudes, have felt and acted as if they were quite as good as the next person, including the boss, patronizing from whom is resented, and have circumvented petty authority, while there was for many years at least, a pronounced antipathy towards and lack of respect for the police—i.e., even on the part of many normal, law-abiding people.

However, there are some complexities in the situation. Although many people have displayed such independent attitudes in their personal, daily lives, and while furthermore large numbers of Australians, past and present, have believed
that "politics are for conformists, and crooks, and time-servers" [12] that has not led many of them to be resistant politically. This is partly for institutional reasons including the very oligarchic character of Australian political machines, but also derives from something else about Australian attitudes. This is that the egalitarian, non-servile type of person to person attitude appears also to co-exist with a contrary one of docile and uncritical acquiescence in the imperious demands of impersonal, more abstract political and administrative authority (operation of IV e (2) servility). A simple example of this was the ease with which in the 1960s full decimalization (of weights, distances, etc., was imposed from above in Australia (and in New Zealand) against the wishes of the majority of the population, whereas attempts to do the same met with successful resistance in America and England; and another example was the fact that in 1987 if it had not been for the committed intervention, not of politicians, but of other public figures including the popular singer Peter Garrett, ordinary Australians would have accepted—although it was against their wishes—the introduction of a compulsory national identity card. However, a compulsory income tax file number was later introduced by authority and (despite promises to the contrary) tacitly used to have most of the functions of an identity card. Likewise, for instance, there has been the recent bureaucratic imposition of unwanted plastic dollar notes on the Australian public, which resented this but put up no resistance. [13] Or, to cite a more particular case, it is arguable that the people of, say, London or Paris, faced by a comparable situation, would have been much more forceful and effective in expressing their resentment than the people of Sydney have been about the notorious longstanding failure to build a new airport well away from the centre of Sydney.

V c. Restoration of integrity to people who feel they have guilty, sins, etc., and to people who have been harmed (or believe they have been harmed). Ancient history, religion and anthropology provide very many examples indeed ranging over such cases as that of Euthyphro in Plato's Euthyphro who sought to expiate an offence of his father's against family honour, that of young Australian Aborigines displaying a guilt that needs expiation when they have eaten emu reserved for the old men, [14] and all sorts of religious examples of feelings about the supposed need to cleanse away sin or moral pollution by various means including purification by blood or water, as is notably instanced by Christian rites of Baptism.

Here too are placed restoration in connection with real or imagined wrongs by means of vendettas and the like—which occur when Class II values (other than attachment to family) are weak or absent; also the familiar legal phenomenon of capital punishment, or other penalties, to make up for the harm done to victims; and as a political example the imposition of reparations on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles to compensate France and other countries for their losses in The Great War.

V d. Restorations of integrity by actions returning harm to real or imagined offenders. This complements V c and refers to vendettas and harm done to people, nations and so on from the point of view of punishing or obtaining revenge against
offenders. In regard for example to capital punishment and long prison sentences imposed on criminals, fluctuations in public attitudes about them depend on variations in the relative strength, on the one hand, of V d and V c (stress on punishment and on harm done to victims) accompanied by strong II d to g sentiments, and on the other hand, of humanitarian IV c sentiments accompanied by weak II ones. For instance, in recent times the former appear to have regained ascendancy, over the latter in the USA.

As a special Australian example, mention may be made of the sacking of the Whitlam Labor Government in 1975 by Governor-General Kerr. This earned Kerr afterwards much widespread public opprobrium (i.e., not just on the part of Labor supporters), which seems to have reflected a feeling that Kerr deserved opprobrium—deserved to have harm returned to him—because spurred on by self-importance, he had acted outside the canons of his office and impugned the integrity of the government process.

Class VI. The Sex Residue.

This concerns, not sexual feelings or activities as such, but their influence on modes of thinking, especially sexually moralistic ones. In his analysis of what he calls "sex hypocrisy" and a "pathological fanaticism of purity", Pareto (writing when sexual moralism was rife) independently advanced a Freudian-type account of how repressed or distorted sexuality displays itself in an immense number of socio-psychological phenomena. "The sex residue" he points out, "is active not only in mental states looking to unions of the sexes or recollections of such things, but also in mental states that evince censure, repugnance, or hatred towards matters of sex." [15] These can lead to ambivalencies such as the state of mind Pareto captures vividly in the following comment:

We need not therefore be surprised that strong sex impulses often lead to loathing for the sexual act and, in the Christian saints, to misogyny. Often enough in their invectives one detects a combination of a sentiment of pure asceticism with a sentiment of unsatisfied sexual interest. The sex-urge may become so violent as to provoke hallucinations, and the Christian becomes convinced that the Devil is tempting him to sins of impurity. And the Devil in question was not altogether without his reality. He is actually present in the mind of the human being, though he is more effectively banished by a sexual act than by any rite of exorcism. [16]

In the case of Class VI Pareto does not make a further division into genera, though he might have done so as follows, (a) The chief case of displaced or distorted sexuality, issuing in various puritanical and censorious attitudes—with side connections with asceticism and masochism (IV f)—and illustrated in the past (notably including in Australia) and to some extent today by censorship laws, "Festival of Light" movements, anti-abortion campaigns, and so on. (b) Cases in which sexual puritanism is exhibited in association with political revolutionism or radicalism, as is illustrated by such French revolutionaries as Hebert and Robespierre, and by
Bolsheviks like Lenin and Trotsky, and also by sections of today's women's movements which have a moralistic, authoritarian "dead men don't rape" etc. attitude towards heterosexuality. (c) Cases in which the Sex residue expresses itself in an opposite way in the form of attitudes that greatly favour sexual promiscuity. An example is the kind of socialist "sex religion" sponsored by the French Utopian Socialist, Enfantin; or, differently, the instances in ancient, and occasionally modern, times of religious sex cults, such as the recent one of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh (died 1990) who preached a combination of Eastern religion and free love and had a large number of followers.

**Summary of Sentiments**

It may be of convenience to readers to give an abbreviated summary of these various factors in the following list, in which an asterisk indicates special socio-political importance.

**Sentiments, Attitudes, Predilections or Propensities**

**Concerning:**

* I a. General combining, especially political cleverness, financial speculation, intellectual inquiry.
I b. Combining like and like, like and unlike.
* I c. Ascription of mysterious powers.
I d. Urge to blend factors.
* I e. Logic and pseudo-logic.
I f. Belief in effective combinations.
* II a(l). Attachment to nation, family.
* II a(2). Patriotism.
* II a(3). Antipathy to races, classes, sects, outsiders.
II b and c. Veneration of the dead.
* II d e f g Religion, metaphysics, ethics, moralism (often in conjunction with IV b.)
II h or I/II. Need for new abstractions.
III. Religious and political processions and demonstrations.
IV a. Belonging to associations and societies.
* IV b. Social conformity.
* IV c. Humanitarianism, pity.
* IV e. Social hierarchy.
IV f. Asceticism.
V Integrity of the individual.
* V a. The status quo.
* V b. Equality.
V c and d. Receiving amends for harm done, returning harm.
VI. Sexuality.

**General Observations And Examples**

Pareto thus advances socio-psychological theory by presenting us with a careful and thorough analysis of what amount to 43 subvarieties of cases. There can be some dispute, as I suggested in passing, about the correct placing, or the duplication, of some of these subvarieties in Pareto's classification.[17] Also, somewhat less stress could be placed on his six broad classes and the differences between them, and more stress placed on the particular affinities, and particular contrasts, between the various subvarieties he lists. For example, three particularly significant tie-ups of cross subvarieties are
these: (1), as noted, between II d, e, f, g (metaphysical and moral abstractions etc.) and IV b. (sociality and conformity); (2) between IV e (hierarchy) and V a (support of the existing order); and between IV c (humanitarian sentiments) and V b (support of equality).

In Pareto's theory what makes sentiments important in history and society is the presence of particular sets of them at given times and places in a widespread and intense way. Consequently, he was much more concerned with the occurrence of sentiments within social groups than with their occurrence within particular individuals. [18] But as an aid to understanding the point and force of his view, I will specify the dominant sentiments (of the kinds in question) of a number of well-known figures.

For example, in the case of distinguished writers of literature, they all possess I a Combining features in virtue of their inventive and creative powers, but some writers also provide evident examples of Class II values - compare, say, Kipling with his British Empire patriotic sentiments (II a and b), *** or, again, as Pareto himself notes, Tolstoy with his religious-like pacifism—which he held in curious association with his double standards about property and sex. Even James Joyce, who displayed Combining talents, reaching their heights in *Finnegans Wake*, that are probably the most remarkable in the history of literature, coupled them surprisingly with I b talismanic sentiments [19] and—although he rejected traditional Irish religion, patriotism etc.—did exhibit II a (2) sentiments in his extreme attachment to Dublin themes. Joyce, it may be noted, also possessed striking Class V sentiments (in the form of integrity of the individual artist).

In the case of political figures, there are many historical examples of people patently devoid of Combining features but although saturated with Class II (a, d-g) traditional attitudes, they could not make use of them in an effectively forceful way—as was true of the titular losers in revolutions, Charles I of England, Louis XVI of France and Nicholas II of Russia. Differently, in the French Revolution, Danton was strong in II a sentiments and effective in defence of the Revolution against invasion ("L'audace l'audace, toujours l'audace"), but partly because (I a) he later took bribes from, or at least supported, the Revolution's profiteers, his fall was brought about by Robespierre. The latter, while tough-minded and very dedicated to his ideals (II, especially d, e, f and g) eventually fell himself because he was so lacking in I a political craft that: he did not take the precaution of trying to reassure or deceive his fearful fellow members of the Convention, and he allowed food prices to be increased thus alienating his all-important sans culotte supporters. [20]

In a contrasting way, a great many ordinary modern politicians have been well armed with propensities such as political cunning, preoccupation with short-term gains etc., while being lacking in Class II faiths and ideals. Quite a few American presidents and British prime ministers have been of this kind. Furthermore, there are certain outstanding leaders in history, such as Richelieu, Cromwell, Frederick The Great,
Bismarck and Lenin, who have joined Class I a cleverness and resourcefulness to various Class II (a, d to g) forms of tough-minded dedication. In terms of Pareto's account of "foxes" and "lions" these men in fact had characteristics of both foxes and lions; or to make use of another type alluded to by Machiavelli in *The Prince*, such leaders are "wolves". Keeping to modern history, to this class might be added for instance Kemal Ataturk, Mao Zedong, and amongst more conventional politicians perhaps, say, William Pitt the Elder, Abraham Lincoln and Charles de Gaulle.

In this connection, in the very famous case of Napoleon Bonaparte, we have a rather curious example. He, of course, was exceedingly able and adaptable (Class I) as a general, an administrator and a politician, and yet he had nothing like the Class II attachment to political or religious causes in the manner of Richelieu, Cromwell etc. However, when we inquire more carefully we find that while Napoleon was surprisingly lacking in Class II a (1) nationalistic attitudes (and failed to recognize their force in history—hence his mistakes in Spain and Russia), he did have strong II a (1) sentiments in respect of *family* attachment (in association to some extent with Class V c and d vendetta sentiments). These were displayed in his loyal (but illogical) retention of the services of his brother Joseph and other members of the family entourage when they had plainly demonstrated their continued ineptitude, and sometimes their disloyalty. [21] Napoleon was likewise surprisingly attached to the old royal traditions (and to Class IV sentiments of hierarchy) which led him—in contrast to Cromwell—to abandon the Revolution's republicanism to become Emperor and to make kings of numerous of his relatives. Although he could see through the "ideology" and "cloudy metaphysics" of French ideologues, he himself could only fall back on "the sacredness of the laws and respect for the laws" as based on "The sacred principles of Justice". [22]

To add a comment about Vilfredo Pareto himself—which will incidentally help to correct some of the distortions put out by his emotive critics—while he of course nowhere discusses the subject himself, it is not difficult to sum up his own dominant sentiment features. Thus, as well as having obvious Class I e logical abilities, he evidently rejected *both* the Class II religious, conservative etc. sentiments ascendant at the time *and* the competing substitutes for them in the shape of Socialism, Progress, Natural Rights, etc., but was himself strongly attached to the values of intellectual inquiry and opposition to censorship [23] and in the realm of politics seems to have had more sympathy for tough-minded people who acted in accordance with ideals or principles as distinct from the hypocritical ordinary politicians (hence his part admiration for the anarchist Malatesta, the pre-power Mussolini, and Lenin). Furthermore, for instance, with regard to Class V b equality sentiments, Pareto was firmly in favour of political and sexual equality for women.

In Australia there has naturally been a much smaller number of public figures of calibre, but prominent Australian leaders do display some similar variations in sentiments to those mentioned above. Sir John Monash, for example, who was Australia's one
very good general, exhibited marked Combining talents (all the more so in view of the limited abilities and outlooks of most World War I generals) in being the real organizer of the breakthrough which led to the German Army's "Black Day" on 8 August, 1918, but otherwise Monash appears to have possessed conventional Class II a (1) and (2) patriotic-authoritarian values (although he was unconventional in having extra-marital affairs). Many successful Australian politicians, of course, have demonstrated Class I shrewdness in obtaining and retaining power while showing few signs of Class II faiths or ideals, and in State politics accusations of corruption among high-up politicians and officials have always been rife but were remarkably prevalent in the 1980s. This was especially so in the case of some of the State Labor administrations that were obviously dominated by Class I a sentiments, but the case of Queensland's National Party was different because, although some officials connected with it were eventually found guilty of corruption, its premier long in office always displayed marked II conservative-religious sentiments.

Accusations of corruption have been rarer in federal politics (although the question of who makes what donations to political parties has been a murky one), but on the question of ideals vis-a-vis corruption, considering that few allegedly corrupt politicians have ever been pursued for long, one interesting case is that of Lionel Murphy, a federal attorney general who became a high court judge. Whatever else he may or may not have done, among Labor Party figures of recent times Murphy was most unusual in being a man principle who stuck to his reforming ideals (for example, he succeeded in greatly liberalizing Australian divorce laws), but because of this—he was hounded by (unsuccessful) prosecutions for corruption until he died in 1986.

Among prime ministers, the World War leaders, W.M. Hughes and John Curtin, were different from the ordinary. They both displayed some Class I a skills, but whereas Hughes with an authoritarian-British patriotic approach (Class II) fared badly when he attempted to introduce conscription in 1917, Curtin, while espousing Class II nationalist-patriotic values, was able to unite the nation including on the subject of conscription. Admittedly, in terms of interests, Australia was much more under threat in the Second than in the First World War. As for the long-term post-war prime minister, Sir Robert Menzies, he showed considerable Class I a manipulative abilities in winning elections, outmanoeuvring opponents and rivals and the like, but these abilities were joined with conspicuous traditional Class II sentiments that probably appealed to "middle Australia", along with strong IV e sentiments of social hierarchy, including his notorious, apparently sincerely-held, attitude of obsequiousness towards royalty.

Or, to mention people of a much less prominent kind in Australia, intellectual figures, an example is John Anderson (he was named in the official list of Australian "Greats" in connection with the Bicentenary celebrations of 1988) who, as the leading Australian philosopher of his time, was characterized by Class I e logical abilities, by Class II devotion (in a non-moralistic way) to ethical goods as he saw them, while
in his uncompromising, argued-out approach to issues of the day he displayed remarkable Class V "integrity of the thinker" qualities. His much publicised stands on these issues notably provoked hostility from people imbued with traditional Class II patriotic, pro-censorship, and religious authoritarian values, but gave heart to other Australians with emerging different sentiments. More recent Australian intellectuals who became well known have not displayed the powers of logical argument Anderson had, but have given strong voice to certain established or emergent sentiments. For example, the writer Patrick White—who had pronounced I a literary skills—and the historian C. Manning Clark were public figures who both gave voice to Australian underdog and egalitarian (V b) attitudes. But in regard to Class II sentiments they mostly, with conspicuous moral fervour, exhibited and helped to stimulate values of the fashionable radical—and totalistic—type that began to flourish in the 1970s. However, White was uncompromising in a spirited way and was prepared (Class V individual integrity) to speak out in criticism of former apparent radicals who had disappointed his expectations.

To demonstrate the applicability of the overall analysis to wider history and contemporary affairs, I will now give two examples, one concerning Britain in a famous period of its history and the other concerning present-day Russia and other former Soviet countries.

In Britain in the late 19th century there was a continuing oscillation in the popularity of the Liberal Party led by Gladstone and the Conservative Party led by Disraeli and later by Salisbury. This situation—I leave aside the question of interests—didn't involve any simple general contrast between I and II, or between IV and V, sentiments. In Gladstone moral dedication (II e and f) mixed in with intellectual abilities (I e) were strong; Disraeli, although he believed in certain traditional (ruling class, Queen and Empire) values, was a clever and artful politician (I a) — compare the widely held view that he was the shrewdest of all the Conservative prime ministers owing to his clearly seeing that "gaps between the classes", i.e., the way in which the interests of the lower classes suffered in comparison with those of the ruling elite, could be overcome by "appeals to conservative emotions", i.e., to Class II and IV sentiments; the Liberal Party was the more popular of the two when, stirred up by Gladstone's moral fervour, humanitarian (IV c) and egalitarian (V b) attitudes were in the ascendant, as happened at the time of the "Bulgarian Atrocities," the British defeats in Afghanistan and South Africa, the Fourth Reform Bill; the Conservative Party was the more popular when imperialist-patriotic (II a), hierarchy (IV e) and revenge (V c and d) sentiments were predominant instead, as happened at the time of Disraeli's successes in foreign affairs, the death of General Gordon, the association of the Party with the noon-time of the British Empire.

In the case of contemporary Russia and other parts of the former Soviet Union, there is a continuing unsettled situation that has already seen considerable fluctuations in the relative strength both of particular interests and particular sentiments since Gorbachev was in power. With regard to the contesting
sentiments, attitudes, values etc., these involve a sharp contrast between Class I and Class II ones. In the reforming leadership, Class I adroit or would-be adroit, new directional, innovative attitudes have been strong, especially in Russia, but have had to be tempered by a wish/need to proceed fairly slowly owing to the balance of opposed forces and attitudes in the population, including amongst the still largely entrenched auxiliary elites of bureaucrats and army officers. Class I has been most pointedly represented in the current market forces economy by I a financial speculation and shady profiteering attitudes. The competing Class II traditional- conservative sentiments are marked especially, on the one hand, by burgeoning revived religious values, nationalist attitudes, and racial antipathies, and on the other hand, by retention of faith in communist values (themselves traditional after more than seventy years), but including more interestingly, in some cases - e.g. in Lithuania—revival of early more idealistic, principled communist values. At the same time, intermixing with these, and competing with one another, have been in particular emergent V b equality seeking sentiments, and persisting IV e hierarchy and V a status quo sentiments. All in all a state of flux and tension that (somewhat resembling the situation in France during the Third Republic) is likely to continue for a long time unless there is some historically dramatic enforcement of a (onesided) solution.

This sentiment theory can also be applied in an evident analytic way to such contemporary phenomena as the obtaining of opinion poll findings, the use of such findings by political parties to adjust policies in the hope of improving their popularity, newspapers engaging in circulation "wars", and television and radio stations in "ratings" ones. What is involved here (along to some extent with interests and derivations) are frequent fluctuations in the strength of certain sets of sentiment-varieties, and what politicians, editors, and television and radio producers for their part are really trying to do, is to stimulate certain sentiments in their publics with a view to altering the strength of certain existing sentiment combinations in a way that increases the appeal of their party, newspaper, television or radio station compared with competitors. Compare, as a well known, particularly crude example, the tendency of the London tabloid press to run sensational or emotive stories (about royalty or whatever) which strongly appeal to large sections of the English lower classes— and thus stir up certain of their Paretan sentiments.

Pareto thus brings to pluralism/complexism a missing socio-psychological component. This takes the form of a detailed, factually-supported theory for analysing and accounting for the part played in shaping socio-political affairs by psychologically-based activities. These consist not only of inquiring and logically-minded-activities (operative in the aware and efficient pursuit of interests, as well of course as in the pursuit of knowledge and the development of science), but also by a large and varied array of other mental phenomena which are little alterable by logical thought and argument. These include such influential phenomena as moralistic, religious, quasi-religious, authoritarian and servile feelings and attitudes, deep-seated prejudices, animosities, and guilts, scheming or devious tendencies, and tendencies conducive to rationalization, self-
deception and gullibility. Pareto makes it inescapably evident that the array of mentioned psychological factors and their striking influence in history and society cannot be ignored or explained away in objective social theory—even though that is precisely what any number of people, including social atomists and millenarians, have overtly or covertly tried to do.

7. SOCIOSEXUAL THEORY

In the case of the sexes, the categories of difference and relation are naturally significant and have a bearing on such matters as marriage, divorce, children and the continuation of communities. But, as well, there are more controversial questions that arise about the relation between sexuality and other social phenomena in regard to hierarchy and freedom, and likewise in the case of women further questions about hierarchy and woman’s “identity” (as is sometimes said questions about women’s status and identity in “a man’s world”), and even questions bearing on the categories of number and quantity owing to the way in which, as feminists stress, slightly more than half the population has by and large over the centuries—at least until quite recently—been regarded as “inferior” to men and has been treated less well in economic and other ways.

Pareto, as we have just seen, was a pioneer socio-sexual theorist in paying serious attention to the social effects of sexuality, but in his view the “Sex Residue” has only marginal influence so far as central historical developments are concerned. Otherwise, apart from one tradition within radical thought which connected sexual liberty with other forms of liberty, little attention was paid to the subject, except on occasion by Freud, until Wilhelm Reich and others did so in the 1930s and 1940s, and later when especially in the early 1970s there was much new women's liberationist writing.

Among these latter writers, Reich and also some radical feminists have made large theoretical claims about the place of sexuality in social affairs which, if true, would entail modification of our findings so far—especially in regard to the revolutionary transformation of society. But even if, as I will argue, these large claims are unjustified—and in any case aspects of the growth of sexual “permissiveness” casts doubt on some of their claims— their theories do involve certain positive insights that are worth adding to the pluralist position.

Reich's Sexual Theory

Reich, who was a member of the official Freudian school of Psychoanalysis in the period 1920-33 (and by all accounts, a very good psychoanalyst), had a dedicated interest in both sexual and social theory. As a result, he became the most outstanding example there has been of someone who was both a Freudian in psychology and a Marxist in politics, but he thereupon had the distinction of being expelled from the Communist Party because of his sexual views and from thePsychoanalytic Institute because of his social views. Later he became strongly anti-Communist and an opponent of orthodox psychoanalysis, and eventually originated some theories and experiments that are difficult to confirm concerning the science
of "orgonomy" dealing with "orgone energy" or "primordial cosmic energy". He was, moreover, the victim of really remarkable persecution by the Food and Drug Administration of the United States Government, which caused him to be sentenced to two years imprisonment in a federal penitentiary (where he died in 1957) for the horrendous offence of transporting orgone boxes across State boundaries and furthermore suppressed his books and required various of his papers to be burnt. [1] In later years his works were permitted to appear again.

There is a problem created by variations in Reich's views at different times, but I want to concentrate on his socio-sexual views, especially as presented in The Sexual Revolution and in parts of his later writings, while leaving aside the main thrust of his later work. This is because that became increasingly remote from pluralism in its treatment of orgone energy as a fundamental biological principle which is supposed to solve all sorts of problems in biology, psychology and medicine. Even so, his later writings do contain various extractable insights on such subjects as neurotic and non-neurotic sexual life, character rigidity and armouring, psycho-somatic causes of illness (of which Reich was a pioneer theorist) and in the conduct of affairs the contrast between "work democracy" and authoritarian politics.

In order to understand Reich's social theory, it is necessary first to make clear briefly his account of individual sexual psychology.

In his treatment of the subject Reich was influenced by Freud, but was also critical of him. Unlike earlier breakaway analysts such as Alfred Adler (with his prime emphasis on inferiority feelings) and Carl Jung (with his mystical "collective unconscious") who wanted to distance themselves from Freud's embarrassing early emphasis on sex, Reich at all times took central issues to concern genital sexuality. With regard to the steady changes in Freud's doctrines, which as time went on became less and less sexual and more and more metaphysical, Reich in effect adopted the view: the earlier the Freudian doctrine the better— which is the sensible view to take if we are to salvage anything except metaphysics from Freud's work.

Reich went on to develop his own theory of neurosis (presented in The Function of the Orgasm, Ch. IV) according to which in the case of neuroses generally, part of their content involves a disturbance of genital sexuality in the form of orgastic impotence. In order to overcome this, what is sexually the matter has to be "brought to consciousness"; but that is not sufficient (as the later Freudians implied), there also has to be development of a capacity for full orgastic satisfaction. In this way Reich advanced a theory (then socially subversive) championing the place, in the avoidance of neurosis, of genuine and continuing sexual gratification.

In developing his position Reich makes a crucial distinction between orgastic potency and orgastic impotence. Orgastic potency is not the same as ordinary potency—as men who are most proud of their sexual conquests and their powers of coital
performance are erectively but not orgastically potent. Moreover, it is a concept that applies to women as much as to men. In cases of orgastic potency, women as well as men are sexually active and there is a mutual capacity for surrender. Normally the partners concentrate both their tender and their sensual feelings on one another, though Reich holds that this case has to be distinguished from the less orgastic situation where, owing to false neurotic transference, partners are excessively idealised and illusions predominate. On the issue of number of partners, he is critical of the two extremes of lifelong "compulsive monogamy" and of mere promiscuity without affection, but regards other relationships as capable of involving orgastic satisfaction.

**Criticisms of Freudianism**

This emphasis by Reich on the distortions of "natural" genital sexuality as the main source of neurosis, not to speak of his unrepentant commendation of the joys of an active, guilt-free sex life, put him at variance with the more respectable theories of the later Freuds; and one of Reich's preliminary contributions to social theory was to note and give reasons for the increasing conservatism of the Freudian movement after World War I. He also noted how this conservatism was correlated with the various doctrinal changes introduced by Freud.

The Freudian doctrines Reich rejects or modifies include those of the death instinct and the Oedipus Complex. Like numerous other critics he denies the existence of the death instinct, and stresses that its introduction by Freud led to a further dilution of the original libido theory. Whereas the earlier Freudian treatment of aggression and destructiveness allowed them to be greatly influenced by the frustration of sexual impulses, the new theory places them with the death instinct in a self-contained biological compartment, immune from sexual and social conditions. (Ironically, Reich in later phases of his own thought came to treat orgone energy in a similar way.) In the case of the Oedipus Complex, while Reich acknowledges the importance of child-parent conflicts and identifications, he also wants to qualify Freud's account. Along with other critics, he insists that the particular Oedipus forms of conflict etc. described by Freud are not ultimate, inescapable forms, but are subject to social conditions—so that we could expect important variations depending on the type of society or sub-society involved.

Criticism of this kind, it can be added, applies also to Freud's super-ego theory. That theory is connected with the theory of the death instinct—the latter is taken to contribute the more unconscious and more aggressive features of the super-ego, so that if the death instinct is fixed and inevitable, the super-ego is so far also fixed and inevitable. But, apart from the criticism of the death instinct, this extension of the super-ego theory has obscured the other part of the super-ego—what was earlier called by Freud the "ego-ideal" which is closely connected with infantile frustrations arising from parental authority and with the development of moral prohibitions. It is here easy enough to show that the super-ego is subject to important social variations. The Freudians themselves have allowed variations which arise
from the different kinds of identification people have in childhood and later. Some of them allow for what is called "the weakening of the superego" and, again, for a "criminal super-ego", i.e., for a superego with values and prohibitions quite different from those of the "normal" super-ego. This points the way to a theory of the social conditioning of the super-ego: we may, if we wish, speak of a single super-ego apparatus, but what it seeks to enforce are the different values and prohibitions that different groups of people have. The operation of the superego, it may be observed, could usefully be referred to in connection with the origin of various of Pareto's Class II sentiments.

In regard to the Freudians' own social theory, Reich criticizes them (rightly) for their atomism, for trying to treat social forces and relationships as merely a matter of individual psychology.

*Reich's Social Theory*

In considering Reich's application of his views to society and politics, we have to note that he writes very much as a therapist and a reformer who believes that a revolutionary upsurge of unrepressed sexuality can lead to a total alteration of existing social structures. That is why, although we have to grant much of Reich's criticism of him, Freud was in some ways rightly more cautious and pessimistic than Reich about the possibilities of social change, and more aware of the obstacles to emancipation from sexual illusions. However, admitting Reich's therapeutic, reformist and indeed Utopian approach (sometimes even with authoritarian overtones of the kind that became more pronounced in some later feminist writings), we can still detach significant objective claims from what he says.

Reich wrote when traditional morality was much stronger than now, but stating his view as he presented it: he holds there is a close connection between political and sexual repression—and correspondingly between political and sexual freedom. This arises from a basic conflict between the patriarchal authoritarianism that dominates society and the natural biological impulses that people have. Society is authoritarian in its structure and contains ruling groups which, for economic and political reasons and because they believe their own ideology (which is connected with their own repressed sexuality), help to impose a repressive morality on the rest of society. This is the morality which abhors homosexuality, lays down chastity as the way of sexual life for the unmarried, and within marriage prohibits adultery and often (in the belief that the sole purpose of intercourse is procreation) deplores contraception and abortion.

This classic authoritarian sexual morality does not succeed in stamping out forbidden sexuality; but what it does do is distort it, and lead many people to live neurotic and guilt-ridden lives and to have unsatisfactory sexual relations even when they are in the permitted marital state. It also—particularly through crucial conditioning in the first four or five years of life of the child's attitudes and guilts by the authoritarian family—leads people to have a character "armouring" which makes them credulous and subservient in socio-political affairs. [2]
The basic conflict involved, Reich goes on to argue, cannot be resolved within the existing social structure; mere reforms within the system are palliatives; what is needed is uncompromising criticism, with a view to altering, the social and sexual role in society of conventional marriage and its adjunct the patriarchal authoritarian family. If these social forms can be revolutionised, natural sexuality will run free and most people become orgastically potent, resulting socially in overall sexual freedom, conjoined with overall political freedom in the shape of spontaneous co-operative activities of work democracy.

**Criticism of Reich**

In assessing Reich's position, an initial objection we can make is to his constant employment of the concept of the natural in a morally and metaphysically loaded way, as in his observations on natural sexuality or the natural biological impulses which are distinguished from "secondary anti-social" impulses including aggression and self-punishment. The realistic point we need to make here is that repressing forces or activities in the mind and society, including sadism and masochism, are just as natural as other forces or activities such as straightforward sexuality, in that they all happen—all come under the category of existence or occurrence. Of course Reich, with his pronounced emphasis on therapy and the need for "healthy" orgastic sexuality, wants to understand by natural that which is biologically primary, i.e., something that is irremovable because if it cannot express itself freely it will do so in a deflected or distorted form, whereas his claim is that the socially-induced psycho-sexual factors (sadism etc.) and the social forces which cause them (authoritarian morality etc.) can be removed. Even so we can still insist that they are natural or real occurrences which have their own definite conditions and ways of going on—just as do such phenomena as disease, famine, wars and illusory thinking.

Furthermore, we have to reject Reich's large claims about removing what is opposed to "primary" biological facts. These claims, when analysed, turn out to depend on a totalistic concept both of society and of mind, which is a concept that is present in all phases of Reich's thought. It is because he regards mind, and correspondingly society, as a total or unitary system that he confidently claimed, first that sex libido and later that orgone energy, provides the recipe for a total solution in the shape of total liberation. Even in his Marxist-Freudian phase, when he suggested a pluralistic combination of an economic principle with a sexual principle, he still assumed an overall solution that would end all aggression and antagonism. So on these counts Reich is open to pluralistic criticisms of the kind presented earlier.

It is true Reich's visions about the future liberated society do at least have the merit, compared with the vague "classless society" of the Marxists, of going into details and presenting us with an imaginable picture of how social institutions and transactions would be transformed if everyone, not excluding society's "rigid" and "frozen-bodied" rulers and politicians, came to be sexually emancipated, loving and lovable, participants in work democracy. However, that answer, in
effect, to the findings of Michels about organizations and Nomad about power-hungry leaders, is not a logically reassuring one. Thus, it depends again on the mistaken assumption that individuals and the organizations to which they belong can be totally co-operative and tension-free (that the social sub-category of conflict and struggle will vanish from the earth), but leaving that aside, how, we may ask, is this dramatic transformation of society to occur? By wholesale therapy, say, or planned nation-wide diffusion of orgone energy? But a moment’s reflection leads us to see that the Reichian reformer is in the same predicament as the Utopian Socialist, as the implementation of his plans presupposes the existence of socio-sexual conditions which make the plans realizable. We need a prior sexual revolution in order to carry out the socio-sexual adjustments needed to introduce the sexual revolution. Nor could it be a matter of relying on the aid of existing ruling elites, as on the known track record of their members—with one or two honourable exceptions—their sympathy for new revolutionizing measures would be likely only if it were a matter of attempting to impose on society newfound forms of biological or psychological engineering that would help to keep the mass of the people servile.

Let us look then at Reich’s claims in a more limited and pluralistic way. What he offers as a general finding about the character of society is a close connection between political authoritarianism/servility on the one hand and sexual authoritarianism/servility on the other hand, which is a connection that does have much corroboration in history. Furthermore, his psycho-sexual explanation of how this connection comes about, although difficult to verify, can be regarded as having at least a good deal of plausibility—providing we treat it cautiously as indicating one, and not the only, factor that can be of importance in the formation of socio-political attitudes. (If Reich is correct to this extent we thus have a partial explanation of what underlies some of Pareto’s varieties of sentiments.)

However, in the case of Reich’s complementary claim about the connection between political and sexual freedom, while that has point too, it is not a connection with anything like the historical influence of the other connection. He does present us with a worked out sexual theory that backs up occasional references to the politically subversive character of free or permissive sexuality which have occurred in literature and in social theory. Compare treatment of the subject in a vivid literary way by the Russian writer Zamyatin who, in his novel We (1920), depicted an authoritarian society in which it was the height of subversion to have sexual intercourse without prior authorization and selection of partner by the State. Likewise Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four depicts the political freethinking of Julia and Winston as being compounded by their having an illicit sexual relationship. But, contrary to Reich’s belief in total solutions, there is no good reason to believe that either sexual or political freedom—in his sense of orgastically potent sexuality and aware participation in work democracy—will come to predominate in society. The most we might expect in the way of Reichian progress would be greater prevalence of minority social groups in which—as in some known examples
of artistic, intellectual, and political groups and movements—there is a tie-up and communication between being sexually free and being politically aware and non-servile.

The latter view is one that was adopted by the Sydney Libertarians in sponsoring Reich's theories in a more pluralist way. It may be added that while John Anderson opposed these sexual theories of the Libertarians, he himself had earlier advanced views of a not dissimilar kind. Thus, he had given papers arguing for a connection between political and sexual servitude,[3] and had also, it has recently emerged, [4] written for instance, "that love, like science and art, can be nothing less than a way of life, not a department of life; that freed sexuality, like free thinking, would colour all one's activities", and (although he had not read Reich) he even referred to "psychosexual impotence" in a manner akin to Reich on "orgastic impotence".

The Recent "Sexual Revolution"

The fact that there is no easy road to genuine political freedom is plainly confirmed by the so-called "sexual revolution" that occurred since Reich's death. Indeed, when we take account of that phenomenon we have to begin by considering whether it doesn't entail a clear falsification of Reich's claims. That is because of the development since the 1960s, of a much more varied and permissive morality which has been assisted by the discovery and wide use of oral contraceptives, the much greater availability of abortion, and by the surprising reduction in the power of opponents of sexual pleasure. At least until quite recently. It remains to be seen whether the onset of AIDS will lead to the eventual return of traditional sexual morality. Moreover, the attribution of considerable risk from AIDS to ordinary heterosexual activities has led to demands for widespread use of condoms—which so far as Reich's theory is concerned means a considerable reduction in the chances individuals have of achieving mutually gratifying orgastic potency.

But the overall development of a permissive sexual morality has not, it is evident enough, been accompanied by any great alteration to the customary political outlook and apathy of the mass of the people. In the course of the spread of sexual permissiveness there was, at the time of the Vietnam War, an unusual amount of political criticism and protest especially in America; but that has since become much more muted.

Consider also the fact that sexual censorship almost totally disappeared in Western countries. On that point it is interesting to note that the key suppositions of both defenders and opponents of censorship have turned out to be mistaken. Censors and moralists often claimed that without vigilant censorship the moral and social order would be in danger of collapse, while numerous opponents of censorship envisioned that if the heavy hand of State censorship, especially of sexual material, were ever lifted that could only mean that society's elitist/hierarchical arrangements would be under serious threat. In fact, although on the one hand there has been a decline in the strength of "family values" and also of "law and order", and on the other hand probably some growth of cynicism about, and
lack of respect for, society's political and other leading figures, there has been little liberation from political passivity and servility—i.e., the socio-political process goes on much the same as before.

What might be argued on behalf of Reich in the face of these facts is that political liberation has been limited in scope because real sexual liberation itself has been limited in scope. There is no doubt that sexual permissiveness, in making it more common to have early sexual experience, to change partners easily, or to have multiple partners, making homosexuality legal, and so on, has altered the kind of physical sexual life lived by numerous sections of the population. However, despite this permissiveness there are still many signs of the old jealousies and illusion-laden relationships, romantic-sentimental attitudes, and furthermore sadistic-masochistic ones. Nor, since Reich's was a psycho-heterosexual theory, did he envisage that freedom would bring a wave of proselytizing homosexuality of the kind that emerged in some countries. Moreover, with regard to accompanying social developments, it can scarcely be said that new social structures of the kind Reich expected have come into being; as was mentioned a moment ago there has indeed been some decline in the strength of the "patriarchal family", but hardly to the advantage and education of now often neglected children, and what has in part replaced the old family is the now notorious State welfare supported phenomenon of "one parent families" which is not at all what Reich had in mind.

In addition, there has been a remarkable shift away from the old situation of sexual moralism, silence and suppression to a new situation in which there is high-powered commercialization and glamorization of the subject—to what in effect is an incorporation of sexuality into the existing hierarchical system—by giving it a central role in what is depicted in films and novels, in the advertising for almost any product, and in the development of a very profitable "pornographic" industry. It is noteworthy, though, that sado-masochism has come to be particularly important in pornography, and also to play a part in advertising. But such opportunistic exploitations of sexuality have done little to further affectionate, "orgastically potent" sexual attitudes; what it does more is to promote and reinforce in many people a fake or substitute kind of sexuality as part of which a certain kind of beauty ideal is set up for women, men are induced to yearn for women of that kind, both sexes are encouraged to believe that men should have great mechanical prowess in bed, and so on—all of which helps to accentuate the feelings of inadequacy both men and women may have. In short, rather than the widespread genuine sexual freedom Reich (in his Utopian way) envisaged, we have a more apparent than real freedom, partial improved sexual gratification accompanied considerably by a perpetuation of old anxieties and illusions, permissive attitudes that are generally absorbed into existing social structures and are countenanced, seemingly without fear, by ruling elites.

Feminist Views

Another recent phenomenon associated in certain ways with the growth of permissiveness, has been the development of the women's liberation movement. That has now primarily become
an activist movement concerned to gain various benefits and advantages for women's groups, such as wages equality with men, and also to enable some feminists to gain power and privileges as lobby leaders etc. But some of the initial radical feminist writers did make broad theoretical claims which have an evident bearing on pluralism. In so doing they were influenced in part by Reich (even though he, like Freud, is sometimes criticized as a "male chauvinist" theorist), especially in their views about the "nuclear family" and the need for a "feminist revolution". Reich in fact was a pioneer advocate of women's liberation though he always upheld equally male and female liberation—and he was the first to speak about "sexual politics". Leading feminist writers of the early 1970s, such as Firestone and Millett, generally concurred with Reich's account of the authoritarian family and its place in moulding political belief and subservience, and endorsed Reich's revealing study (in Part II of *The Sexual Revolution*) of how, in Soviet Russia, the rapid growth of political authoritarianism under Stalin was accompanied by a parallel growth of sexual authoritarianism.

The best feminist writers of recent times have been good at giving a perceptive account of the place and predicament of many women in basically male dominated societies—as was first and notably done by Simone de Beauvoir in *The Second Sex*. But when it comes to serious criticism, feminist writing has often been marked by the use of emotive and other illogical arguments which, as critical thinking feminists see, doesn't help their cause, except in Pareto's sense of stirring up supportive psychologically-based attitudes, and the situation has become steadily worse since the flowering of feminist discussion in the early 1970s, leading on to the censorious and moralistic claims and demands of today on the part of some dominant feminist groups especially in America.

In order, however, not to just rely on announcing that feminists are often found wanting when it comes to logical argument and criticism, let me back this up by referring to one specific case, the at the time celebrated criticism made by one of the better writers, Kate Millett, on the work of the writer Henry Miller. [6]

*Millett On Miller*

Millett in her *Sexual Politics* (1970) does not go as far as some later members of the sisterhood (who would clearly like to bum books of Miller's kind), but she does manage to attack him with unremitting venom. Thus, according to Millett, the whole point of Miller's work is to humiliate women and assert male power and supremacy over them. "Miller," she claims/ "is a compendium of American sexual neuroses"; his works are "masturbatory revery"; he "hates the money mentality" but can only replace it by sex— "while his better 'adjusted' contemporaries swindle in commerce, Miller preserves his 'masculinity' by swindling in cunt"; "Miller's sexual humour is the humour of the men's house, more specifically the men's room" and is like "racist humour or bigot fun". And so on and on.

There is some truth in all of this especially in the case of such works of Miller as *Tropic of Capricorn* and *Sexus*, though
do note that Millett rarely quotes from his best work *Tropic of Cancer*; but what Millett says is marked by constant overstatement, relentless humourlessness, and lack of logical clarity about the exact targets of her criticism. Thus, she runs together as if they were exactly the same, three different things, (1) the psychology and attitudes of Henry Miller personally, (2) what he portrays in his works (which are all lumped together), and (3) the effect of these works on (admiring) readers; and furthermore as part of her own exercise in sexual politics, i.e., denigrating male heterosexuality with an all too familiar "all or nothing" approach without disturbing complexities, she implies that there is one thing and virtually one thing only present in (1), (2) and (3) (as amalgamated), namely, a policy of masculine power-seeking, women-putting-down, etc.

In the case of (1), the question of Miller's psychology—allowing for the sake of argument that it is identical with the psychology of the first person narrators of his works—Millett's position is that Miller's psychology and outlook are just those of a crude, neurotic, humiliated of women etc. (i.e., the same as those of his crudest readers). But that is a caricature of Miller which ignores complexities of his character including, of course, his creativity and drive as a writer, his "zest for life", his interminable loquacity, his deriding of fashionable and conventional values, and so on. Miller (as depicted, by his narrators) does emerge, in much of his work, as an unrepentant, insatiable, woman-consuming heterosexual. Even if he was like that, some women might have been appalled by him and others attracted by him, i.e., a pluralism of reactions is possible, despite Millett's implied monolithic approach. Miller's actual life, however, appears to have been somewhat more conventional; certainly in the years when he lived in New York. While he was a difficult and unreliable person—to some extent because of the conventionality of the women he first lived with—he did have various complicated (and sexual equality yearning) attachments to women. [7] In the case of (3), the relation between Miller's works and their readers, Millet's sweeping suggestion is that the works just pander to all that is neurotic and sex fantasizing in the modern (especially American) male; when the fact is, as it is not difficult sociologically to notice, there are significant variations in classes of readers, including admiring readers, and it is very likely that Miller's works (if they do—or did—do this) only fulfil crude sexual fantasies in the case of a limited class of readers. Millett's simple view of Miller's readers (which ties in with her fallacy of equating (1), (2) and (3)), fails to account, for example, for the contrast between the overall appeal of Miller's works and the appeal of stories in girlie magazines. Such stories typically proceed along the lines of depicting a plumber or a pub-goer, say, who in the course of a day's work or a night's entertainment seduces (or is seduced by) one or more women, who are all avid for more, etc. That is the sort of writing which panders in an obvious way (as it is no doubt deliberately written to do) to crude "sexual success", "women are pushovers" etc. male expectations, but such stories are usually very inferior pieces of writing that do not have the qualities and appeal to a diversity of readers that Miller's work has.

If, without moralizing we look objectively and realistically at the main issue (2), the content of Miller's works, we do find
that they concentrate on male characters who, so far as their sexual attitudes are concerned, have an outlook which—to employ useful Freudian terminology—is marked much more by a consumerist, "prostitute mother" conception of women than it is by an idealised, romantic "virgin mother" conception if them. However, Miller's stories (he is better really at writing disconnected episodes than unified works) have more subtlety than Millett makes out; they do not, for example, often cruelly attribute sexual "success" to the narrator or his friends—compare e.g. the scene with Van Norden and the fifteen franc prostitute in Tropic of Cancer, where Miller's ironic and compelling depiction of the scene turns on Van Norden's inability to perform after being in the Dome cafe all night). Likewise, in dealing with women's interest in sex, it isn't necessarily fantasy to attribute to some women pronounced interest in the matter, but also Miller makes good use of complications arising from women's being ambivalently, or very ambivalently, interested or tempted. This comes out even in a passage (from Black Spring) to which Millett appears to be alluding when she refers dismissively to "chance passengers on subways molested without the exchange of a word or a signal". But this is an example of a judgement by Millett that is economical with the truth as the woman concerned is portrayed as finding the experience far from repugnant. [8]

Sometimes there are even suggestions of love in a tender-attachment way, though it is true these aren't always of a kind that would please either feminists or the readers of The Women's Weekly—consider the description in Tropic of Cancer of a pimp's and his woman's ardent efforts to love away memory of her work-time clients. Above all, interwoven with the underlying concern with sex is a struggling, down and out, self-deprecatory but unrepentant view of the world ("I've got a motter: always merry and bright!") that gives gusto and humour to Miller's best work—including direct writing about sex, in which regard his work contrasts sharply with the humourlessness of other notorious past frank writers on the subject, such as the Marquis de Sade, Frank Harris and D.H. Lawrence.

There is thus a good deal more complexity and a good deal more merit in Miller's work than Kate Millett makes out, and her received "criticism" of it is less an exercise in critical theory than it is one in setting him up as a target for a political tract.

Nor have the leading feminist writers been very successful in making contributions to social theory. In fact few have attempted to do so. But there was one full, systematic statement of theory, also written in the upsurge of American and other feminism, that of Shulamith Firestone in her book The Dialectic of Sex, The Case for Feminist Revolution (1971) which—although I will argue she is mistaken in her main theses—is worth looking at for our purposes. It is also revelatory about the later history of radical feminism that Firestone's theory, at first influential, lost popularity owing to the increasing dominance of militant, separatist feminists who, as one feminist writer noted, do not like the fact, for instance, that Firestone holds "it is female biology that is at fault", and "does not stress the need for a political struggle against male power". [9]
Firestone's Theory

Firestone, who develops her position by way of a criticism of Marx and Freud, begins by referring to the points sometimes made by Marx and Engels about the subjection of women to the effect that, within the family, woman was the first slave as the husband was the owner and the wife the means of production (of children). But she correctly notes that Marx and Engels, as well as later Marxists, underestimated the importance of the subjection of women by placing too much emphasis on economics and failing to see the importance of psycho-sexual factors that lie behind the economic ones. She thus goes back one step further than Marx and claims that the biological division of the sexes lies behind the division of labour which is the basis of the division into classes. But while this sex class system is biologically based it is not immutable. Putting her own position parallel to Marx's claims about eliminating economic classes by means of proletarian revolt, Firestone argues that elimination of "sexploitation" and sexual classes can be achieved by the revolt of women as a class and their securing control over reproduction and over their own bodies.

Firestone spends a good deal of time on Freud and Freudianism and voices standard feminist objections to Freud's theory of the "double orgasm" and of women's "penis envy". At the same time she complains, in a Reichian way, about the social conformity of the later Freudians, especially in the USA, with their emphasis on "adjustment", meaning being subservient, if you are a woman or some other type of frustrated person, to existing social power relationships. But she praises Freud for bringing recognition of sexuality into modern life, and tries in an imaginative, original way to connect a particular theory of Freud's with her Marx-imitating prophecies about the end of the "sex class" system.

The Freudian theory in question is that of the "polymorphous perversity" of the child, according to which the child at first has undifferentiated oral, anal, homosexual, etc., phases and tendencies which are only differentiated later into the phase of genital heterosexuality. But that phase, Firestone argues, arises in response to the incest taboo and has as its main function the preservation of the nuclear family, so that if we could do away with the family (and bring children up communally) we could do away with the social and psychic repressions which differentiate the child's sexuality in a heterosexual genital form. As a result, she conjectures that in the society of the future there may be a "healthy transexuality", superseding both the "sick" heterosexuality and homo-sexuality of today, and not involving the differences between masculine and feminine personalities as we know them now. In other words, we should truly have a sex classless society.

In some later, more empirical material, Firestone gives a forceful account of "love" and "romance". While allowing for the existence of "healthy love" between men and women as equals, she points out how "love", in the shape of spurious "romantic love" does have the social effect of helping to keep women dependent and servile in outlook and behaviour (though we can accept that without having to believe it is a result of a
"male conspiracy" as Firestone sometimes suggests). She brings this out well in referring to the "sex privatization" of women, i.e., the process by which women tend to be deprived of their individuality as different people by being made into sex objects. This is the process by which, as was mentioned earlier, modern advertising, beauty magazines and the like help to stereotype women by promoting fake glamour, fashionable dress and hairdos etc., so that, as Firestone stresses, women are encouraged to live up to a beauty ideal that only a few women can achieve, with the result that other women often feel inadequate or inferior.

In her argument for an overall social solution by means of revolution, Firestone again presents a parallel with Marx, this time with his view that revolutions become feasible when there is an adequate development in the forces of production. Her view is that, while in the past women were biological victims of constant pregnancy and childbirth, today for the first time in history the biological emancipation of women is possible, owing to technical developments which have brought about efficient contraception and abortion, and the possibility of avoiding childbirth altogether by means of artificial reproduction. These developments, together with the abolition of the family and women's obtaining political and economic freedom, will make possible a new society in which the old authoritarian and repressive situation will be replaced by self-determination and perhaps by a pansexual society (in which, for example, there might be transexual group marriages). And if we demur at her optimism by referring to well-known betrayals of past revolutions, Firestone has a specific answer ready to hand. This is that, as Reich brought out about the failure of the sexual revolution in Soviet Russia, such revolutions have been dominated by male revolutionaries with the usual power-seeking and male supremacist values. By contrast, a revolution in which liberated women took the major part would issue in true sexual and other equality and not in the power-bureaucratic situations of our contemporary societies.

Criticism of Firestone

Despite Firestone's evocative conclusions, the general theory from which she derives them is not one that will survive pluralist scrutiny. In seeking to show that "sexploitation" underlies the economic conflicts Marx talks about she is adopting a monistic and reductionist approach in Marx's manner, and when we go into details, the conception of women as a class, in particular, is treated by Firestone in a too unvarying way (as is the later feminist conception of the "sex-gender system"). It is true that throughout history (though decreasingly so in the twentieth century) a great many women have, in sexual, political, economic and cultural ways, been badly treated compared with a great many men. But not all women have been so treated; and in any case there is little evidence to show that women in the mass do, or will come to, form a united social class with a uniform outlook and purpose. To make a comparison, I should say that Machajski in his treatment of intellectuals is in a stronger position than Firestone. It is, of course, much easier to identify and describe the biological class of women than it is "intellectuals", but despite that the latter, even if they don't qualify as a definite socio-
political class in the way Machajski thought, are less diversified and nearer to forming such a class than are women.

It can be added that a number of later militant feminists have been cruder than Firestone in the kind of universalist approach they adopt in lumping all women together in an undifferentiated way. Contrary to that approach, as various feminist critics have themselves pointed out, women differ in many relevant ways, e.g. as regards education, status, race, religious background, type of father/mother/husband relationships, and in personal likings—such as the fact that there are women who share men's interests, and women who don't. Furthermore, there are important variations amongst committed feminists themselves, for instance, in respect of heterosexuality, lesbianism, bisexuality, and even sadomasochism, and in respect of political allegiances—there are feminists who are pluralists, who are anarchists, members of warring Marxist sects, supporters or opponents of co-operation with men, and so on (though rival factions of course often claim that theirs is the women's view). There are even quite a number of feminists who are opposed to reverse discrimination and prefer to be treated on their objective merits. In fact, the growth of feminism makes a definite addition to empirical pluralism: the existence of a variety of crisscrossing and conflicting social groupings.

Another view of Firestone's open to pluralist objection is her suggestion, made in connection with Freud's "polymorphous perversity", that human beings may come to have single undifferentiated sexuality. That conception of a monistic sexual principle is of the same order as, and with as little concrete evidence in its favour, as Reich's conception of an all explaining principle of orgone energy—though he, it would seem, still retained some distinction between male and female sexuality.

Firestone is also to be criticized for the way in which she forgets her ostensible affinities with Marx and, like so many other feminists, slips into atomism by implying that there is a male conspiracy to keep women servile. Men, it must be pointed out, are themselves plainly conditioned by historical circumstances, including social and psychological ones, many of them believe received sexual myths and are, for example, induced to pursue women who want "romance" or are trying to live up to the appropriate beauty ideal. So, whatever television serial writers, fashion designers, advertising experts, women's paper editors, and so on, may be seeking to do, there is no evidence at all that the mass of men contrive to bring about the stereotyped situation in which many women find themselves—and in so far as there are such contrivers their ranks are well known for including women.

Finally, there is Firestone's claim—repeated by numerous other feminists—that the authoritarian-repressive nature of present society (including in countries in which so-called "revolutions" have occurred) stems from male aggression and need for power, but when more loving, un-power-seeking feminine attitudes replace prevailing ones, The Iron Law of Oligarchy, so to speak, will wither away.
With regard to this, (1), apart from familiar difficulties about assumptions that there will be total revolution and that organizations will cease to have their own complex ways of working, there is a difficulty about how the transition to the new society and its attitudes is to be achieved. To anticipate later discussion of the pluralism of values, it is open to various people to adopt pro-female, anti-male values, or even, like the religious feminist Mary Daly, to make the judgement that women are "morally superior"— and likewise it is open to various other people, including various women, to have unrepentant heterosexual values. But a crucial political problem does arise in the case of those hardline feminists who regard man as woman's irreconcilable oppressor and enemy and seek, by "class war" or whatever means, to end this situation. If it really were a matter of male oppressors as a class keeping women in subjection, then these feminists ought to be surprised at the comparative -tolerance with which their views are received and, in particular, on their own social theory ought to predict harsh retaliation by men in the event of women becoming threateningly strong. Also, suppose women somehow did triumph, there would then be the problem of whether they would e.g. make use of men (or "sperm banks") in order to continue the race—although one early hardliner, Valerie Solanas, author of Scum Manifesto (1968), did give the morally and logically consistent answer that society would simply, after a time, come to an end.

However, (2), Firestone's view does bring up some new—piecemeal—factual possibilities. Social history looks certain to be permanently affected by the emergence of recent women's movements and the ferment of demands on behalf of women, and that adds a new component (or an old component with much greater strength) to the pluralism of society. Furthermore, if and when women come to have in numbers and in strength, an influence comparable to men in socio-political affairs, this is likely to lead to some differences in the general style and atmosphere of the conduct of affairs, the formation of factions and allegiances, and the like. But so far as major alterations are concerned—such as a reduction in the oligarchic-bureaucratic tendencies that at present prevail—that is a much less likely hypothesis. There is plentiful evidence already available about women's groups and their doctrinal clashes and faction-fights, and their numerous (mostly middle class) women leaders and careerists who have not hesitated to exploit the new power possibilities that have arisen—and compare the satirical comments made by some more genuine feminists on the subject, such as "I am so reassured when I see one of 'our spokespersons' decrying sexism with a shake of her fashionably permed hair and a flick of her two-feet long eye-lashes." That evidence is not a good sign—even in the area of women's affairs—of any diminution in the force of The Iron Law of Oligarchy. If women do gradually make full entry into what in past history was "a man's world", the obvious likely outcome is that the mass of women—and men—will, as usual, miss out in significant ways, but the ranks of ruling and auxiliary elites will be transformed to include something like fifty per cent women.

8. PLURALIST DETERMINISM
Causality As A Social Category

We can now deal directly with what has been referred to a number of times in the course of this book, the question of social causation.

The regularities that are found in society and history notably include causal ones, furthermore, contrary to the claims of social voluntarism or indeterminism, all socio-historical occurrences have causes which it is open to investigators to seek to ascertain— whether or not they succeed in identifying those causes, or in discovering regularities they instance.

To say thus that causality is a social category cuts across philosophical questions about that frequent source of ambiguity and misunderstanding, the nature of historical or social determinism, and about its defensibility. These, however, will only be touched on briefly as a preliminary to elaborating and illustrating what is distinctive about the pluralist view of social causality.

Defence of the determinist principle "Every event has a cause" in the social field can take (a) the direct form of confirmation by reference to the enormous number of causes that have been recognized; but that method can never amount to complete verification as we can't of course cite all the causes of social occurrences, including ones in the future. It is also true that it would be very hard to falsify the principle if it were false (for if something, say a disease or an economic cycle appeared to have no cause, that would not preclude a cause of it being found in the future), and some philosophers have claimed for this reason that the principle is non-factual; however, it can be replied that the logical properties of, for instance, the proposition "All men are mortal" are similar in that it is also very hard to falsify (compare if we encountered Swift's Struldbrugs from Gulliver's Travels: we might say "They haven't died yet but they will certainly do so someday") and yet this is an evident and consequential factual truth.

But we can (b) offer indirect support of the principle by criticizing the alternative theory which (ignoring the extreme view that no social occurrences have causes) has traditionally maintained that certain social occurrences Social Pluralism: A realistic analysis have no causes owing to the operation of outside factors in the form of historical agents' uncaused free wills. The defect of this theory is that it would put out of court the possibility of any explanatory, not to speak of systematic, study of history and society (except by reducing it to the study of such phenomena as floods, famines and earthquakes). This is because, as Anderson argued, we could never know when a "free" factor was going to intervene and nullify the operation of a supposed social regularity. If the factor really is free, there can be no constraints on its potential intervention; if there are such constraints, if free factor F only operates under conditions XY, then it has been conceded that F is subject to causal conditions.

Take as an example generals in battles. Ordinarily we expect them to behave in certain standard ways. Of course a general could conduct a battle in a peculiar way because he had suddenly become insane, but in that case he would probably
have had a history of mental instability or, raling that, at least be the victim e.g. of an undetected brain tumour—i.e., there would be causal circumstances present. But, differently from that, if there really are free factors we could never know when they might manifest themselves, so that, say, Napoleon at Austerlitz or General Macarthur at Iwo Jima might at any time have suddenly decided of his own free will to give orders that would allow the enemy side to win. If the reply is made "Don't be ridiculous, why don't you pick a more likely or plausible possibility, there was no question of Napoleon or Macarthur ever doing that," then this concedes that what those generals did was subject to certain causal conditions which precluded them from acting "freely" in the required sense. And as for the contention that they might have acted freely in more "likely" or "plausible" ways, then that is to envisage the possible intervention of a free factor which is limited in certain ways, but of course to know about those limitations is once again to concede the point at issue.

Likewise, then, in the case of myriads of other possible examples; once the possible operation of an uncaused free factor is allowed, either restrictions on its operation are smuggled in thus admitting the presence of regularities, or else we could never know when the factor will make an absolutely unexpected intervention thus depriving us of any reliance on social regularities.

To defend the causal principle and determinism in this way, however, does not commit us to the common conception of determinism as a predetermination view according to which there is an inevitable single chain of causes, which is a view that traditionally appears in a theological or metaphysical setting (as for example in connection with the doctrines of preordination and fatalism) but also has its social counterparts. Nor does it commit us to the related belief that there is or can be a high degree of successful prediction in the social field. That is why, in order to avoid linguistic fights as well as lack of clarity, it is better to speak of "pluralist determinism" and of its rejection of "monistic determinism". In this pluralist view there is a great deal of complexity attaching to social causality, and of a kind that presents obstacles to social discovery. One case of this relates to social regularities. Thus, while we can say that every event has a cause, analysis reveals that, more precisely, types of event have sets of necessary and sufficient conditions but, as we saw in connection with Mackie's account of elliptical laws and INUS conditions, these may be of a complex kind and not easily discovered and specified. Two other significant cases, which will be discussed presently, concern prediction and its uses, and the complexities of the course of history.

_Utopian Reformers_

Reverting to attempts to mix determinism with voluntarist elements, a classic social example of this is provided by Utopian reformers past and present, as when in seeking reforms they assume that expression of the moral merits of what they seek, together with public goodwill, the force of example, or the imposition of the reforms—if they have the power to do this — are sufficient to bring about desired social changes.
Such reformers have usually been non-establishment radicals or philanthropists, but occasionally they have been powerful despots. As one example, Joseph II of Austria in the 1780s had an abiding wish to improve the lot of the serfs and common people, and thought that social intervention by use of his despotic powers as Emperor would be sufficient to achieve wide-ranging reforms. But of course few of his reforms endured as underlying causal conditions, including the entrenched position of the nobles and landowners, remained operative.

Among 19th century Utopian Socialists, Robert Owen, for instance, accepted determinism in part when he took the view that man's character is determined by his social environment and argued in consequence that great changes for the better could be wrought if reformers like himself would change the environment. But he forgot that social conditions also applied to him so that he was not free to alter society as he wished, as was demonstrated by the fact that other rich employers did not join him in trying to establish socialist cooperatives. Likewise, Charles Fourier in France in the same period argued that man is corrupted by circumstances so that the thing to do is to alter circumstances, and he went on to canvass the formation of worker-redeeming phalansteries (ideal communes of 1620 people); but Fourier was neglectful of some other circumstances when, in order to finance his phalansteries, for a period of his life he waited at home each day, hopefully but in vain, for a rich philanthropist to call. Furthermore, the attempts at co-operatives that were made by Owen, followers of Fourier, and various others including the later attempts made by the Australian Utopian Socialist, William Lane, in Paraguay in the 1890s, all eventually failed—owing to the operation of unanticipated causes such as the difficulties created by slackers, dissidents, and the hostility of neighbours.

The criticisms of these past Utopians have continuing topicality in that they apply also to the innumerable reformers of today who make similar, causally-naive assumptions. Today's reformers usually try to act within existing societies when they confidently sponsor policies on behalf of “oppressed” sections of their own and of other people's countries. But they rarely stop to ask pertinent, self-critical, deterministic questions, such as (1) under what conditions can the key reforms they seek be implemented?, (2) if those conditions are in fact not present, what are the actual social effects of their reformist interventions?—as when e.g. they support large scale continuing aid to backward African countries but that helps to destroy local self-help agriculture, or in some Western countries that introduce widespread "egalitarian education" but in doing so debase the quality of the education the people receive.

As for Karl Marx (and followers) in this context, the fact is that while he was critical of the Utopian approach, he could have added some self-criticism. His alternative to "Utopian Socialism" is of course what he describes as "Scientific Socialism". But that position, on the one hand in its criticism of naive theories of reform gives promise of a genuine determinist account of the social complexities that make planning for the future difficult, and then, on the other hand, intrudes some Marxist voluntarism in the shape of the blithe assumption that
history is on Marx's side, i.e., that social conditions will inevitably come about which will make it possible for his programme for the future to be implemented.

**Prediction and "Social Engineering"**

Pluralist determinism differs from one familiar version of determinism in not endorsing the view—classically associated with the French astronomer Laplace—that determinism implies complete or overall predictability. That thesis has affiliations with monism in its carelessly made assumption that there is such a single totality or sum of things as the universe or the future; but the main criticism from the point of view of pluralist determinism is that, owing to the infinite complexity of things, there is not and could not be any such thing as complete knowledge of the premises which would have to be employed in any envisaged complete prediction of the course of history or the universe.

Prediction of a less grandiose kind in the social field also has its problems. Even though every social occurrence has necessary and sufficient conditions it by no means follows that we can always or even often predict what is going to happen—let alone bring it about.

The assumption—and the rejection—of the view that social determinism implies widespread prediction and subsequent "control", is often complicated by partly misleading contrasts with the situation in physical science. Aside from hardline "social engineers" (such as the Marxists), the view that has been commonly held is that social scientists are unable to predict successfully in anything like the way physical scientists can. But closer scrutiny reveals that except for the efficacy of controlled experiment, the contrast in this respect between the two fields is much exaggerated. The chemist or the engineer, for example, is often able to predict accurately because he is in a position to bring about what he predicts. As well as being able to make correct hypothetical predictions of the form "If A then C" (and it is open to social scientists to do this), the chemist or the engineer can often also bring about the antecedents of these hypotheticals and thus bring about their consequents. But even here there are limitations. There is, according to pluralist determinism, nothing which is unpredictable in itself, but owing to the complexities of things, when we do successfully predict we only predict certain features of the occurrence in question—any given prediction will leave some features of it unpredicted. Even in such a simple laboratory example as when, say, sulphuric acid is made to act on zinc and thus fulfil a prediction that zinc sulphate and hydrogen gas will be formed, there will owing to impurities in the original acid and metal—be variations in the properties of what is produced (which can be discounted by the chemist for his purposes).

Outside the area of controlled experiment and its simplifications, physical scientists are also limited in respect of actual, specific predictions. They too are often forced to piece together their explanations (find out what exact antecedents were present) after the event. Useful predictions can be made about the tides, but usually not the exact time and height of the tide at a given place owing to unknown variations in the strength
of winds and currents. Compare the obvious but parallel difficulty of predicting just when and how a given person will die, or a given bridge will become unsafe, or just when and where a given leaf or berry will fall to the ground. But this resemblance between the physical and social sciences is usually unnoticed because of the emphasis placed on experimentation and the uses made of its findings, and because of the associated fact that in the physical field we are in general more interested in characteristics of occurrences that we can predict than we are in the ones we cannot. In contrast, in the case of history and society our interests very much include an interest in particular outcomes (when will a war end, unemployment decrease, a recession occur, and so on) which we are noticeably unable to predict.

However, while social science resembles physical and biological science in being a general or theoretical science, there are sharp differences in respect of practical applications. Engineering and other applied sciences can, with the help of repeated experimentation, perfect the construction of aeroplanes, produce anti-biotics, improve wheat crops, and all sorts of other useful things. But there are few corresponding practical applications of social science. First of all, as an obvious fact about significant sociopolitical affairs, when something new or at least unusual does happen to be brought about largely through the intervention and initiative of leaders—let's say, e.g., de Gaulle's restoring France's sense of unity and prestige, Andropov and Gorbachev in vainly trying to reform Communism in the USSR in the 1980s, or the more recent moves made by Deng Xiaoping to steer China in a capitalist direction—such leaders can scarcely be said to have been using applied social science; they simply acted logically and/or intuitively in the light of their grasp of affairs. Secondly, in so far as there are scientific interventions in the social field, these are of a restricted kind and mainly consist of economic interventions, e.g. devaluing a currency or altering tariffs, or using computer technology for taxation etc. administration; or else—as frequently occurs in dictatorships—they involve the use of scientific methods of coercion and intimidation to silence opponents. It is also true that in some narrower areas use has been made of political science in developing techniques for assessing public opinion, and these are sometimes effectively employed by political parties to vary their stated policies or to improve their leaders' television "image"; but these are peripheral rather than core parts of genuine social inquiry.

As a final point, even if we waived for the sake of argument the objections to its predictive claims, the theory of wholesale social engineering faces insuperable difficulties brought on by facts of social life including conflict. If wide-scale prediction were possible, that itself would be a factor in social affairs, and there would be the difficulty that the predictor's predictions could defeat themselves by becoming known and prompting the intervention of fresh social factors. This is what the French novelist Stendhal pithily noted long ago in *The Charterhouse of Parma* when he depicted his hero Fabrizio having discussions with the family astrologist. The astrologist claims he is quite successful at his work, but explains he has to take care to keep
his predictions in the family circle as otherwise "they alter the event".

Historical Accidents And "Great Men"

These complexities become all the more evident when we go into what is a crucial issue for pluralist theory, the nature of what is commonly called accident or chance in history.

The views of Marx and Engels have now lost much of the appeal they had until recently in the West—especially in universities—but reference to them does enable us to bring out clearly what the pluralist position is on this subject. Thus, Marx claimed that while accidents do occur in history, they cancel one another out and at most merely speed up or delay the inevitable (i.e., according to Marx) course of development, and among such accidents he included the character of particular historical figures. [1] In this vein Engels went on to minimize the influence of "great men" in history in a well known and widely believed statement:

That such and such a man and precisely that man arises at a particular time in a particular country is, of course, pure chance. But cut him out and there will be a demand for a substitute, and this substitute will be found, good or bad, but in the long run he will be found... that if a Napoleon had been lacking, another man would have filled his place, is proved by the fact that the man was always found as soon as he became necessary: Caesar, Augustus, Cromwell, etc. [2]

This statement, which can be compared with an earlier statement by Hegel on subject: "They are great men, because they willed and accomplished something great; not a mere fancy, a mere intention, but that which met the case and fell in with the needs of the age," [3] does not specify what makes a leader necessary or needed in a given social situation. In fact it depends on the unwarranted inevitablistic/monistic assumption that there is only one possibility in any given situation—e.g. that in England at the time of the Civil War the situation was ripe only for a Cromwell to defend the parliamentary and gentry cause and not for someone to defend the royalist cause. But if for the sake of argument we set that aside, then what Engels is asserting is that whenever he is needed an appropriate great man is found, and presumably also the converse, whenever a great man is found he is needed. But the trouble with this view is that it foists on us a circular type of explanation since there is no independent way of deciding whether a historical agent is great and whether he is needed. Whenever a great man is needed, Engels tells us, he will be found; but what is the criterion for his being great? Simply that he is needed.

It is true that there is a certain opacity attaching to "greatness" and Engels' approach is not altogether lacking in point in that sometimes a leader honoured with the title merely derives his or her reputation for some reason such as being in power for a long time, rather than from having any real ability. Moral judgements are often involved and also the question of success—compare Orwell's observation that the great man has to die at the right time (he happened to be talking about Lenin). Moreover, there are fluctuations of opinion even when genuine
talent has been present. For instance, we can expect that Bismarck's stocks, which declined with the collapse of the Third Reich, will rise again with the reunification of Germany. Or, as another type of complication, while accidents play some part in the rise of any able leader, in some cases the operation of accident is crucial and we have a special case of the conjunction of accident and talent; for example, in contemporary times if there had not been the accident of the Falklands War in 1982 and the fact that the British victory revived Margaret Thatcher's flagging popularity it is very unlikely that she would have been able to press forward with her unusual efforts to overcome Britain's long standing economic difficulties.

However, let us keep to relatively straightforward examples of great leaders with genuinely outstanding ability—such as Caesar, Cromwell and Napoleon—in order to show why we should not be bluffled into accepting Engels's circular explanations.

In the case of Napoleon, for example, the argument of Engels and his followers Kautsky and Plekhanov is that if Napoleon had not existed or had been killed, say in 1797, there would certainly have been a substitute for him, and not merely a substitute in the sense of some other military dictator but of a dictator who would have been led to do the same things; in other words, that the broad history of France 1798-1815 would have been almost exactly the same whether Napoleon or a substitute had been in power. Now we can agree that certain social conditions have to be present before a historical agent such as Napoleon can have an opportunity to significantly influence the course of events. This is the point Plekhanov makes when he writes: "This very Napoleon would have died as the barely known General, or Colonel, Bonaparte had the old order in France existed another seventy-five years. [4] That is to say, while under the Ancien Regime Napoleon, with all his ability, would at best have reached a subordinate position in the hierarchy, the French Revolution threw open to him the opportunity to become France's ruler—and so, likewise, if he had not been available some other general would have made use of the opportunity.

Let us consider this famous example in more detail than is usually done. The Marxist claim is most implausible in the light of Napoleon's remarkable military and administrative talents. Nor is it supported, by such factual evidence as we can find to bear on the issue. There were indeed many able generals apart from Napoleon who were thrown up in the wars following the French Revolution, including Jourdan, Kellerman, Hoche, Joubert, Pichegru and Moreau. But only one of them, Lazare Hoche, appears to have had a military brilliance and an energy comparable with Napoleon's. Let us suppose, for the sake of Engels' argument, that Napoleon died, or failed in his takeover coup, and that Hoche (who died young in 1797) actually lived on and became dictator. If Hoche had then led French armies into the later wars we may conjecture that he would have had victories as great as Napoleon's. But there the substantiated parallel ends. Thus, on the side of administrative brilliance, there is no particular evidence to suggest that Hoche would have carried out constructive work comparable in quality to the
drawing up of the Code Napoleon. Still, let us suppose that for the sake of argument too. But then the fact does remain, on the evidence that is available about Hoche, that he was a dedicated republican (for which, in contrast with Napoleon, he is admired by Republican groups in France to this day) and so—like Cromwell but unlike the Emperor Napoleon—would have upheld the central republican traditions of the Revolution with all the consequences that entails. We could, of course, brush that point aside and try to save the Engels hypothesis by going on to suppose that Hoche, too, had in him the makings of a royalty complex; but there is no good reason to suppose that, and even if we did would it not then be extraordinarily improbable to suppose further that Hoche would have pursued the same policies as Napoleon, including the Concordat with the Pope, the Continental Blockade, and the disastrous invasions of Spain and Russia?

The difficulty with the Marxist view can also be brought out acutely and ironically by asking what, in their view, was the role of their own outstanding leaders, Lenin and Mao Zedong? In the case of Lenin, for example, even such a dedicated Marxist as Trotsky was led to concede in effect that without Lenin the Bolshevik Revolution would not have taken place, [5] which is clearly the sensible view to take. That view is indeed contested by Trotsky's own Marxist biographer, Isaac Deutscher, [6] who tries loyally to follow Engels and Plekhanov, but the only real substitute for Lenin he can suggest is Trotsky himself—which is thoroughly implausible not least because of Trotsky's previous Menshevism and the fact that without Lenin's endorsement of him he would never have obtained a following in the Bolshevik Party. Contrary to the Marxist view, and more forthrightly than Trotsky, a recent writer, Orlando Figes, has brought out convincingly in detail how, without Lenin, it is most unlikely that the Revolution—and its disastrous laying of the foundations for Stalinism—would have occurred at all.[7]

The Chinese Communists attained power under different circumstances, but it can be similarly argued that without Mao Zedong and his novel emphasis on the support of the peasants they would not have done so, or at least not in that period of history. Or, as a different famous example, take the case of Hitler. In Germany in the period up to 1933, it was the nationalist and economic issues that gave the Nazi Party its opportunity, but the party would never have gained power without Hitler's particular oratorical and other abilities, and his success, in turn, was made easier by the lack of talent amongst the leadership both of the ordinary Right-Wing parties and of the Communist Party.

In recent times there has been a shortage of great or alleged great leaders. Thatcher went well for a time in a mould-breaking way so far as Britain is concerned, but she was thrown out by her own party in 1990 before it became clear whether she would or would not have succeeded in her main objectives. More successful, at least during his own lifetime, was the Ayatollah Khomeini who was a charismatic figure for his followers, and it was largely owing to his personal toughness and will that the post-Shah revolution in Iran took much of the course it did.
The conclusion to be drawn, consequently, is the pluralist one that leadership does have a genuine and independent place in history. Revising Engels’ formula we can say that some leaders are great, i.e., do have and exercise outstanding talents, and some are not great, i.e., possess power but lack special talents except perhaps for the devious politician’s talent for possessing power. The latter are normally the kind of leaders who flourish in countries that are relatively free from tensions or crises. But the former—and normally only the former—are the kind of leaders who, given social conditions that enable them to attain power and exercise their talents, can help to bring about significant changes that would not have occurred without them. Moreover, sometimes such an outstanding leader is available and sometimes not. If, according to the Engels theory, Turkey with Kemal Ataturk and China with Mao Zedong, say, each had “need” of a “great man” and got one, the falsification is that other backward countries, e.g., India, Brazil, Mexico, the Philippines, surely have had similar “needs” but these have remained unsatisfied.

However, granting that leadership sometimes does have a crucial, independent role in history, there are still definite restrictions on what even the ablest leaders can effect, owing to the fact that they have to work with existing circumstances. Reverting to Lenin, for example, his leadership was necessary for the Russian Revolution to occur, and no doubt if he had not died prematurely he would have mitigated some of the nastier Stalinist developments. Nevertheless, it seems plain that even if Lenin had been alive and well he would have been helpless to arrest the development of Russia into a rigid bureaucracy. In fine, while there are developments that occur only if an able leader emerges, there are also developments that no leader can alter.

**Varieties of “Accidents”**

We can now make a more general analysis of the ways in which accident or chance have been said to play a part in history.

(1) There is the view that there is accident or chance in the sense that some events have no causes at all. This view is thus incompatible with determinism.

(2) Chance may be treated as if it were a causal factor itself. Machiavelli, for example, while he is chiefly concerned with causes the ruler or prince can help to bring about, sometimes seems seriously to suggest that one of the necessary causes for success is chance or “Dame Fortune”. But, of course, to treat chance as a specific cause along with other specific causes is to make a philosophical category mistake.

(3) There is the commonly held view of chance as that which is not intended though it is caused. There are several variants of this.

(a) There is what we call a chance encounter, as when you meet someone you know, without having planned to do so.

(b) There is chance as in the expression “a game of chance”; where what is meant is, for example, that in a game of bridge the cards fall out in a random way—the hands dealt are
caused by shuffling, etc.—but there is chance in the sense that the dealer is not cheating.

(c) There is mischance—the situation where a course of action is carefully planned, but by mischance an unintended, undesired event intervenes to upset what is planned, such as when, say, a meteorite collides with a space rocket. We can put into this class the common reference to "accident" as in a "motor car accident"—if two cars have a head-on collision we say it is an accident because the drivers normally do not intend to produce this result.

(4) There is the kind of chance or accident or contingency which arises from the intervention of an unexpected or unusual factor. Consider as an illustration what is known as "accidental death". Now any death is natural in the sense that death by drowning, poisoning, etc., can be medically explained, but accidental death is accidental in the sense that it involves a departure from what we tacitly regard as the biologically normal course of events—which is for a person to die of old age or at least from some internal disease, rather than from the abrupt intrusion of an extraneous cause such as drowning. It should be noted that this case is different from accident variety (3) dealing with unintended results, though a motor car accident, as a matter of fact, illustrates both types of case, as it is both unintended and not an expected or customary course of events. A good way of bringing out the difference between the two kinds of criteria is by considering why it seems inappropriate to speak of murder as a form of accidental death. In accordance with (4) being murdered is a form of accidental death in the manner of drowning, etc., but to speak of it in that way would clash with the fact to which we here give priority, namely, that murders are intended and so are not accidents in terms of variety.

Causes, Fields and Effects

Now, with reference to history, the type of accident or chance which is most important is that of variety (4). This has been noted by a number of philosophers and historians, though their formulations are often inexact. Take the classic pioneer treatment by the historian J.B. Bury who, after pointing out that accident or chance is, of course, compatible with determinism, went on to write:

A chance may be defined as the valuable collision of two or more independent chains of causes —"valuable" meaning that it is attended with more or less important consequences. [8]

His reference, however, to "chains of causes" is misleading, for this suggests two or more self-enclosed causal chains of the simple form: A gives rise to B, B gives rise to C, and so on, and that is a suggestion he compounds by implying that when we don't have chances we do have a single monistic chain of causes.

To avoid these mis-suggestions we need to notice a complexity attaching to causal situations that is often overlooked. To be clear we need to be able to specify not only what is a given cause and its given effect but also what it is that, when the cause acts on it, comes to undergo change. This is the
causal field. [9] In everyday cases, for example, a painter painting the wall of a room causes it to come to have a new colour, or a particular tide coming in makes an expanse of dry sand become wet. Even though in these cases we regard the field as "passive", each pair of factors, the painter and the wall, the tide and the expanse of sand, have their separate histories and what occurs is the result of their interaction.

In historical cases of a series of connected causes we have to pay special attention to what the fields are. To illustrate by referring to the familiar example of parentage, suppose we have a series of succeeding members of a male line of descent, M1, M2, M3, M4, etc. While the relation "ancestor of" is transitive, i.e., each M in this list is an ancestor of each later M, we cannot simply say that e.g. M1 is the cause of each or any of the others; we have of course to take account of female parentage. Now when we take the parent-child causal relation as a whole we can speak simply of the father as the cause, the mother (plus strictly her gestation) as the field, and the child as the effect. (Although of course in detail it involves a complex set of relations, among them in particular that in which the mother is a cause who, by interacting with a field, the embryo and foetus, nourishes it and enables it to grow.) So let us add the corresponding female fields F1, F2, F3, etc. But while we can then explain the causation e.g. of M4 by reference to M3 and F3, there is no single series of causes involved. At every step we have to refer to the different fields, Fl, F2, F3, each of which itself involves an independent causal series. (Even in cases of reciprocal interconnection as when close relatives interbreed and there are ancestors common to paternal and maternal lines of descent, there are still various separate series involved.)

As a result, we don't have a simple self-enclosed series. What we can do if we wish, is speak of remote as well as of immediate causes; for instance, we can speak of M1 as the cause of M4 given as the field the whole situation involving Fl, M2 and F2, M3 and F3, and likewise of M2 as the cause of M4 given as the field F2, M3 and F3. But this does not gives us a causal chain: M1 causes M2, M2 causes M3, M3 causes M4, as at each step the fields are different.

Like considerations apply to alleged historical examples of causal chains. There is never a simple transitive series, A causes B, B causes C, etc., but A interacts with field X to produce B, B with Y to produce C, and so on - and if a given factor, e. g. Y, is absent the next effect does not occur. That is, we need to recognize that in every case cause and field are separate and have their own complex lines of development, and when they intersect and interact they yield a contingent outcome, i.e., an outcome which is not determined or explained by any one series on its own.

In specific historical cases we thus have to take care, not only about the cause and effect, but also about the field, specification of which is sometimes relatively easy and sometimes difficult and disputable. To mention a famous example, in the case of Waterloo it is fairly straightforward. In the overall situation there were the three armies of Napoleon, Wellington and Blucher (each with an independent history)
involved. In regard to the battle its fluctuating course could be analysed into a number of causal situations in which the field each time was the specifiable balance between Napoleon’s and Wellington’s armies, the cause a given new initiative (e.g. a French cavalry advance) and the effect the temporary advantage gained by one side (e.g. an attack held off by a British square). But if we restrict ourselves to the crucial last phase of the battle, there the field is the fairly evenly balanced state of the two armies (with the French probably in a better position), the cause the arrival of Blucher’s army late in the day, and the effect the French defeat.

In more complicated cases there is frequently reference to underlying, auxiliary, remote, immediate, precipitating, and so on causes—as, for example, in the much discussed cases of the causes of the French Revolution and of the First and Second World Wars. These do involve some genuine disputes amongst historians, but numerous of the varied observations made are compatible with one another owing to the fact that different fields are being assumed. As a relatively simple example, in the famous case of the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo in 1914, the description of this as the precipitating cause of World War I is correct providing we take the field to include the existing state of rival economies and imperialist attitudes and the associated build-up of armies and navies at the ready. This field formed a “powder keg”—as the phrase went—which Sarajevo lit, but if that had not taken place some other “precipitating cause” would probably soon have had a similar effect. To speak of this in relation to this field as the cause of the war is not really in conflict with speaking e.g. of an “underlying cause” in relation to a different field as the cause of the war. There has been more controversy about what was the underlying cause, but according to one prominent answer we could specify it as Germany’s expanding economy and imperialist attitudes acting on a field consisting of an existing equilibrium that included Britain and France’s unyielding economic and imperialist dominance.

Reverting to the problem of historical accident or chance, it will be seen that one pluralist way of dealing with the problem is simply to say that, since all outcomes flow from the contingent interaction of separate causal series, there is accident or chance in every case. However, if instead of merely saying that we return to the criterion suggested by accident variety (4) mentioned above, we can make a distinction (a relative distinction) between what, in the light of historical knowledge, are (a) cases of fairly normal or not unexpected interactions of series, and (b) cases where one of the series is of an unusual or extraneous kind. We can then treat the latter as examples of (relative) accident or chance. To cite two famous examples mentioned by Bury, the fact that a woman is sexually very attractive involves a definite causal series (her heredity), but such a fact does not normally interact with a political situation to have the profound effects that occurred when Mark Antony was charmed by Cleopatra in 42 B.C. and Henry VIII by Anne Boleyn in the 1520s. In a similar way, we can regard as historical chance or accident other such intrusions of extraneous or unusual sequences as, for example natural disasters such as earthquakes, political assassinations, and of the presence in
times of great moment of leaders of remarkable ability—or of remarkable ineptitude.

This, then, is the finding of pluralism. There is no single line causation, but interaction at all points between factors that stem from separate, complex series; and (contrary to Marxism) among the factors which have definite independent influence is the exercise of human leadership and initiative.

9. THE JUSTIFICATION OF POLICIES

Taking Sides

The part of the social process concerned with the advancement of policies and the expression of socio-moral preferences again exemplifies the categories of relation and difference in particular, owing to the way in which—as will be made clear in what follows—differing groups relate themselves to objectives and values that not only differ but are often of an irreconcilable kind.

In regard to policies, in the wider pluralist view of society there are—as we have seen—clear limitations on what socio-political plans or aspirations are feasible ones. Plans for large scale social engineering, for instance, emerge as patently unrealistic (no one can make or control the future); or, differently, the chances in any society for really widespread, lasting, aware and active democracy appear negligible. Such a pluralist view of what is socially the case is of course presented irrespective of whether we like or approve of it. In terms of their personal sympathies, some pluralists, having a preference for certainty and simplicity, may regret the limitations imposed by social complexities on grandiose planning, and it is evident that many of them are sympathetic to democratic and critical thinking activities even if they don't believe they do, or can be made to, prevail in society. (More will be said, in a concluding comment, on the sympathies and policies of social pluralists.)

There are, however, feasible policies and aspirations as well as unfeasible ones, so given our view of what is the case, the question arises of what follows about taking sides and seeking to justify particular socio-political policies, commendations, recommendations, exhortations, and so on.

Here the quick pluralist/complexist answer is (1) that there is nothing that is justified in the sense of being absolutely justified or being something that everyone is obliged to support, and (2) that any policy, recommendation etc. that is consonant with pluralism (does not deny the pluralist account of what is the case), and whose particular factual claims are correct, may be justified in a qualified or relative sense. For example, providing we confine ourselves to the realistic content of policies (as distinct from illusions, illogicalities and so on enlisted in their defence) it may be a justified policy for a given social group (directors of a big company, or members of a parliament, say) to award themselves large salary increases but equally justified for various other groups to oppose this. Likewise, for those people who endorse a cost-benefit approach to community health it may be a justified policy to campaign for curtailment of the use of alcohol and tobacco, but also justified policy for other groups
(e.g. drinkers, smokers, and people who rate individual liberty higher than cost benefit rewards) to resist that kind of curtailment. Or, as a more complicated example, consider the use of amniocentesis, which can detect such medical conditions as Down's syndrome and spina bifida in a foetus, but has been made use of in some countries by certain groups of young women really as a way of finding out—what amniocentesis also reveals—the sex of the unborn child, and who, when this turns out to be female, proceed to have abortions. Now this can be justified policy from the point of view of the women concerned and their husbands, and from the point of view e.g. of people who favour a decrease in population growth, but it is also a policy that can be justifiably opposed by various other groups, such as feminists and other opponents of discrimination against girls, by disbeliefers in a future imbalance in a country's sexes, and also e.g. by taxpayers in cases where the medical tests and abortions in question are financed by a national health body.

In other words, a pluralist statement of what is socially the case will include the fact that, flowing from the different interests and aspirations different social groups—in society at large and within institutions and movements—actually have, there is a pluralism of competing, but often equally justifiable, policies, recommendations, and so on. Each group in this sense justifies its case and what actually happens (which policies, if any succeed) depends on the interplay of social forces.

**Moral Questions**

But surely, it may be said, that even-handed judgement leaves something out. What about moral views; don't they enable us in various cases to come down in favour of a given policy or recommendation rather than an opposed one? The answer in brief is again: If at all, only in pluralistic ways; only in the sense that there is also a pluralism of competing moral values and competing moral justifications. To elucidate, I will say something about moral theory, not at great length, but enough to bring out the points that are pertinent to social politics.

Moral issues, of course, are taken up in a number of ways—historians, sociologists and anthropologists deal with the moral beliefs and customs that are found in particular societies (thus contributing to the empirical findings of pluralism), moral philosophers develop theories and offer findings about ethical issues. But what is important in ordinary politics and social affairs are attempts to persuade people to endorse particular policies and values, and here we find that such attempts regularly involve use of socio-moral arguments and justifications that are very often unsound. [1] These are in some cases aimed at fellow members of a given social group, or more widely at other groups or at society at large. But the distinction is not hard and fast; there are usually elements of a proselytising kind, appealing to society at large, even in the case of "inside group" arguments and justifications, and claims about the "real" interests or aims of a given group may be employed to obscure or cover up an existing diversity—as when attempts are made to persuade or cajole unconvinced or dissident members of, say, a religious sect, a political party branch, a feminist lobby, or an environmental group, into agreeing with what is urged by the
leadership. But granting qualifications of that kind, there is often less difficulty about finding agreed en justifications in the case of "inside" directed claims. Since group members in those cases do have certain shared interests, attitudes and values, they will tend to be united about what they want, and as a result their disputes may concentrate on differences of a factual/causal kind, such as: We want to bring about state of affairs A; is doing B rather than C the best way of bringing A about? But with "outside" claims the situation is more difficult, and here the appeal to alleged socio-moral justifications becomes crucial.

In traditional moral theory—which like religion had immense influence in history until quite recently—the search for a prescriptive justification takes the characteristic form of appealing to an authority of some kind. This ultimate authority, such as God, the Bible, our moral sense of Duty, or more politically the writings of Marx or Lenin, or our moral sense e.g. of Justice or Natural Rights is—or was—supposed to convince people of what they ought to do or support.

There are well known logical objections that can be levelled against such appeals to authority. One type of criticism denies the credentials of the supposed authority—e.g. by advancing arguments against the supposed existence of God, Duty, Natural Rights, etc., or by criticizing the authenticity and coherence of the Bible, and so on. But that, in this context, is a subordinate issue. The main criticism is of the illogical nature of the argument from authority. No proposition is true because an authority says so; at best a "reliable" authority comes to be so regarded because the propositions asserted by the authority are, or frequently are, true; so that the primary and independent question is: Are the propositions asserted true?

That is why moral appeals to an authority don't have the desired logical binding power; and if they often do have social and psychological binding power for people who "have faith" in the authority or are emotively attached to it, that does not apply and there is no reason why it should apply to uncommitted or disbelieving other people. The problem the socio-moral policy-maker has is that of showing what is valuable or worth supporting about his commands or exhortations. He may assume it but his problem is to show it. This is what Plato brought out very well long ago in the Euthyphro when he pointed to the distinction between saying (1) that something A is good or morally worthy because an authority likes it and (2) that the authority likes it because it is as intrinsically good or morally worthy. Let us apply this to theistic-authoritarian ethics. We have to ask (1) Is A good because God commands us to do A? or (2) Does God command us to do A because it is good? If the first answer is given, i.e., that goodness resides merely in God's will or fiat, then we are faced with an arbitrary command to do A and in this case there is no reason for obeying the command, except perhaps bowing out of fear or servility to the superior power of a tyrant, but that is not a sound moral reason for doing so. The alternative is to assert (2) and admit that God himself commands A because it is good. However, in that case a different, independent account will have to be offered about why A is good.
Of course attempts may be made to evade this dilemma by arguing that there is really and objectively good, that God himself is good and believes in the good, and that is why he prescribes the good for human beings; but this good still has to be described and defended, and it still requires "faith" on the part of the people at whom the argument is directed in the existence and in the goodness of God. On the latter issue, it may be noted, there are continuing philosophical problems that arise also for the religious believer about the existence of evil (as understood e.g. by Christians themselves). If there are manifest evils—an example often suggested is the widespread occurrence of cancer—the problem is that either God permits this because he is not after all omnipotent, which undermines Christian theology, or he does so because, although he is omnipotent, he is not a benevolent but a malevolent God (as e.g. the writer Thomas Hardy suggested).

The position is logically similar with other traditional authorities such as Conscience and Moral Sense, whether they are taken literally as supposed inner items of mental machinery, or as is increasingly common nowadays, simply as dressed up expressions of subjective feelings. If we do treat them seriously, once again there is no binding reason to accede to what is commanded or demanded. When we have the situation, our Moral Sense of, say, Duty or of the "rights of the oppressed", tells us we ought to do or support A—or what it comes to in practical social situations, when some moral advocate (representing an overt or covert specific interest) tells us we ought to do what our Moral Sense tells us to—it has not been shown why we ought to do that rather than do what Inclination or our feeling for our own interests prompts us to do. Of course, the moral advocate may insinuate there must be something wrong with us, we should do what our Moral Sense tells us to do as that is what it means; but this is no reply as it substitutes for the proposition at issue "We ought to obey our Moral Sense" the empty tautology "We ought to obey that which ought to be obeyed".

**Appeals to General or Community Interests**

With the decline of (more overt) authoritarian ethics, a type of moral claim that came to flourish in social and political affairs is one which appeals to general or community "goods" and related concepts. Philosophically this has connections with the doctrines of such writers as Rousseau and Bentham. Thus Rousseau spoke of the "general will" in contrast with individual wills and wanted to promote it, but failed to be clear about what it really was. Bentham supported utilitarianism and generally upheld "the greatest good of the greatest number", but he and his followers were unable to find a clear, non-question begging criterion for deciding which interests were of the greatest good. But despite its known philosophical defects, this kind of belief in the existence of a general or common moral measure for solving practical socio-political problems is still very popular today.

Against this kind of moral justification we can again make the anti-authoritarian point that even if there were discernibly such a thing as the general interest or the common good it would not provide a moral sanction of the desired absolute kind, for
suppose, say, the common good requires us to do A, that is not an unassailable reason for doing what it requires—to obtain that it has to be construed as "the good we must support", so that again we have an empty tautology "We must support the good we must support". Furthermore, the offered general goods regularly turn out to conflict at crucial points with other conceptions of such goods. Fresh air, for instance, and a clean environment may be what people prefer, but conflicts quickly emerge when achieving that involves increasing unemployment, or reducing expenditure on other things such as education or health. Likewise, some of today's much vaunted economic approaches to social affairs merit the blunt comment Pareto made long ago about the financial speculator: "He cannot believe his ears when he is told that there are people who judge an enterprise other than by a computation of profit and loss." [2]

Mostly in social practice the legislator or commentator purporting to be a disinterested calculator on behalf of the general interest and the like, in fact forwarding particular interests in an ideological way. That is to say, whether or not this is consciously understood by its proponents, the social force of claiming to be furthering the common good or interest of all lies in its being an effective way of camouflaging the fact that certain particular interests are being forwarded at the expense of other particular interests.

If we disentangle its assumptions, we see that the theory of the general interest assumes a unitary or totalistic view of society, but as has been argued in this book, society is pluralistic and its various groups and associations have an irreducible variety of wants, interests, attitudes and aspirations. Although, as has been pointed out, there are various forms of agreement and co-operation within society and its ingredient social complexes, there are also many differences, including irreconcilable ones, and these falsify the idea of some single, agreed-on, overriding set of interests and objectives that is implied by marshalling the aid of "the general interest". What the use of that term and equivalents really involves is a mixture of (1) an appeal to socio-moral standards which reflect particular interests, aspirations etc. and (2) a more direct assertion of those interests and aspirations themselves. But in alive and controversial cases—such as, for instance, disputes about building up or not building up a country's military strength, making or not making abortion readily available for women, supporting tariff protection as a way of keeping people in employment or alternatively supporting a "level playing field" in the hope it will improve a country's economic situation, favouring or not favouring disinterested inquiry vis-a-vis "practicality" in university studies—there is usually no way of reconciling the clashes between standards, and clashes between interests, that are involved.

The above types of assumptions and contentions are the ones that have been highly influential in socio-moral debate. But as they are all unfounded (belong to the illusion-promoting part of the social process) they have to be set aside when we look for the realistic content of policies.
Consideration of more recent, in part more subtle, moral theories is not as much to the socio-political point as these theories (except in giving support to new good of society claims e.g. about the environment), being too special or recondite, have not been nearly as influential in society at large. Still, to refer to them briefly, some recent theorists have been good at casuistry (in a non-derogatory sense) to an extent previously unknown outside religion- i.e., they develop for example various specific conclusions about equality, bioethics, over-population and other current concerns in a logical way, given their premises and assumptions. But they are not good at establishing these premises and assumptions.

Consider, for example, the attempt made to back up absolutist moral judgements by the American philosopher John Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* (1972). Rejecting utilitarian theories about net amounts of happiness and the like, he develops a method of imagining yourself behind "a veil of ignorance" as to how your own interests might turn out and then fairly judging what principles you would like to see operating, and he goes on to deduce from this conclusions about the justice e.g. of political and economic equality. But Rawls does not really show why everyone should be prepared to use a neutral "veil of ignorance" about their own interests and accept it as "fair" if those interests turned out to suffer. [3]

The same problem confronts other theorists' attempts to find universal solutions to policy questions by appealing to rational principles of a supposedly purely non-interested kind. That kind of approach, which is tied in with an atomistic conception of how society goes on, doesn't show— anymore than do cruder appeals e.g. to Moral Sense or the Good of All—why other people should agree, and should not suspect the covert aims of the theorists, all the more so if it emerges that it is those other people's interests and preferences that stand to be penalized.

Or, as another example, consider an Oxford philosopher influential in moral theory, Derek Parfit who also makes use of rational considerations—ones that emphasize impersonality—to draw conclusions in various cases about what are the best courses of action. But while he works out his distinctions and examples with much expertise, when it comes to defending his basic moral assumptions he does not show why they need to be accepted, and in fact all he does is fall back on a form of (non-religious) faith by suggesting that progress on the issue is nowadays possible because theistic moral theorists are being superseded by non-religious ones. [4]

I can here again mention Anderson's own original, non-religious theory of what he called "the science of ethics". This is a naturalistic, descriptive theory according to which ethical goods— which are important forces with fluctuating strengths in history and society—are productive or enterprising activities including inquiring and artistic ones, and love and courage. But his ethics has not pleased ordinary moral absolutists as it has no prescriptive elements. That is, according to Anderson goods are objective qualities of certain psycho-social activities that work and communicate through people as in certain social movements, and whether particular people or social groups
happen to have relations, such as supporting or recommending, to goods is an entirely separate question. Expanding this point, to say that (1) an activity A is good, and (2) a person or group X supports A, are two entirely separate propositions, and it is a fallacy of what Anderson calls "relativism"—confusedly amalgamating a quality and a relation to run the two propositions together as ethical writers almost always do or end up doing. Moreover, in his view the preoccupations of moralists are futile so far as goods are concerned as these, when they occur in people, do so in a natural or spontaneous, as distinct from a forced or compulsive, way.

**Relational Ethics**

But in the case of social affairs, even if Anderson were wrong and one of the many different and competing moral theorists somehow did find a correct relativist-type moral standard or criterion concerning the-good-that-must-be-pursued, pluralist criticism would still apply. There would still be the problem of effective justification, of getting people to recognize the good, and in particular, when they have interests and preferences inimical to the good, of getting them to act in accordance with it. Logical persuasion to pursue the good might be effective to some extent amongst, say, rationally-minded scholars (although even then!), but owing to the interaction of ordinary social forces—the workings of pluralist determinism—it is unlikely to have much influence in the hard world of socio-political affairs and antagonisms. Even if we were prepared, say, to envisage the coming of an Age of rule by moral philosopher-kings (Plato) or by moral priest-scientists (as in Comte's more elaborate theory), we should also have to envisage their having an extensive back-up of vigilant good-enforcers.

In fact, however, I take it that there is no objective, intrinsic good, whether or not it is identified with some obligatory absolute standard. That is, I here do not agree with Anderson about the existence of objective goods. But if he is mistaken on this point, that does not really affect his own pluralist findings. All that is lost is the term good in Anderson's sense, and on that point as some of us young "Andersonians" used to say long ago, it might have been better if Anderson had abandoned the term to the moralists and their confusions, and described his cooperative, communicating psycho-social "goods" as forms of positive freedom. At any rate, the view I wish to endorse is what is ordinarily called "ethical relativism", but as that is a confused term as Anderson correctly pointed out, I shall speak more clearly of a relational view of ethics. Heraclitus, it can be mentioned, was again first in the field in adopting this view—compare: "To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some things wrong and some right." [5]

I shall state this position only briefly here but recommend to the reader J.L. Mackie's *Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong*, which presents a powerful, detailed argument of the case for the non-objectivity of values.

This kind of view should not be misunderstood—as it often is—as maintaining that ethical relationists are quite cynical or at least neutral people who lack real values of their own. On the contrary, relationists have (varying) particular interests and
values, and can be honest, committed, passionate and so on in espousing or defending their values. (That is true, for example, of the ethical relationists amongst the social pluralists referred to in this book.) One distinguishing feature they do have, nonetheless, is that they usually do not proselytise and use moral concepts and fictions in the misleading, ideological manner of members of most other social groups.

It should be noted, however, that in recent times there has been a quite remarkable spread in the wider sociopolitical world of beliefs said or implied to be of an ethical "relativist" kind. But such beliefs often differ in key ways from the relational ethics I am referring to. The trouble is that upholders of such beliefs are often committed to a logically inconsistent position. Compare the views of people who are contemporary postmodernists or deconstructionists, not to speak of proselytising feminists, gays, and so on. Numerous of them claim to endorse ethical "relativism" (and also aesthetic "relativism"), yet in their sociopolitical activities they often do not merely advance and defend their interests and values in a straightforward, frank and honest way, but act in a similar way to moral absolutists by proceeding as if their values and attitudes are morally supreme and ought to be imposed in society. In other words, these are contemporary examples of confused, ideological moral (and aesthetic) beliefs.

But let us return to genuine, logically-minded relational ethics. In this view, as applied to socio-political affairs, there is a certain objectivity about moral standards or values in that we can identify particular standards or values upheld by particular social groups (Group X upholds A, Group Y upholds B, and so on), and there can also be some objective questions of casuistry—about the correct applications to particular cases of these standards or values. But the standards themselves are relative, i.e., there is a variety of social groups (or as we can also say a variety of outlooks and interests or a variety of ways of living) with a variety of competing standards (or sets of values) and no objective or ultimate standard for deciding amongst them. In social practice, however, that is rarely recognized or stated by proponents of a given standard, and they characteristically proceed as if theirs is the only or the real standard. We have typically a situation where a social group X seeks to promote an interest or aspiration which is contrary to that of another social group or of various other groups. But this naked clash of interests or aspirations is usually not stated in that open, unadorned way, and instead is expressed as, or mixed in with, claims or insinuations about moral necessities. Consequently, when we see that the arguments used to back up these moral claims are logically unsound (never provide binding justifications), and furthermore take account of our pluralist socio-psychological theory, we are entitled to conclude that we have here a type of recurring moral error or illusion. This involves a process of illusory, unconscious moral objectification that may partly result from a survival in today's concept-formation of what had more social propriety when theological ethics had complete sway, and more generally reflects deep-seated feelings of idealization, rationalization and perhaps psychological anguish.
Hypothetical Imperatives

Reference to another traditional moral topic, the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives, has been deferred until now as it can be of positive help in relation to social policies. This distinction, made famous by Kant, is between categorical imperatives of the form "Do A," or as more commonly and morally expressed, "You ought to do A," and hypothetical imperatives of the form "If you want A, do B," or "If you want A then you ought to do B."

There are some demarcation problems that arise concerning the two types of imperatives, as a statement with the hypothetical form such as "If you promised Roslyn to go to her party you ought to do so," may have the force of the categorical imperative, "You ought to keep your promise to go to her party," while categorical imperative forms of words especially in the context of speaking elliptically to friends and other people with shared interests and attitudes, often have the force of hypothetical imperatives—for example, "You ought to change your golf grip," may have the force of "If you want to improve your golf, and I know you do, then you ought to change your grip". It is true that even hypothetical imperatives may carry with them a suggestion of absolute obligation, as when the "ought" is used to suggest that the person spoken to really ought to adopt the efficient or most efficient means to an end. But this can be covered by understanding the reference to efficiency as another antecedent of the hypothetical: "If you want A, and you want to achieve it efficiently, then you ought to do B."

However, in standard, primary cases the distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives is clear enough, and returning to Kant he tried on philosophical grounds to establish certain categorical imperatives as true and thus to provide an absolute foundation for moral obligation. Kant based his position on a principle which, in a typical formulation, he expressed as, "Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law." This principle, which was often later put forward in the form of asking "Suppose everyone did the same?", is worth expanding on here because it has often been called on in popular moralism to demonstrate social conclusions, such as for instance that it is absolutely wrong for people not to keep their promises, or not to fight for their country in wartime, or to do things that ruin the environment, or to knowingly spread AIDS. We cannot without contradiction, so the argument runs, will it to be a universal law of nature or suppose that everyone did the same, in the case of failing to keep promises, refusing to fight for your country, doing things that ruin the environment, or knowingly spreading AIDS.

But this argument has never fazed logically-minded pluralists. First of all, as a subsidiary point, it is false as a matter of psycho-social fact to suppose that there is any possibility that everyone will break their promises, fail to fight for their country, do things that ruin the environment or knowingly take the risk of spreading AIDS. But, secondly, even if everyone did break promises and so on that would merely be a social fact; it would have the socially awkward consequence that no one could be relied upon to keep their promises, one's country would easily
fall to an invader (i.e. if it could raise troops), the earth might become uninhabitable, and in the AIDS case that the spread of the disease might be unchecked; but there is nothing in this to show that people would be categorically obliged not to do the things in question. What we can construct are merely appropriate hypothetical imperatives, such as (to take two of the examples) "If you want to think of posterity you ought to support conservation of the environment." "If you want to think of your partners you ought to take precautions against spreading AIDS." Most people no doubt would affirm the antecedents of such hypotheticals, but some would not—e.g. some people might genuinely go the way with the old joke "Why should I worry about posterity, what has it ever done for me?"; some AIDS-carriers might out of resentment wish to spread the disease, and there is no binding moral reason why they should affirm them.

The general difficulty with the Kantian type of argument may be summed up as the same as the one facing the concept of the common good or interest. The argument smuggles in that concept—or the concept of the common obligation—this time in the more subtle and covert form of what is called "the principle of universalizability", particularly (there are several versions of the principle) by maintaining that there are certain maxims or values that everyone universalizes or applies to all people. Compare the key type of argument, "How would you like to be X?"—where X is e.g. a starving African, a Boat person or an aborted foetus— which is asserted with the implication that you have to universalize and take X's side without question. But in fact there is no constraint to do so (anymore than there is in the case of examples of a less favoured kind such as: "How would you like to be a murderer found guilty by the jury?... an entrepreneur sent to gaol for defrauding small investors?"), and people with different preferences, values etc. are quite entitled to sympathize with, have no sympathy for, or be indifferent to, X's situation. In other words, there are inescapable subjective elements attaching to universalizability,[6] and it does not justify some universal or common set of moral values.

Unrestricted categorical imperatives thus have no place in the realistic analysis of social policies or recommendations—except in the sense of being targets for criticism and for the unraveling of the specific interests that lie behind them. But hypothetical imperatives can be usefully employed in our analysis of policy issues, and so can in a derivative way categorical imperatives that have a restricted (non-universal) application. Thus, suppose a given social group, Group X, wants an end or objective A, and B is a good means, or the best means, of bringing about A; we can then set out the following argument.

(1) If you want A you ought (would be wise) to support B.
(2) Members of Group X want A.
Therefore,
(3) Members of Group X ought (would be wise) to support B.

That is, given as premises the hypothetical imperative and an affirmation of its antecedent we can, by the valid inference form
of modus ponens or affirming the antecedent, derive a (restricted) categorical imperative as a policy conclusion.

The central issue—a factual issue—is of course whether (1) is true, i.e., whether given the objective A, policy B is in fact a good way (or when the issue concerns alternative policies, the best way) of bringing about A. But in addition, there can be disputes about (2), i.e., about whether Group X really does want A, as there may be majority versus minority, or leadership versus rank and file, and so on, disputes about that; or the matter may be somewhat obscure and require further analysis or investigation in order to determine just what the group does want; or, again, in the case of multiple wants or aims of a group, there may be questions about what is their relative strength and so about how they are to be graded. But still, if a social group is at all cohesive we can usually identify a common or at least a majority end sought, or more or less agreed on, by members of the group, and in that case the group or its leadership can concentrate on finding a suitable policy for implementing the end.

However, in the case of other social groups—in the example groups other than Group X—while they could accept the truth of the hypothetical (I), they are in no way bound to apply its findings to their own group. The question for them is, What does their group want? If, say, Group Y wants C, and D is a good way of bringing about C, then they ought or would be wise to support D. But they might be indifferent to A which is wanted by Group X, or again—as regularly happens with groups in conflict—opposed to A, and in that case there is obviously no reason why they ought to support B; unless in a special complex case, doing B, say, as a temporary policy does help to bring about C as well as A. [7]

Does The End justify The Means?

A related policy question of some historical significance concerns whether “the end justifies the means”. Argument about that principle—for and against—is usually mixed in with moral claims of an absolutist kind. A good example of this is provided by Trotsky’s famous defence of the principle in relation to revolution. [8] Trotsky, cutting through conventional moral disclaimers, deals in a realistic way with the connection between means and ends by pointing out that what particular people do in history is decided, not by supposed “moral absolutes”, but by the exigencies and expediencies of particular conditions, so that, for example, for people fighting in a civil war the assassination of “oppressors” has a different complexion from ordinary murder. However, while Trotsky talks pluralistically about different ends and about how the use of some means may be counter productive in relation to some ends (for instance, as in Stalin’s Russia, use of extreme violence, lying propaganda etc., may assist revolutionaries to retain power but is counter productive in relation to the original aim of bringing about genuine cooperative socialism), it emerges that there is after all one ultimate or overriding end, namely the achievement by the revolutionary proletariat of its historic mission. So there is a supposed moral absolute after all. And if the implication is that the end must be supported because it is inevitable (as Trotsky supposed was true of the triumph of Marxism), the reply is that
that only gives us a hypothetical imperative ("Support X if you want to be on the winning side") as there is no obligation to support something because it is going to, or looks as if it is going to, triumph. Such a view is of the same ilk as the claim that "Might is right" presented as a moral absolute; it ignores the content and variety of values by making success the only issue, when in fact many people in history are found, rightly from the point of view of their interests and attachments, contesting to the end political policies of which they disapprove.

But when absolutist claims about the end are set aside, we can deal with "the end justifies the means" principle in a realistic, factual way. As in other policy situations, we have to be clear about exactly what end is aimed at, and given that we can ask whether the means at issue really does bring about the end. For instance, nineteenth century terrorists were mistaken in believing that their actions would bring about the end of Tsardom and other tyrannies—their theory about the efficacy of assassination is another variant of social atomism. Or, differently, there are special cases where we could almost say that "the means justifies the end". An illustration is the sending of aid by the West in the 1980s and later to backward countries, e.g. Ethiopia and Somalia, where in some cases the food was diverted by rulers away from the starving sections of the population for whom it was intended. Yet even when this became known many donors of money and food, e.g. in England, were prepared to continue their charitable actions. Thus, in these cases the means, doing "good works" (or in some cases probably assuaging guilt feelings) was more important than the ostensible end. However, in a more precise analysis we should have to conclude we have here a case of multiple ends, where the primary end is to satisfy psycho-social charitable impulses (operation of Pareto's IV c sentiments). On the other hand, in the case of the rulers who diverted the food, we have an evidently straightforward instance of the use of ruthless means to achieve a desired end: distribution of free food to their political advantage.

The question whether a given means does bring about a desired end is a realistic question in its own right; in addition, it bears on the principle that the end justifies the means in that critics of a given application of the principle will be all the more severe if the means doesn't even bring about the end. An example is the World War II bombing of Dresden which did not break German morale or shorten the war. But so far as the principle itself is concerned, deciding whether use of a means is justified or not is simply a factual question about the actual interests, preferences or values of the persons or groups involved—or of outside observers making judgements. If M is an effective means of bringing about an end E, and among people who want E, some are prepared to use M but others regard its use as less desirable than the achievement of E, then each side is correct in making its judgement—the one that E does, the other that it does not, justify the use of M. In ordinary life, for instance, when heavy drinkers are confronted by the prospect of cirrhosis of the liver, some of them are prepared to give up drinking but others, regarding the required means as intolerable, are not prepared to do so, and (despite what medical people and believers in longevity at all costs--introducing their
values—may say) each type of drinker may be quite justified in taking the stand he does. Likewise in socio-political affairs, it is a pluralist matter of measuring strength of feeling or value-attitude for or against a usable means, with that in favour of a desired end. As a simple, specific example, when early in December 1941, codebreakers in Australia decoded instructions to the Japanese Consulate-General in Sydney to burn all codes and ciphers, the Australian Minister of External Affairs, Dr Evatt, thought this action was reprehensible [8] — i.e., while the codebreakers had their (justifiable) point of view, Evatt was equally justified, in the light of his values, in wanting diplomatic ends to be secured by honourable means. Or, to cite a famous case consider the controversy over the dropping of the two atom bombs on Japan in 1945. On the one hand, President Truman and his advisers were apparently much more concerned to save the lives of American soldiers (and appease American opinion) by a speedy termination of the war than they were concerned about employing such a devastating weapon, whereas on the other hand their critics rated avoidance of use of the means as morally more important than using it as the method to secure the end.

Nevertheless, there can be some complications as participants in socio-political disputes are not always correct or logical in what they maintain or assume. Thus, in the case of Truman and his advisers it is likely that they were mistaken in their assumptions and the dropping of the bombs did not speed up the end of the war. [10] And apart from making factual mistakes about whether the means does bring about the end, they can be subject to self-deception and inconsistency. For example, in the also famous case of the Nuremberg Trials, their sponsors were justified from their point of view in so far as they simply pursued vindictive, punish-the-losing-leaders aims; but they were unjustified in so far as they mixed that in to a large extent with obfuscating, ethico-legal myths: absolutist moral claims and the invention of spurious "laws" as a basis for the Trials. [11] Some leaders, e.g. British ones, were also open to a further charge of inconsistency, considering their claim to have fought the war in pursuit of non-barbarous, non-Nazi-like, ends.

Another, rather common, case of inconsistency is illustrated by those spokespersons and commentators who object to a given country's actions, but not to another country's actions, when they have used comparable ruthless means in pursuit of comparable ends—compare disputes about military interventions by Iraq, Israel, USA, Russia...

When disputes about ends justifying means are stated objectively they can usually be shown to involve opposed, but equally justified, core contentions. They are equally justified (the end pluralistically does and does not justify the means) because there is no magical moral solution, no Categorical Imperative, which demonstrates that either side in a given dispute really ought to give primacy to the interests and value-preferences of the other side.

*Altering The Balance of Interests and Attitudes*

We have seen that there are issues of fact about which courses of action will, or will best, bring about particular
objectives, and furthermore, issues of fact about which social
groups are, and which social groups are not, in favour of such
objectives. This leads us to a remaining type of question about
policies and recommendations: the possibility of *altering* the
interests, preferences, attitudes etc., that people have—the
possibility, say, of Group X, which supports A, inducing
members of Group Y, which supports B, to relinquish their
support for B in favour of A.

Now this alteration may be attempted by means of logical or
rational persuasion. But we all know the difficulties that
procedure faces in ordinary politics and it is hardly more
effective in bringing about changes of attitude, e.g. amongst
members of public services, churches or universities. Even in
the seemingly more promising case of economics, we find that
writers in this area, although they do deal with people's more
obvious and down to earth interests and do often argue logically,
they rarely appear to induce their readers—or their fellow
economists—to alter their customary attitudes. The general
conclusion that has to be drawn, in line with the findings about
the ideological influences on beliefs, is that logical persuasion in
social politics has a low success rate even amongst intelligent
and well-educated people.

Another possibility is *non-logical* persuasion by use of
propagandist, emotive, proselytising, and so on techniques. This
often does have a greater success rate than logical persuasion
but has its qualifications, as either it has only a shallow or
temporary impact—as with inducing alterations in the attitudes
of voters at election times—or, as was noted earlier, when it is
strikingly effective that mainly depends on heightening or
awakening attitudes and interests *already present* in the people
being propagandized or manipulated.

In fact, in so far as people do, in ordinary circumstances,
*notably alter* their attitudes and interests, and so their deeper
socio-political allegiances, this arises chiefly because of changes
in their occupations, habits or life-styles, their becoming older,
better-off, bored, bitter, activated by new enthusiasms, and
suchlike stimuli. Moreover, in the more extreme cases in which
people undergo a dedicated *conversion* to a new cause or set of
ideals, it is well-known that this is much more likely to occur for
emotional, Freudian-type reasons than as the result of external
persuasion.

It can be added that there is one more way in which the
balance of interests, attitudes and so on in a society can be
altered. This is by employing the harsh measures which are
favoured by history's tyrants and which are commonly made use
of in periods of violent struggles and revolutions—that is, by
imprisoning, terrorizing, or killing sections of a population. In
past history this method has had mixed success looked at from
the standpoint of its users; for example, much of the religious
persecution during the Reformation and Counter Reformation
was ineffective and had undesired side-effects, as did France's
revocation in 1685 of religious toleration for Huguenots; on the
other hand, the well-known use of terror by French
revolutionaries in the period 1792-94 against real and suspected
"enemies of the people" did help avert the grave danger of
successful foreign invasion. It has to be admitted that in the twentieth century the use of this method in a murderous, widespread way has brought about sought-after results in the short-term: Stalin's and Hitler's regimes notoriously did succeed in exterminating immense numbers of people classed as dangerous or undesirable, Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge did likewise in Cambodia in the 1970s, and their example has been followed on a smaller scale by the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and by other regimes in the Middle East, South America, Africa, and especially the former Yugoslavia. 

However, this approach to rearranging the balance of attitudes etc. in a country, which of course is only open to groups which (when they have the power) are prepared to be ruthlessly authoritarian, has its complications. Take, in particular, the question of nationalist, racial or religious antagonisms within given countries. In some historical situations such antagonisms, being slighter to begin with or being ameliorated e.g. by religious or cultural affinities or by considerable intermarriage, become submerged in naturally occurring cosmopolitan developments, as happened, for instance, in the Roman Empire and among the Anglo-Saxons; while in other situations, despite certain continuing differences, a considerable degree of cosmopolitan harmony was achieved, as, for example, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, past and present Switzerland, and in the immersion in American life of millions of immigrants in the first decades of this century (though that has been less true of very recent massive migration to the USA).

In contrast, in numerous other situations nationalist, racial or religious antagonisms have been acute and have persisted for centuries, and overcoming them by forcible measures, such as the "ethnic cleansing" practised by Serbian etc. troops after the break-up of Yugoslavia, is often not very effective. Stalin did have some success (from his point of view) in the forced relocation of peoples within the USSR, and considerable success was achieved by Turkey and Greece when (after their war and the massacres of 1920-22) they agreed to extensive mutual exchanges of populations. But usually such measures can be effective only when there are relatively few people of undesired race or religion in a given region. Compare too how, because Czechs mostly inhabited one region and Slovaks another region, the break-up of Czechoslovakia on 1st January 1993 was peacefully agreed to (though problems remain for the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia). When, however, there is a large intermingling of antagonistic peoples in the same region—as e.g. in Lebanon, parts of Iraq, parts of India, and in some of the new States that emerged from the USSR, or as is occurring in Western Europe as the result of large-scale migration by Muslims, Poles, and others—little that is really effective is achievable either by the use of brutal State force, or (in the other direction) by State attempts, by means of legal penalties, to enforce compulsory inter-racial harmony.

Justifiable Policies

It thus emerges that there is an irreducible pluralism of socio-political policies, recommendations, exhortations and so on, many of which, providing specific objectives are laid on the
table, can be shown to be justifiable or to have a justifiable core. Of course, in social practice, this is rarely done in a candid, objective way. It would appear, reverting to social categories, that if group disagreements and conflicts are categorical features of society, the same is not quite but is almost true of the conduct of policy-advancements in morally-loaded, facts-twisting ways.

Still, it is usually not difficult for an analyst to cut through obfuscation to the factual content of a policy. Sometimes of course it may be found that a sought objective is not attainable at all—as with such millenial objectives as, say, the elimination of war, or of world poverty given its inseparable connection with the constantly increasing populations of backward countries. Again, as a very common case, a policy may only be attainable in a limited way. Or, what often comes to the same thing, there can be a problem about implementing a viable policy. As an example, it might be reasonably maintained that "If you want cheap, efficient, extensive public transport in big cities, you ought to support stringent restrictions on the use of motor cars in those cities". But (unless indeed eventual oil crises enforce a solution) for the people who, accepting the antecedent, would assert the consequent, there is the problem of bringing about the stated restrictions—in view of the desire so many work-goers have to drive their cars in cities and the entrenched interests of motor car and oil companies.

But our basic analyses can clarify policy claims and counterclaims by formulating implied factual hypothetical imperatives. Not all such hypotheticals will be true; people do frequently make factual mistakes as well as moral and logical ones. But when the facts are or appear to be correct, when a hypothetical imperative is well supported by the known evidence, and a given group is in favour of the hypothetical's antecedent, then the group is justified in following or urging the course of action indicated in the consequent—not with moral absoluteness, but as a sound or sensible thing to do.

**Influence of Pluralists**

If pluralism or complexism is granted to be a true theory about socio-political affairs, it may be asked: What important difference does, or can, knowledge about it, make to those affairs? Moreover, as an associated question, it may be asked: What moral and political attitudes do, or can, social pluralists have?

To the first question the answer is: Not a great difference. This is because, owing to the operation of factors and forces of the various kinds discussed, i.e., owing to the fact that pluralist conditions limit the extent of pluralist awareness, the mass of people, and likewise the mass of politicians and other socio-political agents, will go on in the usual way and have little interest in or knowledge of pluralist truths.

This is not to deny that pluralist awareness does have some influence. Thus, among the non-elite there has always been some instinctive recognition of how society really does go on, despite myths to the contrary that flourish, and this can lead to some spirited resistance to oligarchic etc. forces in trade unions and radical political parties. Then on the other side there is the
question of certain unscrupulous but realistic participants in affairs, notably exemplified by the "Machiavellians" of history.

But as was pointed out in connection with manipulation theories in the analysis of ideology, such leaders almost always have some illusory beliefs about what they were really doing (they would hardly have risen so high if they had not), which places limitations on the extent to which they were pluralists/complexists. Somewhat the same applies to the much more numerous class of "aware" fixers, numbers men, devious operators and so on who play a definite but much less important part in political and other affairs. They can be regarded in some respects as pluralism-minded operators in that they cut through certain received myths and gain some advantages over their more conventional or more gullible competitors. However, while there may be some such people who are shrewd and consistent pluralists in their thought (whether or not they openly admit this), they are few in proportion as most members of the class of fixers etc. can at best be described as quasi-pluralists owing to their retention (in varying and ambivalent ways) of social atomist beliefs in the overriding effectiveness of manipulation, corruption and use of "influence".

In a different way again, as well as quasi-pluralists of the shifty, fixer etc. type there are or have been some quasi-pluralists of a more principled kind to be found in the ranks of anarchists, communists, Trotskyists and other supporters of revolution— including ones today, e.g. in South America, involved in hard struggles against nasty, army-backed regimes. That is to say, some people of these kinds, while dedicated to the struggle against existing elites, probably recognize at least ambivalently that their revolutionary objectives will never be realized, or that if they began to be people like themselves would soon be superseded by the usual kinds of post-revolution careerists, users, etc.

**Policies of Pluralists**

Among pluralism-aware people themselves there are also variations in their particular standpoints (which arise in part because of variations in their own Paretan sentiments). Thus, many pluralists guardedly accept existing democratic systems as being, despite their defects, the best there are. Hence, while being more vigilant and critical than is usual, and in some cases supporting the reform of old parties and other associations or supporting the creation of new more principled ones, they normally go on supporting and voting for some given political party and so on in conventional or customary ways. However, as noted earlier in criticism of some "pluralist-democrats", people who take this stand sometimes exaggerate the extent to which Western countries actually operate in democratic ways and wrongly minimize the part played in affairs by elites and oligarchic processes.

If there are "reluctant democrats" we also have to allow the existence of pluralists who are "reluctant authoritarians", as in the case of some pluralists (and also some anarchists) who were so disgusted by Italian parliamentary politics that they preferred Mussolini's regime. That is to say, the increasingly low level character of democracy and its politicians in some countries,
coupled with the developing phenomena of uncontrollable crime, hard drugs, drug dealing, and so on, may lead some pluralists (along with other people) to prefer other types of regime—such as authoritarian democracy of the Singapore kind, or improved less Stalinist/bureaucratic type Communist regimes that may just possibly arise e.g. in Eastern Europe or China, or forms of “benevolent despotism” yet to emerge.

However, if such people remain genuine pluralists, they will have no illusions about key features of such regimes; they will merely prefer them to available alternatives.

But there are also people who reject such policy and value attitudes and prefer their recognition of pluralism/complexism to be rigorous and uncompromising.

Among these, first of all, there are those with an attitude of withdrawal, of trying to be as apolitical as possible. This may arise out of despair or disgust with politics—as has been known to happen, for instance, with some aware university professors who take care to keep clear even of university politics, and likewise e.g. with some pluralistically-minded workers who, although they have leadership or organizing abilities, refuse to become involved in trade union affairs. This is also the kind of stand notably taken by the writers Voltaire and James Joyce—by Voltaire when he ultimately came down on the maxim, “Let us cultivate our own garden,” and by Joyce when to the social forces bearing down on him he responded with “Silence, exile and cunning”.

A second type of approach is that of people who recognize the inevitability of elite-oligarchic processes, pervasive illusions, and the deceits and hypocrisies commonly found in politics, but who believe in carrying on continual opposition, protest and criticism as best they can in their particular work situations or the particular countries they are in.

One person with such an approach was even Karl Marx in his early libertarian, pre-totalistic phase, as when he advanced the following view in 1843: “To make the future and establish things for all time is not our concern. All the more surely what we now have to do is the uncompromising critical evaluation of all that exists, uncompromising in the sense that our criticism fears neither its own results nor the conflict with the powers that be.” [12] The egregious French pro-Stalinist philosopher, Louis Althusser, naturally regarded this phase of Marx's thought as “pre-Marxist” and bad, whereas the passage in question was adopted as a motto by the Sydney University Libertarians.

Another was Albert Camus who argued, (in The Rebel, and at a time when Sartre was supporting Stalinism) that what was needed was not oppressive “final revolution” but liberating “continual rebellion”. This kind of position was, as we saw earlier, advanced more fully and explicitly by Max Nomad in his advocacy of permanent opposition and protest on the part of the non-elite against the dominance of elites or “predatory wolves”. Likewise, John Anderson in Sydney forcefully argued for the need for groups attached to freedom— including
freedom of thought and criticism—to struggle constantly against the encroachments of forces promoting servility and illusion.

Standpoints of these kinds were naturally brushed aside in the euphoria of radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s and with the continuing faith of so many intellectuals in Marxism-Communism. But perhaps such conceptions of continual opposition or resistance will come to be revived in greater strength in the changed circumstances of contemporary times. In any case they remain an honest uncompromising type of value stand adopted by some pluralists.

Chapter One

[1] For example, in A Pluralistic Universe, New York, Longmans, Green and Co., 1932 (first edition 1909) pp. 322-3. John Anderson saw that there was more to pluralism than, for instance, the atomistic version of it dismissed by the Glasgow University logic professor Robert Latta when he said, inter alia, "The mystic turns from an inexplicable Many to a mysterious One, the pluralist from a One, supposed to be colourless and empty, to a rich unanalysable Many," (Inaugural Lecture 1902, p.30). Anderson, after studying James in depth, developed a view of pluralism of the kind outlined here.


[3] Anderson, a thoroughgoing realist and empiricist philosopher, ill his teachings at Sydney University, criticized and sought to improve on Alexander's theory in certain ways. For a discussion of this, see A.J Baker, Australian Realism, the Systematic Philosophy of John Anderson, C.U.P., 1986, Ch.7.

[4] To be precise, the term "complex proposition"—first used in this sense by John Neville Keynes—refers to quantified (universal or particular) propositions that contain at least one complex term, a "complex term" being either a conjunctive term (e.g. "AB", "ABC") or a disjunctive term (e.g. "Either A or B", "A or BCD") or combinations of these.


[7] As a good military affairs example, S.E. Finer, in his The Man on Horseback, London, Pinter Publishers, second edition 1988, makes a detailed study of military interventions, especially in Third World countries, which provide us with the materials to formulate various complex universal propositions concerning those interventions.

Chapter Two
Compare the influential erroneous views along these lines of Sir Isaiah Berlin and Sir Karl Popper.


Pareto gives a detailed analysis of actions along these lines in the course of making a classification of what he calls "logical actions" and "non-logical actions", Treatise of General Sociology, § 151.

Letters to Bloch, 21 September 1890, and to H. Starkenburg, 25 January, 1894.

Chapter Three


[7] The Mind and Society, § 2053. Hereafter "$..." refers to this work. It is interesting to note that George Orwell, who seems to have had an interest in Pareto's work, in his Nineteen Eighty-Four presents, in effect, an elite—that made up of "inner party" members—which sets out to be an exception to Pareto's rule by remaining in power for ever.

[8] §2254.


[10] Burnham was particularly influential in Australia in the 1940s and he was once commissioned, for a large fee, to write for the Sydney Daily Telegraph. His views along with some of Anderson's were effectively used at that time in public criticisms of the Chifley Government's "Labor bureaucrats".


[13] First developed in A Preface to Democratic Theory, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956, and followed up in
Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy and several other works.


Chapter Four

[4] Compare e.g. Hage and Meeker op cit.
[6] op. cit., p. 401
[8] Originally named Max Nacht, Nomad was an Austrian Pole who settled and spent most of his life in New York. He was strongly influenced by Machajski when he met him in Switzerland, and also in his early days he attended lectures by Michels.
[12] The Decline and Fall of the Raman Empire, Chapter 15 (1776).
[14] Mussolini was something of an intellectual in his earlier days; Dr Salazar of Portugal, although a competent economist, was apparently not especially intellectual in other ways.

Chapter Five

[6] For detailed logical argument along these lines, see J.L. Mackie, “Self-Refutation—A Formal Analysis”, in his...
Chapter Six


[2] *Pareto*, London, Chapman and Hall, 1936. Borkenau also had some influence on Australian misperceptions of Pareto as it appears that when during the war, with other ex-German nationals, Borkenau was deported from England to Australia, on board ship he conducted classes on Pareto to people some of whom became political scientists.

A later curious criticism of a Wittgensteinian-kind which sought to show Pareto's overall procedure was mistaken in principle, was advanced by Peter Winch in *The Idea of a Social...*


[8] Curtin's New Year message (27 December 1941) included: "Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom."

[9] On Carr, compare the comment by Leopold Labedz, "Carr was, of course, only one of a number of intellectuals fascinated with power who at the time of its decline in Britain were looking with nostalgic sympathy at the rising new empire... Carr's own gigantic rationalization was to be his History of Soviet Russia," Survey, March 1988, p. 101.


[13] Whereas, in contrast - as P.P. McGuinness pointed out in The Australian, April 9-10 1994— when a few years ago the Bank of France produced an unwanted 10-franc coin, there was such an outcry the bank eventually had to withdraw it.

[14] Pareto himself gives this example, § 1242 Note 2. He quotes the explorer Charles Stuart.


[16] § 1358.


[18] Compare also his comment: "In individuals sentiments are always more or less complex, sometimes very much so. In making a scientific analysis, therefore, we have to fix our main attention on sentiments, not individuals." § 1137.

[19] Compare Joyce's anxiety to ensure that Ulysses was published on his fortieth birthday, 2 February 1922, which meant that special arrangements had to be made for the first copies to arrive in the Dijon-Paris express—as is described by Richard Ellmann, James Joyce, New and Revised edition, O.U.P., 1982, pp. 523-4.


[22] Quoted by Pareto, § 1793.
[23] Compare Pareto's telling criticism of literary censorship in his *Le Mythe Vertuiste et la litterature immorale*, 1911, at a time when other opponents of censorship were rather cautious about what they said publicly.

Chapter Seven


[2] Reich argued this first in his *The Mass Psychology of Fascism* - a book written in his pro-Communist phase. Later he applied the argument also to Communism, which he described as "Red Fascism".


[5] Compare Janet Radcliffe Richards who, in *The Sceptical Feminist*, Pelican Books, London, 1982, objectively noted the silliness of the view that women should not make use of "male science" (p. 28), along with various other bad arguments and exaggerations of "anti-rational", "strident" etc. feminists.

[6] It may be noted that the Libertarian Society at Sydney University was an early sponsor of critical papers on Miller.


[8] Miller, in "The Tailor Shop" sequence in *Black Spring*, describes how he is pressed tightly and very intimately against a woman in a Manhattan subway train in the rush hour, and the woman stays glued to him in the same position even when the crowd thins out. When she gets off at the Borough Hall stop he decides to get off too and try his luck, but the woman rushes off without giving him so much as a backward look.


Chapter Eight

[1] See letter to F. Kugelmann, 17 April, 1871.


[7] op. cit., passim
Chapter Nine

[4] In his own words: "Non-Religious Ethics has been systematically studied, by many people, only since about 1960. Compared with the other sciences, Non-Religious Ethics is the youngest and the least advanced." Reasons and Persons, O.U.P., 1984, p. 453.
[7] An extreme example along these lines is provided by a big transport strike in Berlin in November, 1932, that was organized by the Communists to help their cause by striking a blow against the government. But the Nazis also wanted to do this to further their ultimate ends, and so, temporarily setting aside their antagonism to the Communists, they united with them in supporting the strike. It was not a good time to go anywhere in Berlin.
[11] More honest was the exercise of spontaneous "justice" by summary execution after capture—as happened (although there was a quick "court martial") in the case of Mussolini.

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